Anharmonic Torsional Stiffness of DNA Revealed under Small External Torques

DNA supercoiling plays an important role in a variety of cellular processes. The torsional stress related with supercoiling may be also involved in gene regulation through the local structure and dynamics of the double helix. To check this possibility steady torsional stress was applied to DNA in the course of all-atom molecular dynamics simulations. It is found that small static untwisting significantly reduces the torsional persistence length ($l_t$) of GC-alternating DNA. For the AT-alternating sequence a smaller effect of the opposite sign is observed. As a result, the measured $l_t$ values are similar under zero stress, but diverge with untwisting. The effect is traced to sequence-specific asymmetry of local torsional fluctuations, and it should be small in long random DNA due to compensation. In contrast, the stiffness of special short sequences can vary significantly, which gives a simple possibility of gene regulation via probabilities of strong fluctuations. These results have important implications for the role of local DNA twisting in complexes with transcription factors.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, to appear in Phys. Rev. Let

The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s So Different from the 1970s?

We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.

Encapsulated formulation of the Selective Frequency Damping method

We present an alternative "encapsulated" formulation of the Selective Frequency Damping method for finding unstable equilibria of dynamical systems, which is particularly useful when analysing the stability of fluid flows. The formulation makes use of splitting methods, which means that it can be wrapped around an existing time-stepping code as a "black box". The method is first applied to a scalar problem in order to analyse its stability and highlight the roles of the control coefficient $\chi$ and the filter width $\Delta$ in the convergence (or not) towards the steady-state. Then the steady-state of the incompressible flow past a two-dimensional cylinder at $Re=100$, obtained with a code which implements the spectral/hp element method, is presented

It's What You Say Not What You Pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.Change, Incentives, Coordination, Communication, Experiments, Organizations

"Observability and Overcoming Coordination Failure in Organizations"

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimentaIncentives, Coordination, Observation, Experiments, Organizations

The macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks: Why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?

We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.Great moderation, supply shocks, stagflation, monetary policy, real wage rigidities