6 research outputs found
Market Structure, Technological Gap and Vertical Linkage Effects from Foreign Direct Investment
This paper is based on the model of backward linkages from foreign direct investment (FDI) Lin/Saggi (2003), where the market structure of the final goods sector is represented by a monopoly or Cournot oligopoly, and the supplier sector β by a pure monopoly. We extend this model by examining cases of perfect competition and a vertically integrated domestic company in the intermediate goods market. Our analysis shows that coming of foreign companies to the final goods sector provides positive backward linkage effects. Although this result doesnβt depend on the market structure in the final goods sector, the latter significantly affects the size of FDI linkage effects β the more competitive is the intermediate goods sector, the larger are the backward linkage effects. They reach their maximum under perfect competition in the intermediate goods market, minimum β under monopoly in this sector, and medium size - when a vertically integrated local firm exists in the market. We have also discovered that a more competitive market structure per se doesnβt guarantee larger positive effects of FDI. It is important that in addition to a competitive structure local firms do not significantly lag behind foreign firms in their technological level.effects from foreign direct investment, vertical linkage effects, market structure, technological gap
FDI outflows and international trade nexus: Empirical evidence from country income groups
Relevance. Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and international trade are traditionally viewed as key drive of economic integration and globalization. At the same time, the relationship between these phenomena is ambiguous both from theoretical and empirical points of view. This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the relationship between outward foreign direct investment and international trade for countries with different levels of income per capita.Research objective. This study examines the dynamic interplay between OFDI and international trade in different income groups such as low-income (LIC), low-middle income (LMIC), upper-middle income (UMIC), and high-income (HIC) groups.Data and methods. Based on World bank country income classifications, data from 161 countries are divided into LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and HIC for the period 1998-2019. The study employs the Difference (DFF-GMM) and two-step System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) techniques to explore the OFDI-trade nexus.Results. The results are mixed and significant providing support for both complementarity and substitutive FDI. Findings suggest that OFDI and trade nexus in LIC have negative impact indicating a substitutive effect, but in other economies, the impact is significantly positive and complementary.Conclusions. Trade and OFDI nexus are substitutive in LIC, hence sound economic policy, aimed at increasing countryβs international competitiveness, should be adopted. However, trade and OFDI in LMIC, UMIC and HIC economies have mutually complementary relationship that facilitates the improvement of the domestic economy. Thus, government should promote policies that sustain the benefits of OFDI and trade interactions
ΠΠ»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ
The article discusses the effectiveness of tax incentives for regulation of the level of foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) and outflows in the economy. Theoretically, changes in tax levels should influence both the profitability of investment projects and companiesβ choice of locations for their production units. At the same time, transfer pricing opportunities in the world economy may neutralize the effects of tax changes on the level of countriesβ FDI inflows and outflows. The aim of the research is to study empirically the influence of tax levels in countries on bilateral FDI flows. Methodologically, this study relies on regression analysis. Two variables indicating the tax level of the economy are used: the share of total taxes on income, profits and capital gains and share of taxes and social contributions in total government revenues. The database includes observations over 71 recipients and 91 home countries in 2001β2016. The gravity approach is applied to construct the econometric model while the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood method is used to derive unbiased estimates. The main results of the research are as follows. First, there is a negative relationship between the tax burden and level of FDI inflows to the country. Second, higher taxes lead to an increase in FDI outflows only in the countries with relatively low taxes, while in countries with relatively high taxes the opposite dependence is observed. Third, vertical (efficiency-seeking) FDI are much more sensitive to the level of taxes in the recipient country compared with horizontal (market-seeking) FDI. We have not found any evidence for the positive influence of tax differentials on bilateral FDI. The conclusion is made that tax regulation measures may be an efficient instrument for stimulating FDI inflows to the national economy.For citationDrapkin I.M. The Influence of Taxes on Inflows and Outflows of Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of Tax Reform. 2020;6(3):244β255. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2020.6.3.084.Article infoReceived August 12, 2020; Revised September 1, 2020; Accepted October 22, 2020ΠΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΌΠ΅Ρ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΈΠΈ. Π‘ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Ρ, ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ΅Ρ Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π±Π΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠ², Π°, ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ, Π½Π° Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ° Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΅Π³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²Π°. Π‘ Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Ρ, Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ Π½ΠΈΠ²Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅. Π Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠ° Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ. ΠΒ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ Π΄Π²Π° ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»Ρ, ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΠΆΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅: Π΄ΠΎΠ»Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³Π° Π½Π° Π΄ΠΎΡ
ΠΎΠ΄, ΠΏΡΠΈΠ±ΡΠ»Ρ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΎΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π»Π° Π² ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ², a ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΠ»Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²Π·Π½ΠΎΡΠΎΠ² Π² ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ². ΠΠ°Π·Π° Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π²ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅Ρ Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π΄ 71 ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠΉ-ΠΈΠΌΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ 91 ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠΉ-ΡΠΊΡΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΠΠ Π·Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΎΠ΄ 2001β2016 Π³Π³. Π ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π»Π΅ΠΆΠΈΡ Π³ΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄. ΠΠ»Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π΅ΡΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΠΊ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π²Π΄ΠΎΠΌΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΄ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡ ΠΡΠ°ΡΡΠΎΠ½Π°. Π ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Ρ ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ. ΠΠΎ-ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΡΡ
, ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅-ΠΈΠΌΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ ΠΠΠ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π΅Π½ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Ρ ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ. ΠΠΎ-Π²ΡΠΎΡΡΡ
, ΡΠΎΡΡ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Π½Π°Π³ΡΡΠ·ΠΊΠΈ Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Ρ ΠΊ ΡΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΎΠ² ΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΊΠ° ΠΠΠ ΠΈΠ· ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Ρ ΡΠΎΠ»ΡΠΊΠΎ Π΄Π»Ρ Π³ΡΡΠΏΠΏΡ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ Ρ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ΠΌ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΎΠ±Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ, Π΄Π»Ρ Π³ΡΡΠΏΠΏΡ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ Ρ Π²ΡΡΠΎΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ΠΌ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΎΠ±Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½Π°Ρ Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ. Π-ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡ
, Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ (ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΠΎΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ) ΠΠΠ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ Π³ΠΎΡΠ°Π·Π΄ΠΎ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ ΡΡΠ²ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΠΊ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΎΠ±Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠ΅-ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΏΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΡΠ°Π²Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Ρ Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ (ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π½Π° Π²Π½ΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠΊ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Ρ) ΠΠΠ. Π-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΡΡ
, Π³ΠΈΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π·Π° ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠΆΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π½ΠΈΡΡ Π² ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠΎΠ±Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ ΠΠΠ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠΌΠΏΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ. Π‘Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Π½ Π²ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π½Ρ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠΌ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΈΠΌΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠ° ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ Π² Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΡ.ΠΠ»Ρ ΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΡΠ°ΠΏΠΊΠΈΠ½ Π.Π. ΠΠ»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ² Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΡΡΠΌΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΉ // Journal of Tax Reform. β 2020. β Π’. 6, β 3. β Π‘. 244β255.β DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2020.6.3.084.Β ΠΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΎ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ΠΠ°ΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ 12 Π°Π²Π³ΡΡΡΠ° 2020 Π³.; Π΄Π°ΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ 1 ΡΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ±ΡΡ 2020 Π³.; Π΄Π°ΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡ ΠΊ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈ 22 ΠΎΠΊΡΡΠ±ΡΡ 2020 Π³
ΠΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΡ COVID-19 ΡΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ: Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ²ΠΊΠ°
Π ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΈ ΠΎΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π°Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅Π·Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π΄Π°Π»ΠΈ ΠΎΡ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Π°Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠ°Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π»Π° ΠΊ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠ°. Π Π½Π°ΡΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² ΠΎΡΠ²Π΅Ρ Π½Π° Π²ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ COVID-19, ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠ΅ Π²Π½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΡΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»ΠΈ. ΠΠ»Ρ ΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ EBRD-EIB-WB Enterprise Survey, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ΅ Π²ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅Ρ ΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎ 18 000 Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π¦Π΅Π½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈ ΠΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΠΏΡ (Π¦ΠΠ) ΠΈ Π¦Π΅Π½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΠ·ΠΈΠΈ (Π¦Π), Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎ 1000 Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ. ΠΠ»Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡ-ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΈ Π²Π·Π²Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡ-ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ. Π‘ΠΎΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π³ΠΈΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π·Π΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, Π² ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΊΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π΄Π²ΠΈΠΆΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΈΠ»Ρ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Ρ Π΄ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡ Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ. Π€ΠΈΡΠΌΡ Π² ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Ρ
Ρ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ (Π΄ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ COVID-19), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π² ΠΊΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΡ
Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ΄Π°Ρ
ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Π»ΠΈ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ Π² ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·Ρ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»ΠΈ Π²ΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈ. Π ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π°Ρ
