A plea for studying qualitative individual differences by default [Invited Commentary]

I see great potential in the approach proposed by Rouder and Haaf. First, using an example from unethical decision making, I demonstrate that considering quantitative individual differences alone can make us overlook important psychological phenomena that are only visible at the individual level. Thus, the study of quantitative individual differences should, by default, be complemented by investigation of qualitative individual differences. Second, having powerful tools to study qualitative individual differences in cognition has great potential to advance personality science. Recently, personality psychologists are increasingly working towards obtaining a better understanding of the processes that underlie the expression of personality in behavior. The toolbox provided by Rouder and Haaf may add to this research in meaningful ways

On the (mis)use of deception in web-based research: Challenges and recommendations

The deception of research participants remains a controversial issue in the behavioral sciences. Current ethics codes consistently limit the use of deception to cases in which non-deceptive alternatives are unfeasible and, crucially, require that participants subjected to deception be debriefed correspondingly along with an option to withdraw their data after learning about the deception. These conditions pose a particular challenge in the context of web-based research because participants can typically discontinue a study unilaterally (i.e., dropout by simply closing the browser window) in which case full debriefing and an option to withdraw one’s data are no longer available. As a consequence, the study would no longer be compatible with ethical standards. Based on recent meta-analytical data, we provide an existence proof of this problem, showing that deception is used in web-based research with little to no indication of safeguards ensuring full debriefing and subsequent data withdrawal options. We close by revisiting recommendations for the (non-)use of deception in web-based research and offer solutions to implement such safeguards in case deception is truly unavoidable

Are social desirability scales desirable? A meta-analytic test of the validity of social desirability scales in the context of prosocial behavior

Social desirability (SD) scales have been used for decades in psychology and beyond. These scales are sought to measure individuals' tendencies to present themselves overly positive in self-reports, thus allowing to control for SD biases. However, research increasingly questions the validity of SD scales, proposing that SD scales measure substantive trait characteristics rather than response bias. To provide a large-scale empirical test of the validity of SD scales, we conducted a meta-analysis (k = 41; N = 8980) on the relation between SD scale scores and prosocial behavior in economic games (where acting in a prosocial manner is highly socially desirable). If SD scales measure what they are supposed to (namely, SD bias), they should be negatively linked to prosocial behavior; if SD scales measure socially desirable traits, they should be positively linked to prosocial behavior. Unlike both possibilities, the meta-analytic correlation between SD scores and prosocial behavior was close to zero, suggesting that SD scales neither clearly measure bias nor substantive traits. This conclusion was also supported by moderation analyses considering differences in the implementation of games and the SD scales used. The results further question the validity of SD scales with the implication that scholars and practitioners should refrain from using them

Economic games: An introduction and guide for research

Prosocial behaviors constitute vital ingredients for all types of social interactions and relationships as well as for society at large. Corresponding to this significance, the study of prosocial behaviors has received considerable attention across scientific disciplines. A striking feature of this research is that most disciplines rely on economic games to measure actual prosocial behavior in controlled experimental settings. However, empirical research often fails to fully exploit the richness of this class of paradigms. The current work aims to overcome this issue by providing a theory-driven overview of and introduction to the variety of economic games for researchers in psychology and beyond. Specifically, we introduce prominent theories of games (Game Theory and Interdependence Theory) and show how the concepts from these theories can be integrated in a unifying theoretical framework considering games as providing specific situational affordances for behavior. Additionally, we describe several games in detail, including their structural features, the affordances they involve, the social motives that may guide behavior, the flexibility they entail to manipulate specific situational aspects and, thus, affordances, and typical research findings. We conclude that tailored selection and combination of games and game variants allows to obtain a unique understanding of the underlying psychological processes involved in prosocial behavior. As a practical tool for researchers, we also provide standardized game instructions and guidelines for the implementation of games in future research. Ultimately, the review can foster optimal use of economic games in future work and thereby set the stage for high-class, replicable, and innovative research on human prosociality

Prosocial behavior and altruism: A review of concepts and definitions

The field of prosociality is flourishing, yet researchers disagree about how to define prosocial behavior and often neglect defining it altogether. In this review, we provide an overview about the breadth of definitions of prosocial behavior and the related concept of altruism. Common to almost all definitions is an emphasis on the promotion of welfare in agents other than the actor. However, definitions of the two concepts differ in terms of whether they emphasize intentions and motives, costs and benefits, and the societal context. In order to improve on the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the study of prosociality, we urge researchers to provide definitions, to use operationalizations that match their definitions, and to acknowledge the diversity of prosocial behavior

Bending our ethics code: Avoidable deception and its justification in psychological research

Deception of research participants has long been and remains a hot-button issue in the behavioral sciences. At the same time, the field of psychology is fortunate to have an ethics code to rely on in determining whether and how to use and report on deception of participants. Despite ongoing normative controversies, the smallest common denominator among psychologists is that deception ought to be a last resort – to be used only when there is no other defensible way to study a question or phenomenon. Going beyond previous normative discussions or inquiries into the mere prevalence of deception, we ask the fundamental question whether common practice is compatible with this interpretation of our field’s ethical standards. Findings from an empirical literature review – focusing on the feasibility of nondeceptive alternative procedures and the presence of explicit justifications for the use of deception – demonstrate that there is a notable gap between the last resort interpretation of our ethical standards and common practice in psychological research. The findings are discussed with the aim of identifying viable ways in which researchers, journal editors, and the scientific associations crafting our ethics codes may narrow this gap

The dark core of personality and socially aversive psychopathology

Objective: Although dark traits as studied in mainstream personality research and socially aversive psychopathology as studied in abnormal psychology intend to account for the same classes of behavior, their degree of conceptual and, consequently, empirical correspondence has remained limited at best. We aim to overcome this divide by demonstrating clear convergence between the common core of all dark traits (the Dark Factor of Personality, D) and the four prominent instances of socially aversive psychopathology: narcissistic, antisocial, paranoid, and borderline tendencies. Method: In a large-scale, eight-month longitudinal study we assessed D, basic personality (the six HEXACO dimensions), and narcissistic, antisocial, paranoid, and borderline tendencies at time 1 (N = 2,329) and the latter aversive tendencies again at time 2 (N = 668) using different inventories. Results: D predicted all instances of socially aversive psychopathology cross-sectionally and longitudinally, with a large effect size on average, beyond the six HEXACO dimensions and even beyond the very same instances (measured through a different inventory). Conclusions: Bridging mainstream personality and abnormal psychology, the findings reveal strong, theory-consistent correspondence between dark traits and socially aversive psychopathology once dark traits are viewed through the lens of their common core, D

Ten steps toward a better personality science - How quality may be rewarded more in research evaluation

This target article is part of a theme bundle including open peer commentaries (https://doi.org/10.5964/ps.9227) and a rejoinder by the authors (https://doi.org/10.5964/ps.7961). We point out ten steps that we think will go a long way in improving personality science. The first five steps focus on fostering consensus regarding (1) research goals, (2) terminology, (3) measurement practices, (4) data handling, and (5) the current state of theory and evidence. The other five steps focus on improving the credibility of empirical research, through (6) formal modelling, (7) mandatory pre-registration for confirmatory claims, (8) replication as a routine practice, (9) planning for informative studies (e.g., in terms of statistical power), and (10) making data, analysis scripts, and materials openly available. The current, quantity-based incentive structure in academia clearly stands in the way of implementing many of these practices, resulting in a research literature with sometimes questionable utility and/or integrity. As a solution, we propose a more quality-based reward scheme that explicitly weights published research by its Good Science merits. Scientists need to be increasingly rewarded for doing good work, not just lots of work