Precession of collimated outflows from young stellar objects

We consider several protostellar systems where either a precessing jet or at least two misaligned jets have been observed. We assume that the precession of jets is caused by tidal interactions in noncoplanar binary systems. For Cep E, V1331 Cyg and RNO 15-FIR the inferred orbital separations and disk radii are in the range 4-160 AU and 1-80 AU, respectively, consistent with those expected for pre-main sequence stars. Furthermore, we assume or use the fact that the source of misaligned outflows is a binary, and evaluate the lengthscale over which the jets should precess as a result of tidal interactions. For T Tau, HH1 VLA 1/2 and HH 24 SVS63, it may be possible to detect a bending of the jets rather than 'wiggling'. In HH 111 IRS and L1551 IRS5, 'wiggling' may be detected on the current observed scale. Our results are consistent with the existence of noncoplanar binary systems in which tidal interactions induce jets to precess.Comment: 5 pages (including 1 figure), LaTeX, uses emulateapj.sty, to be published in ApJ Letters, also available at http://www.ucolick.org/~ct/home.html and http://www.tls-tautenburg.de/research/research.htm

Generalizing Quantum Mechanics for Quantum Gravity

`How do our ideas about quantum mechanics affect our understanding of spacetime?' This familiar question leads to quantum gravity. The complementary question is also important: `How do our ideas about spacetime affect our understanding of quantum mechanics?' This short abstract of a talk given at the Gafka2004 conference contains a very brief summary of some of the author's papers on generalizations of quantum mechanics needed for quantum gravity. The need for generalization is motivated. The generalized quantum theory framework for such generalizations is described and illustrated for usual quantum mechanics and a number of examples to which it does not apply. These include spacetime alternatives extended over time, time-neutral quantum theory, quantum field theory in fixed background spacetime not foliable by spacelike surfaces, and systems with histories that move both forward and backward in time. A fully four-dimensional, sum-over-histories generalized quantum theory of cosmological geometries is briefly described. The usual formulation of quantum theory in terms of states evolving unitarily through spacelike surfaces is an approximation to this more general framework that is appropriate in the late universe for coarse-grained descriptions of geometry in which spacetime behaves classically. This abstract is unlikely to be clear on its own, but references are provided to the author's works where the ideas can be followed up.Comment: 8 pages, LATEX, a very brief abstract of much wor

On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony

If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible

Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’

In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. In this paper I shall first argue that the cases given do not motivate positing the notion of a disqualifier. Conclusions drawn about the existence of disqualifiers do not follow from the considerations advanced. Second, I shall directly argue that an essential core claim of those who would posit disqualifiers, that so-called disqualifiers actually do prevent epistemic bases from conferring justification, is false. In sum, I shall argue that there are no disqualifiers

On justifications and excuses

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them

On the Nature of Intellectual Vice

Vice epistemology, as Quassim Cassam understands it, is the study of the nature, identity, and significance of the epistemic vices. But what makes an intellectual vice a vice? Cassam calls his own view “Obstructivism” – intellectual vices are those traits, thinking styles, or attitudes that systematically obstruct the acquisition, retention, and transmission of knowledge. I shall argue that Cassam’s account is an improvement upon virtue-reliabilism, and that it fares better against what I call Montmarquet’s objection than its immediate rivals. Nevertheless, I contend that it does not go far enough — Montmarquet’s objection stands. I conclude that either the objection needs to be answered in some other way, or else proponents of Obstructivism need to explain why their account of the nature of the intellectual vices does not have the counterintuitive consequences it appears to have. Alternatively, another account of the nature of the intellectual vices needs to be sought