The Viability of Cooperation Based on Interpersonal Commitment

A prominent explanation of cooperation in repeated exchange is reciprocity (e.g. Axelrod, 1984). However, empirical studies indicate that exchange partners are often much less intent on keeping the books balanced than Axelrod suggested. In particular, there is evidence for commitment behavior, indicating that people tend to build long-term cooperative relationships characterised by largely unconditional cooperation, and are inclined to hold on to them even when this appears to contradict self-interest. Using an agent-based computational model, we examine whether in a competitive environment commitment can be a more successful strategy than reciprocity. We move beyond previous computational models by proposing a method that allows to systematically explore an infinite space of possible exchange strategies. We use this method to carry out two sets of simulation experiments designed to assess the viability of commitment against a large set of potential competitors. In the first experiment, we find that although unconditional cooperation makes strategies vulnerable to exploitation, a strategy of commitment benefits more from being more unconditionally cooperative. The second experiment shows that tolerance improves the performance of reciprocity strategies but does not make them more successful than commitment. To explicate the underlying mechanism, we also study the spontaneous formation of exchange network structures in the simulated populations. It turns out that commitment strategies benefit from efficient networking: they spontaneously create a structure of exchange relations that ensures efficient division of labor. The problem with stricter reciprocity strategies is that they tend to spread interaction requests randomly across the population, to keep relations in balance. During times of great scarcity of exchange partners this structure is inefficient because it generates overlapping personal networks so that often too many people try to interact with the same partner at the same time.Interpersonal Commitment, Fairness, Reciprocity, Agent-Based Simulation, Help Exchange, Evolution

Growth and Economic Policy: Are There Speed Limits to Real Convergence?

Real convergence in the recently acceded EU member states (RAMS) is taking place in a new environment, with important implications for convergence and vulnerabilities. Financial liberalization can increase temporary imbalances, while financial integration provides the necessary external finance to support the larger current account deficits involved. Thus, periods during which relative prices are distorted and resources are not reallocated to reach a new equilibrium can be lengthened. When prices are sticky, the exchange rate regime matters in the short run: a fixed exchange rate regime generates a larger current account deficit than a flexible exchange rate regime. That is, the extent of vulnerability to adjustment risk will depend on several factors, and trade-offs between these, including price stickiness, the extent of unhedged balance sheet exposures, and the degree of nominal flexibility afforded by the exchange rate regime. Financial liberalization and integration may also lead to sizable changes in th  composition of final demand, and through this, considerable movements in the equilibrium real exchange rate. It may therefore be a challenging task for policymakers to achieve fast and steady nominal convergence in certain phases of convergence in this new environment. The paper discusses the challenges policymakers in RAMS face and the policies that can make the convergence process faster and smoother.real and financial convergence, financial integration, recently acceded EU member states, Sz�kely, Watson