63 research outputs found
The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal)Performance: A Stability-Oriented Assessment
The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties on European Union (TEU), especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised to virtually guarantee price stability and a "strong" euro. Actual developments have shattered these hopes in a rather drastic way. Despite the dismal monetary developments, conventional wisdom holds that neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Yet, the euro's performance over 2000–01 is generally seen as a puzzle. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-) performance, explores the institutional setting and traditions behind the ECB's conduct, and scrutinizes the rationale that inspired its interest rate policies.
Easy Money through the Back Door: The Markets vs. the ECB
This paper assesses the performance of the European Central Bank (ECB) over the first two years of Europe's new policy regime. The verdict is that the ECB was not actually in charge, as the markets took over and imposed easy money on the euro zone. It is argued that the causes for the ECB's loss of effective control over the currency and monetary stance lie partly in the low-growth legacies of unsound macro policies inflicted upon Europe over the 1990s. The ECB made matters worse, though, first by failing to communicate effectively and coherently with financial market participants and, second, by playing against the markets' dominant theme: growth. This resulted in a time-inconsistency problem: attempts to prop up the euro through narrowing the current interest rate spread vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar were perceived as risking the euro zone's growth prospects and hence the sustainability of tighter money in the future. Under such conditions, interest rate hikes might then weaken rather than strengthen the currency. A more balanced and proactive attitude toward growth, and medium-term orientation as regards inflation, might have both reduced inflation in the short run and improved growth in the longer run. The recent short run of impressive GDP and employment growth spurred by easy money embarrasses the structural myth, and underlines that the ECB was not actually in charge.
Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland’s Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany After the War
This paper investigates the (re-) establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on the ‘independence’ of the central bank, which, together with a ‘stability-orientation’ in monetary policy, proved a lasting German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to a widespread presumption, Ordoliberalism, the dominant contemporary force within the German economics profession widely held to have shaped the new economic order of West Germany called ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy), is found to have had no such impact on the country’s emerging monetary order at all. In fact, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and some key ideas underlying Ordoliberalism will be identified. Nor can an alternative – more Keynesian – policy regime and model of central bank independence that was developed in the mid 1950s by the Economic Advisory Council of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s famous first economics minister, claim any credit for the eventual legal status of the central bank that became enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957; a regime that subsequently remained untouched despite the (Keynesian) ‘Stability and Growth Act’ of 1967. It appears that, while contemporary economic theory had no decisive influence on the outcome, the central bank’s role as a political actor in its own right and in carving public opinion should not be underestimated in explaining a peculiar German tradition that was finally exported to Europe in the 1990s. Key words: central banking, central bank independence, Ordoliberalism, Keynesianism, monetarism JEL classifications: B22, B31, E50central banking, central bank independence, Ordoliberalism, Keynesianism, monetarism
On the 'Burden' of German Unification: The Economic Consequences of Messrs. Waigel and Tietmeyer
This paper investigates the causes of western Germany's remarkably poor performance since 1992. The paper challenges the view that the poor record of the nineties, particularly the marked deterioration in public finances since unification, might be largely attributable to unification. Instead, the analysis highlights the role of ill-timed and overly ambitious fiscal consolidation in conjunction with tight monetary policies of an exceptional length and degree. The issue of fiscal sustainability and Germany's fiscal and monetary policies are assessed both in the light of economic theory and in comparison to the best practices of other more successful countries. The analysis concludes that Germany's dismal record of the nineties must not be seen as a direct and apparently inevitable result of unification. Rather, the record arose as a perfectly unnecessary consequence of unsound macro demand policies conducted under the Bundesbank's dictate in response to it, policies that caused the severe and protracted de-stabilization of western Germany in the first place.
Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence
This paper challenges the time-inconsistency case for central bank independence. It argues that the time-inconsistency literature not only seriously confuses the substance of the rules versus discretion debate, but also posits an implausible view of monetary policy. Most worrisome, the inflationary bias featured prominently in the time-inconsistency literature has encouraged the development of a dangerously one-sided approach to central bank independence that entirely ignores the potential risks involved in maximizing central bankers' latitude for discretion. The analysis shows that a more balanced and symmetric approach to central bank independence is urgently warranted. The views of Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman are shown to shed some illuminating and disconcerting light on a fashionable free-lunch promise that is based on rather shallow theoretical foundations.time inconsistency, central bank independence, monetary policy, rules versus discretion, credibility
Uncertainty, Conventional Behavior, and Economic Sociology
This paper addresses the problem of the conceptualization of social structure and its relationship to human agency in economic sociology. The background is provided by John Maynard Keynes's observations on the effects of uncertainty and conventional behavior on the stock market; the analysis consists of a comparison of the social ontologies of the French Intersubjectivist School and the Economics as Social Theory Project in the light of these observations. The theoretical argument is followed by concrete examples drawn from a prominent recent study of the stock market boom of the 1990s.
Insuring Against Private Capital Flows: Is It Worth the Premium? What Are the Alternatives?
Global Imbalances, the U.S. Dollar, and How the Crisis at the Core of Global Finance Spread to 'Self-Insuring' Emerging Market Economies
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