1 research outputs found
DolphinAtack: Inaudible Voice Commands
Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an
increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various
systems into voice controllable systems(VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows
that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control
the systems. Hidden voice commands, though hidden, are nonetheless audible. In
this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that
modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f > 20 kHz) to achieve
inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the
modulated low frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated,
recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems.
We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including
Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By
injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few
proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime
call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode,
and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose
hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to
detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine
(SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to
inaudible voice command attacks.Comment: 15 pages, 17 figure