Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper addresses two side effects of corporate lobbying on firm value in the pharmaceutical industry. Employing corporate lobbying and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval data for the period from 1998 to 2013, we find that lobbying firms have a 67.3 percent higher chance that their new prescription drugs are approved by the FDA than non-lobbying firms. On the 3-day window surrounding FDA approval announcements, lobbying firms yield, on average, a 1.1% higher market reaction than non-lobbying peers. However, we also find that insiders in lobbying firms abnormally purchase their own stocks prior to FDA approvals. These opportunistic purchases substantially increase a firm’s litigation risk. Our evidence highlights the ambivalence of lobbying. While lobbying enhances firm value, it also offers an opportunity for insiders to trade their shares first by exploiting private information that eventually hurts firm value

Natural Disaster Risk and Corporate Leverage

Firms located in more disaster-prone counties adopt more conservative leverage policies than those in less disaster-prone counties. Compared to peers in the least disastrous areas, firms in the most disastrous areas are less levered by 3.6 percentage points, equivalent of foregoing $13.47 million. We argue that this systematic difference in leverage is attributed to elevated operating disruption, increased cost of capital, and tightened financial flexibility. Our findings indicate that firms incorporate natural disaster risk in financing decision, which is consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure

Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness

We show that firm‐specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination‐informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery. Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of enhanced voluntary disclosure quality

Do Unions Affect Innovation?

We examine the effect of unionization on firm innovation, using a regression discontinuity design that relies on “locally” exogenous variation generated by elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. Passing a union election results in an 8.7% (12.5%) decline in patent quantity (quality) three years after the election. A reduction in R&D expenditures, reduced productivity of inventors, and departures of innovative inventors appear to be plausible underlying mechanisms through which unionization impedes firm innovation. In response to unionization, firms move their innovation activities away from states where union elections win. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of unionization

Competition law reform and firm performance: Evidence from developing countries

We examine the effects of competition laws on firm performance in East Asian countries that have enacted antitrust legislation in the last three decades. Exploiting the staggered changes of these laws as quasi-exogenous shocks, we find that strengthened competition laws improve firm performance. Treated firms increase R&D investments and efficiency in inventory and asset management, while free cash flow decreases after reforms. Also, the effect of competition laws on firm performance is stronger with weaker corporate governance. Our findings indicate that government intervention promoting competitive market environments could benefit corporate owners in emerging markets where corporate governance is often substandard

Green Innovation and the Value of Multinationality

When do multinational corporations (MNCs) derive the most from internalizing the transfer of proprietary technological know how? We revisit this question, which lies at the core of theories on multinationality and performance, from the perspective of corporate strategy involving the mix of green versus non-green innovation effort and a foreign operations focus on countries with high-versus-low environmental standards. We find that high exposure to foreign markets with more stringent environmental regulations stimulates MNCs’ green patent applications. We further show that MNCs’ environmental competitive advantage obtained through green innovation activities, coupled with exposure to foreign countries with high environmental standards, increases firm value in the long run. However, this long-run advantage produces economic rents only when foreign countries have a common-law legal system, effective government, and high growth. Finally, the pursuit of green (or even non-green) innovation while competing in polluting industries is positively associated with market value. Overall, our study highlights that green technology development is a main source of value creation for multinationals

Environmental Regulation and the Cost of Bank Loans: International Evidence

Using a sample of 27 countries between 1990 and 2014, we find that banks charge a higher interest rate on their loans when lending to firms that face more stringent environmental regulations. Further, we show that firms facing such regulations maintain lower financial leverage, incur more operating expenses, and have fewer banks participating in their loan syndicate. The results of the subsample analysis suggest that the increase in the cost of bank loans is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms in industries with high environmental litigation risk, and those located in bank-based economies. Overall, our results provide evidence that the observed higher loan spread is the result of environmentally sensitive lending practices by banks

Top VC IPO underpricing

Highlights Top VCs are the underwriters\u27 best clients and thus should get the best service. Top VC IPOs receive more analyst coverage than non-top VC IPOs. Top VC IPOs are twice as underpriced as non-top VC IPOs. Regulatory shocks starting in 2000 eliminated the value of all-star coverage. The quid pro quo of underpricing for research coverage disappeared. Abstract Before the IPO bubble burst, the first day return for IPOs backed by top VC firms was double that of non-top VC IPOs. Top VC IPOs were also twice as likely to receive all-star analyst coverage and suffered twice as large negative returns upon lockup expiration. We argue that this was not a coincidence. Underwriters benefited from underpricing vis-à-vis allocation strategies whereas VCs gain from information momentum which allows them to cash-out at higher prices at lockup expiration. All-stars are a scarce resource underwriters allocate to their best clients (top VCs) who bring them repeat business. Post-bubble, regulatory shocks restricted preferential IPO allocations and reduced the value of all-star coverage. Consequently, these relations disappeared indicating that regulatory changes likely had the desired effect

Corporate Political Strategies and Return Predictability

We assess whether observable corporate political strategies can serve as channels of value relevant political information flow into stock prices and form the basis for profitable return predictability strategies. We document that returns of politically connected firms’ stocks lead those of their non-connected peers, suggesting that information shocks associated with new policies and other political developments become evident first in the stock prices of firms that pursue political strategies and then, with delay, in those of similar non-connected firms

The color of shareholders\u27 money: Institutional shareholders\u27 political values and corporate environmental disclosure

Highlights Institutional shareholders’ political values significantly influences corporate environmental disclosure and performance. Firms with Republican-oriented institutional shareholders are less likely to issue environmental reports. Institutional shareholders’ Republican-oriented political values are negatively associated with environmental performance. Institutional shareholders’ Republican-oriented political values are negatively associated with green innovations. Abstract In this study, we investigate whether and to what extent institutional shareholders\u27 political values influence their investees\u27 environmental disclosure and performance. Using employees\u27 political donation data, we construct institutional investors\u27 political ideology score, which higher (lower) value represents a more Republican- (Democratic)-leaning culture. We find that firms led by institutional shareholders with a more Republican-oriented political ideology are less likely to issue environmental reports. Such a negative effect is more pronounced for firms with institutional shareholders with long-term horizons, with high corporate Republican ideology scores, and without an environmental committee. We further find that institutional shareholders\u27 Republican-oriented political values are negatively associated with their investee firms\u27 environmental performance and green innovations. Overall, our results indicate that institutional shareholders\u27 internal political polarization significantly influences corporate environmental disclosure policies