Π¦ΠΠ ΠΈ Π¦Π, ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠΊΡΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠ΅ΠΏΠΎΡΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠΊ, Π½Π΅ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π²ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π΅Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΡΠ±ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΈ Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΉ ΠΌΠ°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄Π½Π΅Π³ΠΎ Π±ΠΈΠ·Π½Π΅ΡΠ°. Π§ΡΠΎ ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠ°, Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠ° Π΄Π°Π»ΡΠ½Π΅ΠΉΡΠ°Ρ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ° Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΡΠ½ΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
Π±Π°ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ², Π»ΠΈΠ±Π΅ΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π²Π½ΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΠΎΠ² Π΄Π»Ρ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΠΏΠ»ΠΎΡΠ°Π΄ΠΎΠΊ
ΠΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΡ COVID-19 ΡΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΈΠ»Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ: Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Ρ ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ²ΠΊΠ°
Π ΠΎΠ·Π½ΠΈΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΈ ΠΎΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π°Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅Π·Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π΄Π°Π»ΠΈ ΠΎΡ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Π°Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠ°Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π»Π° ΠΊ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠ°. Π Π½Π°ΡΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² ΠΎΡΠ²Π΅Ρ Π½Π° Π²ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Ρ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ COVID-19, ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠ΅ Π²Π½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΡΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»ΠΈ. ΠΠ»Ρ ΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ EBRD-EIB-WB Enterprise Survey, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ΅ Π²ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅Ρ ΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎ 18 000 Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π¦Π΅Π½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈ ΠΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΠΏΡ (Π¦ΠΠ) ΠΈ Π¦Π΅Π½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΠ·ΠΈΠΈ (Π¦Π), Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎ 1000 Π½Π°Π±Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ. ΠΠ»Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° Π±ΡΠ»ΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡ-ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΈ Π²Π·Π²Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±ΠΈΡ-ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ. Π‘ΠΎΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π³ΠΈΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π·Π΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, Π² ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΊΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π΄Π²ΠΈΠΆΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΈΠ»Ρ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Ρ Π΄ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡ Π»ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ. Π€ΠΈΡΠΌΡ Π² ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Ρ
Ρ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Π΅ΠΌ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ (Π΄ΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ COVID-19), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π² ΠΊΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΡ
Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ΄Π°Ρ
ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Π»ΠΈ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡ Π² ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·Ρ ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²Π»ΠΈ Π²ΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΠ°Π½Π΄Π΅ΠΌΠΈΠΈ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½Π²Π΅ΡΠ³Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΡΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈ. Π ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π°Ρ
Π¦ΠΠ ΠΈ Π¦Π, ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠΊΡΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠ΅ΠΏΠΎΡΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠΊ, Π½Π΅ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ Π²ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π΅Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΡΡΠ±ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΈ Π½ΠΈΠ·ΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠ²Π½Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΏΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΉ ΠΌΠ°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄Π½Π΅Π³ΠΎ Π±ΠΈΠ·Π½Π΅ΡΠ°. Π§ΡΠΎ ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΡΠ°, Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠ° Π΄Π°Π»ΡΠ½Π΅ΠΉΡΠ°Ρ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ° Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΡΠ½ΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
Π±Π°ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ², Π»ΠΈΠ±Π΅ΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π²Π½ΡΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΠΎΠ² Π΄Π»Ρ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π² Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠ»Π°ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΡΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ½Π»Π°ΠΉΠ½-ΠΏΠ»ΠΎΡΠ°Π΄ΠΎΠΊ
Intensive and Extensive Margins of Export: Determinants of Economic Growth in Russian Regions under Sanctions
The impact of foreign trade on the Russian economyβs growth remains debatable. In 2014, the economy faced initial sanctions, leading to export restructuring and affecting growth. In 2022, a second unprecedented wave of sanctions necessitated export restructuring and intensified the challenge of sourcing economic growth. This study evaluates the impact of intensive and extensive export margins on Russian regionsβ growth from 2015 to 2021 and discusses post-2022 implications. It is hypothesised that new export goods and markets are vital for economic growth in Russian regions. The study shows that both intensive and extensive margins are positively related to the level of development in Russian regions, and developed regions with diversified economic structures had higher values of export margins. The methodology uses panel regression with random and fixed effects. The empirical results show Russian regionsβ market share in the products they export and in the countries where they export (i. e. intensive product and geographic margin) is important for the economic growth of Russian regions, while the results for extensive margin are ambiguous. The obtained findings have implications for industrial policy, which should prioritise the development of measures aimed at supporting existing exporting companies in expanding their presence in familiar markets. The task of export diversification should primarily be addressed through working with existing exporters and export products, while the export of innovative products should be viewed as a gradual evolutionary process within the framework of long-term planning