Intentions and Social Interactions

In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions - affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a dynamic psychological game under incomplete information. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. I discuss how being tolerated but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually beneficial trades, the choice of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its implication for political correctness and affirmative action.guilt, intentions, psychological game, second-order beliefs, social interaction

Autocratic rule in ethnically-diverse societies

An autocrat who is politically insecure may not invest in income-enhancing goods like education, roads, the rule of law, etc. The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination exacerbate an autocrat's fear of the negative effect of high income or income-enhancing investments like public education on his political survival. I show that in such ethnically-diverse societies, kleptocrats may be better off with a bigger share of a smaller national income than they are with a smaller share of a bigger national income. I discuss applications and limitations of my results.

Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For example, discrimination based on immutable or prohibitively unalterable characteristics such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is driven by either racial (gender or ethnic) discrimination or generational discrimination (i.e., young versus old). When the conflicts are mutually exclusive, I find that racial discrimination is socially intolerable for a much wider range of parameter values relative to generational discrimination. When they are not mutually exclusive, I find that racial discrimination can be socially intolerable while generational discrimination is socially tolerable. The converse is not true. My results are not driven by a stronger intrinsic aversion to discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics. I am able to explain why some forms of discrimination (e.g., racism) are much less tolerable than other forms of discrimination (e.g., age discrimination) without making any value judgements about either form of discrimination.conflict, contest, discrimination, race, generation, rent-seeking

Guilt aversion and insincerity-induced disutility

Suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. Furthermore, suppose the inviter extends an insincere invitation hoping that you will reject it and thereby assuage his guilt. I characterize the perfect Bayesian psychological equilibria of this social interaction. I discuss the implications of insincerity aversion for the acquisition of information, the likelihood of cooperation, political correctness, choice of identity, psychological forward induction, and models with interdependent preference types. Note: This paper was previously circulated under the titles "intentions and social interaction" and "a psychological game with the interdependent preference types." The current version is a SIGNIFICANTLY revised version and supersedes both earlier versions.

Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

History is replete with overt discrimination of various forms. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For example, discrimination based on immutable or prohibitively unalterable characteristics such as race or gender is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple model of conflict which is driven by either racial (gender) discrimination or generational discrimination (i.e., young versus old). I show that there exist parameters of the model where racial (gender) discrimination leads to conflict but generational discrimination does not.

A psychological game with interdependent preference types

Suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. Interestingly, this social interaction is, under certain conditions a game with interdependent preferences types combined with either (i) a psychological game, or (ii) a standard Bayesian game. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, there exists a unique equilibrium in which a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance.

Misery loves company: social influence and the supply/pricing decision of a popular restaurant

In a model with social influence, Becker (1991) offers an explanation for why popular restaurants with excess demand do not raise their prices. He also offers an explanation for why such restaurants do not increase supply but admits his explanation may be weak. Becker does not provide a formal analysis of why supply is not increased. In this paper, I present a formal analysis of Becker's argument based on a different kind of social influence. I also offer an alternative explanation of why some restaurants are popular and others are not. Finally, while Becker (1991) includes market demand and the gap between market demand and supply as separate arguements in the customers' demand function to explan why supply and price are not increased. I only include the gap between demand and supply in the customers' utility function to explain both puzzles.cost of failure; excess demand; social influence

Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment

I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset mindful of the fact that an encroacher’s valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset owner’s investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner engage in a contest over the control of the asset after investment has taken place. A standard result is that the asset owner will underinvest in the asset relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. Contrary to this standard result, I find that when the interaction between the asset owner and the encroacher is infinitely repeated and the encroacher has some bargaining power over the size of the transfer from the asset owner to him, then there is a cooperative equilibrium in which the asset owner finds it optimal to over-invest in the asset when property rights are incomplete relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. Overinvestment is used to induce cooperation. However, this result depends on the encroacher’s bargaining power or, more generally, whether the transfer is an increasing function of investment.contests, incomplete information, property rights, investment, transfers

Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment

I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset mindful of the fact that an encroacher’s valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset owner’s investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner engage in a contest over the control of the asset after investment has taken place. A standard result is that the asset owner will underinvest in the asset relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. To check the robustness of this result, I extend the benchmark model by changing (i) the nature of competition over property rights, (ii) the information that the players have about each other, (iii) the duration of the interaction between the players, and (iv) the bargaining power of the encroacher. Contrary to recent results, I find that when the interaction between the asset owner and the encroacher is infinitely repeated and the encroacher has some bargaining power over the size of the transfer from the asset owner to him, then there is a cooperative equilibrium in which the asset owner finds it optimal to over-invest in the asset when property rights are incomplete relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. Overinvestment is used to induce cooperation. However, this result depends on the nature of transfers or the encroacher’s bargaining power.contests, incomplete information, property rights, investment, transfers