Reply to "Comment on `Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography'"

This is a Reply to the Comment by Lydersen et al. [arXiv: 1106.3756v1]

Quasar outflow energetics from broad absorption line variability

Quasar outflows have long been recognized as potential contributors to the co-evolution between supermassive black holes (SMBHs) and their host galaxies. The role of outflows in AGN feedback processes can be better understood by placing observational constraints on wind locations and kinetic energies. We utilize broad absorption line (BAL) variability to investigate the properties of a sample of 71 BAL quasars with P$\thinspace$V broad absorption. The presence of P$\thinspace$V BALs indicates that other BALs like C$\thinspace$IV are saturated, such that variability in those lines favours clouds crossing the line of sight. We use these constraints with measurements of BAL variability to estimate outflow locations and energetics. Our data set consists of multiple-epoch spectra from the Sloan Digital Sky Survey and MDM Observatory. We detect significant (4$\sigma$) BAL variations from 10 quasars in our sample over rest frame time-scales between < 0.2-3.8 yr. Our derived distances for the 10 variable outflows are nominally < 1-10 pc from the SMBH using the transverse-motion scenario, and < 100-1000 pc from the central source using ionization-change considerations. These distances, in combination with the estimated high outflow column densities (i.e. $N_{\textrm{H}}$ > 10$^{22}$ cm$^{-2}$), yield outflow kinetic luminosities between ~ 0.001-1 times the bolometric luminosity of the quasar, indicating that many absorber energies within our sample are viable for AGN feedback.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables, 1 supplementary figure, accepted to MNRA

Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution

In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of passive optical components has been suggested. However, to date, there is no quantitative bound that specifies such components in relation to the security of the system. Here, we turn the Trojan-horse attack into an information leakage problem. This allows us quantify the system security and relate it to the specification of the optical elements. The analysis is supported by the experimental characterization, within the operation regime, of reflectivity and transmission of the optical components most relevant to security.Comment: 18 pages, 11 figures. Some typos correcte