The Russian default and the contagion to Brazil.

This paper investigates the contagion from Russia to Brazil in late 1998 under two dimensions players involved and the timing of events. The data does not seem to reflect a compensatory liquidation of assets story by international institutional investors. It does contribute, however, to the suspicion that the contagion was triggered by foreign investors panicking from the Russian crisis, and joining local residents on their speculation against the Brazilian real. Adjusted correlations in the Brady market increase significantly during the crisis, which lends support to the view that if there was a contagion from Russia to Brazil, the most likely place of the transmission was the off-shore Brady market. Finally, the paper does not support the hypothesis that it was the liquidity crisis in mature markets, and not the Russian crisis, that timed the crisis in Brazil.

Does monetary policy stabilize the exchange rate following a currency crisis?

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It analyzes a large data set of currency crises in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The main question addressed is: can monetary policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher inflation? We find that tight monetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. When the economy is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight monetary policy may not have the same effect.

Hard currency and financial development

This paper investigates the relationship between hard currency and financial development. It creates four different series of hard currency based on different sets of data. The results of the paper suggest that indeed financial development and the hardness of currencies are highly correlated. However, we find that the relationship from currency hardness to financial development is fully captured by macro variables that represent overall macroeconomic stability. This suggest that having a hard currency is not a pre-condition for financial development but rather establishing a macroeconomic stable environment.

Overshootings and Reversals: The Role of Monetary Policy

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises taking into account the role of a fragile banking system. It analyzes a large set of currency crises that led to real exchange rate undervaluations from a sample of 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. First, the paper evaluates whether tight monetary policy increases substantially the probability of reversing the undervaluation through nominal appreciation of the exchange rate rather than through higher inflation. Second, using panel data, the paper estimates the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rates. We find that tight monetary policy facilitates the reversal of the real exchange rate through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. In contrast, when the economy is also facing a banking crisis, tight monetary policy may not have the same effect.

Financial market contagion in the Asian crisis

This paper tests for evidence of contagion between the financial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines. Cross-country correlations among currencies and sovereign spreads are found to increase significantly during the crisis period, whereas the equity market correlations offer mixed evidence. A set of dummy variables using daily news is constructed to capture the impact of own-country and cross-border news on the markets. After controlling for own-country news and other fundamentals, the paper shows evidence of cross-border contagion in the currency and equity markets.

Is adopting Full Dollarization the solution? Looking at the evidence.

The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the full dollarization option and offers a few stylized facts and conclusions regarding the effects of full dollarization. On one hand, a full-dollarized economy delivers an impressive inflation performance and may even reduce the impact of external confidence shocks, although not external real shocks. On the other hand, full dollarization does not guarantee fiscal discipline neither the elimination of currency risk precludes default risk or the high volatility of sovereign spreads. In addition, it is not clear whether the reduction in domestic interest rates is the consequence of full dollarization or the competitive internationalized banking system.

Does Monetary Policy Stabilize the Exchange Rate Following a Currency Crisis?

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It analyzes a large dataset of currency crises in 80 countries for the period 1980-98. The main question addressed is whether monetary policy can increase the probability of reversing a postcrisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher inflation. We find that tight monetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation. When the economy also faces a banking crisis, the results are not robust and depend on the specification. Copyright 2003, International Monetary Fund

CAN FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES STILL “WORK” IN FINANCIALLY OPEN ECONOMIES?

Recent studies have shown that exchange rates in developing countries have limited flexibility. In this paper we review the existing explanations for this stylized fact, using a simple framework of monetary policy in a world where firms face balance sheet effects and the economy has a high pass-through from depreciation to inflation. We estimate a panel regression using quarterly data in the period 1990–1999 for a sample of 46 countries (19 industrial and 27 developing), and find that the use of the exchange rate to buffer external shocks depends crucially on (i) on the degree of integration with capital markets, and (ii) the quality of external financing. We conclude that flexible regimes are viable in financially open economies, provided external financing is not based on very volatile capital. This, of course, is dependent on the establishment of credible macroeconomic policies.

Capital Flows and Controls in Brazil: What Have We Learned?

This paper analyzes the relationship between capital account liberalization and macroeconomic volatility using Brazil as a case study. The paper provides several stylized facts regarding the evolution of capital flows and controls in Brazil in the last three decades. We conclude that, notwithstanding the financial crises and macroeconomic volatility of the recent past, capital account liberalization and the floating exchange regime have led to a more resilient economy. Further liberalization of the capital account is warranted and should be accompanied by a broad range of reforms to improve and foster stronger institutions.