2 research outputs found
Taxation and Development: a Review of Donor Support to Strengthen Tax Systems in Developing Countries
Recent years have seen a growing interest among donors on taxation in developing countries. This reflects a concern for domestic revenue mobilization to finance public goods and services, as well as recognition of the centrality of taxation for growth and redistribution. The global financial crisis has also led many donor countries to pay more attention to the extent and effectiveness of the aid they provide, and to ensuring that they support rather than discourage the developing countriesā own revenue-raising efforts. This paper reviews the state of knowledge on aid and tax reform in developing countries, with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Four main issues are addressed: (1) impacts of donor assistance to strengthen tax systems, including what has worked, or not, and why; (2) challenges in āscaling upā donor efforts; (3) how to best provide assistance to reform tax systems; and (4) knowledge gaps to be filled in order to design better donor interventions. The paper argues that donors should complement the traditional ātechnicalā approach to tax reform with measures that encourage constructive engagement between governments and citizens over tax issues.Department for International DevelopmentBill and Melinda Gates Foundatio
The āPeter Pan Syndromeā in Emerging Markets: The Productivity-Transparency Trade-off in IT Adoption
Firms make investments in technology to increase productivity. But in emerging markets, where a culture of informality is widespread, information technology (IT) investments leading to greater transparency can impose a cost through higher taxes and need for regulatory compliance. This tendency of ļ¬rms to avoid productivity-enhancing technologies and remain small to avoid transparency has been dubbed the āPeter Pan Syndrome.ā We examine whether ļ¬rms make the tradeoļ¬ between productivity and transparency by examining IT adoption in the Indian retail sector. We ļ¬nd that computer technology adoption is lower when ļ¬rms have motivations to avoid transparency. Speciļ¬cally, technology adoption is lower when there is greater corruption, but higher when there is better enforcement and auditing. So ļ¬rms have a higher productivity gain threshold to adopt computers in corrupt business environments with patchy and variable enforcement of the tax laws. Not accounting for this motivation to hide from the formal sector underestimates productivity gains from computer adoption. Thus in addition to their direct eļ¬ects on the economy, enforcement, auditing and corruption can have indirect eļ¬ects through their negative impact on adoption of productivity enhancing technologies that also increase operational transparency