80 research outputs found

    Retroactive subjectivity in documentary film

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    A thematic apperception comparison of stuttering and non-stuttering children

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    Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston Universit

    Richard Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. ix + 274

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    What to do when the world doesn't play along: life after moral error theory

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    This work addresses the ‘what next?’ question for moral discourse, which concerns the best choice of action given the truth of the moral error theory. The moral error theory comprises two claims: (i) that moral discourse is used assertorically, and (ii) that moral assertions systematically fail to state truths. The upshot of the moral error theory is that nothing is really right or wrong—indeed, that the very idea of things being right or wrong is fundamentally mistaken. And yet, I argue, there are strong ar-guments in favour of moral error theory. With such far-reaching implications, we’d do well to have some guidance regarding what we ought to do upon coming to be-lieve that the moral error theory is true. In the first part of this work, I evaluate the answers to the ‘what next?’ question that have been proposed in the current literature. These include a systematic revision of our moral concepts (revisionism), preserving moral language in the spirit of a use-ful fiction (fictionalism), ridding ourselves of moral discourse entirely (abolitionism), and making do with our current erroneous moral discourse (conservationism). I ar-gue that none of the first three proposals offer us an entirely satisfactory answer to the ‘what next?’ question. Conservationism is the most promising solution still on the table. However, conservationism is yet to be fully developed. In the second part of this work, I develop and motivate my own version of conservationism, and show that it is the most attractive response to the ‘what next?’ question; one that is capable of se-curing the many desirable practical goods that our moral practices provide

    VIII—Situational Dependence and Blame’s Arrow

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    A looming deadline. A difficult situation at home. A heated phone conversation that redirects our attention. Certain features of our circumstances can be (at least partially) excusing; sometimes, agents who act wrongly in the face of circumstantial pressures are not (that) blameworthy for having done so. But we’re rather bad at detecting these factors that excuse others from blame. When put together, these two observations yield an under-appreciated problem: we fall short of procedural norms of blame in fairly systematic ways

    Moral Kombat: Analytic Naturalism and Moral Disagreement

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    The art of connecting: an exploration of art-based attunement in art psychotherapy

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    This article explores the concept of attunement from its initial experience within the dyadic mother-infant experience to the art-therapeutic relationship. It suggests that the three-way relationship characterizing the art-therapeutic work lends itself to communication within which shared experience and in turn, shared meaning and a sense of self, can be gained. Through a case example and a literature review, the role of the art and the vitality affects inherent in use of art materials as facilitators of this capacity to share, are brought to focus. Drawing mainly on psychological, psychoanalytic and child developmental perspectives, the potential part taken by the therapist and his limitations are examined.Keywords: attunement, cross-modal communication, primary and secondary subjectivity, dyadic and triadic communication, vitality affects

    Hypocrisy and Moral Authority

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    Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems

    SPECIFICATION AND PROCUREMENT OF CP-5 FUEL TUBES.

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    Contains the specifications of CP-5 fuel tubes

    Moral Kombat: Analytic Naturalism and Moral Disagreement

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    Moral naturalists are often said to have trouble making sense of inter-communal moral disagreements. The culprit is typically thought to be the naturalist’s metasemantics and its implications for sameness of meaning across communities. The most familiar incarnation of this metasemantic challenge is the Moral Twin Earth argument. We address the challenge from the perspective of analytic naturalism, and argue that making sense of inter-communal moral disagreement creates no special issues for this view
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