dacl10k: Benchmark for Semantic Bridge Damage Segmentation

Reliably identifying reinforced concrete defects (RCDs)plays a crucial role in assessing the structural integrity, traffic safety, and long-term durability of concrete bridges, which represent the most common bridge type worldwide. Nevertheless, available datasets for the recognition of RCDs are small in terms of size and class variety, which questions their usability in real-world scenarios and their role as a benchmark. Our contribution to this problem is "dacl10k", an exceptionally diverse RCD dataset for multi-label semantic segmentation comprising 9,920 images deriving from real-world bridge inspections. dacl10k distinguishes 12 damage classes as well as 6 bridge components that play a key role in the building assessment and recommending actions, such as restoration works, traffic load limitations or bridge closures. In addition, we examine baseline models for dacl10k which are subsequently evaluated. The best model achieves a mean intersection-over-union of 0.42 on the test set. dacl10k, along with our baselines, will be openly accessible to researchers and practitioners, representing the currently biggest dataset regarding number of images and class diversity for semantic segmentation in the bridge inspection domain.Comment: 23 pages, 6 figure

Rekonvaleszenz der Demokratie? Die Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte im internationalen Vergleich

Nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 wurden in einigen westlichen Demokratien bürgerliche Freiheitsrechte durch eine verschärfte Sicherheitsgesetzgebung empfindlich beschnitten. Allerdings zeigen sich im folgenden Jahrzehnt deutliche Erholungseffekte, die wiederum zwischen den Ländern variieren. Auf Grundlage von Daten u. a. des Demokratiebarometers gehen wir der Frage nach, welche Faktoren die unterschiedliche Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte in 22 OECD-Staaten zwischen 2002 und 2012 erklären können. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein starkes und unabhängiges Rechtssystem und eine liberale politische Kultur den Wiederaufbau von Freiheitsrechten fördern, während die Betroffenheit von terroristischen Anschlägen keinen signifikanten Effekt auf die Erholung der Freiheitsrechte hat. Die Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass Demokratien dann zu einer Selbstkorrektur im Bereich der Sicherheitsgesetzgebung fähig sind, wenn sie durch rechtsstaatliche Institutionen eingehegt werden, die durch eine liberale politische Kultur unterfüttert sind

Ökonomie der Zeit: Does Time Matter?

Wie in vielen anderen Weltregionen soll der halbjährliche Wechsel zwischen Winter- und Sommerzeit in der EU abgeschafft werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob es eine optimale Zeitzone für ein Land gibt und ob ein „Zeitzonenflickenteppich“ tatsächlich mit hohen ökonomischen Kosten einhergeht. Die Zeitmessung ist ein rein nominales Konstrukt und Veränderungen sollten deshalb langfristig ohne spürbare Folgen bleiben. Von praktischer Relevanz ist allein die Sonnenscheindauer

The EU Self-Surplus Puzzle: An Indication of VAT Fraud?

The world runs a trade surplus with itself: the reported values of exports exceed the reported values of imports. This is a logically impossible but well-known empirical fact. Less well-known is the fact that, in recent years, more than 80 percent of the global surplus is a trade surplus that the EU has with itself. In this paper, we show that this EU self-surplus amounts to a striking 307 billion Euro in 2018. It persists in goods, services, and secondary income accounts. It also exists within the Euro Area, and is strongest between neighboring countries. Around the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, the EU self-surplus quadrupled. Balance of payments data from the United Kingdom appear highly distorted. We argue that these phenomena are not only due to measurement error. Rather, a large fraction of the EU's self-surplus puzzle seems related to fraud in value added tax. The resulting loss in tax income could amount to as much as 64 billion Euro per year

The EU self-surplus puzzle: an indication of VAT fraud?

The world runs a trade surplus with itself: the reported values of exports exceed the reported values of imports. This is logically impossible but a well-known empirical fact. Less well-known is the fact that, in recent years, the EU has a trade surplus with itself that amounts to more than 80% of the global surplus. In this paper, we show that this EU self-surplus is worth a striking 307 billion Euro in 2018, equaling 1.9% of the Union's GDP, which persists both in goods and services trade accounts. We further examine discrepancies in goods and services trade accounts at the country and country pair level. These are strongest between neighboring countries and exist for members of the Euro Area as well as non-members. Around the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, the EU self-surplus quadrupled. Our estimations suggest that Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden are EU Members with the most inaccurate statistical regimes. We observe systematic biases which unlikely root in random measurement error. By contrast, we suspect that a large fraction of the EU's self-surplus puzzle seems related to fraud in value added tax (VAT). VAT exemptions for exporters provide strong incentives for the over-declaration of true export values. The resulting loss in tax income could amount to as much as 64 billion Euro per year

What Do We Really Know about the Transatlantic Current Account?

Do the U.S. have a current account surplus or a deficit with the EU? Since 2009, official sources disagree: The U.S. Department of Commerce claims a consistent U.S. surplus while Eurostat reports the opposite. International transactions are notoriously difficult to measure accurately, but the size of the transatlantic discrepancy is extremely substantial: over the last ten years, it has grown to a cumulated 1 Trillion USD. In times of severe trade policy disagreements across the Atlantic, this gap is obviously problematic. This paper tries to dissect the transatlantic reporting gap. Two country-pairs – U.S.-UK and U.S.-Netherlands – account for almost the entire transatlantic discrepancy, which, in 2017, stood at about 180 billion USD. In the former case, national statistics on net services trade disagree by as much as 55 billion USD; in the latter case, there is a reporting difference in net primary income of about 60 billion USD. In contrast, data provided by the Bundesbank for the German-U.S. current account closely mirror U.S. data. Non-random measurement error and, possibly, deliberate manipulation seem to cause the observed discrepancies

Hard Brexit ahead: breaking the deadlock

Negotiations between the EU and the UK have reached deadlock, with the positions of the UK (no backstop, no single market, no customs union, no dependence on the ECJ), Ireland (backstop, no hard border) and the EU (backstop, indivisibility of the four freedoms, no cherry-picking) all being mutually exclusive. In the current stage of negotiations (or lack of, as the EU insists there will be no re-opening of talks) a hard Brexit is the only possible equilibrium. From a game theoretical perspective, the backstop is inacceptable for any British government as it permanently manifests only one sub-game perfect equilibrium, which is the backstop itself. Conversely, a time limitation on the backstop is unacceptable for the EU, as it risks manifesting another sub-game perfect equilibrium, which is hard Brexit. There­fore, neither renegotiation of the backstop nor elections or the extension of the withdrawal period of Article 50 TFEU can break the deadlock. A first-best solution, which from a trade perspective would be the continuation of UK membership in a reformed EU, is beyond the scope of this analysis. We instead take Brexit as given and discuss terms that limit its political and economic damage. We focus on the contentious issues only; we do not elaborate on the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement itself, for which a settlement has been reached that appears to be satisfactory for both sides. Because the core debate revolves around the backstop and the issue of a possible border between the Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, we mostly deal with trade policy arrangements