The Putin phenomenon

The Putin presidency in Russia became increasingly popular as it progressed and a leadership cult developed around the president himself. Not only was there general satisfaction with the leadership as a whole, there was also evidence that it was regarded as increasingly successful in all fields of policy, particularly in international affairs; and focus group discussions as well as surveys suggested the newly elected president, Dmitri Medvedev, would be expected to continue those policies. A closer examination of the survey evidence suggests that the Putin leadership in fact had relatively weak roots in the wider society, and drew widely but superficially on public support. More than anything else it was the strong economic performance of these years that generated support for the Putin presidency, and this suggested that any future leader would depend for his position on maintaining that economic performance in what were now more difficult circumstances

Russia and its neighbours: East or West?

As ‘Europe’ becomes more diverse, the countries that were formerly part of the USSR face new choices. One of the most fundamental is whether they identify with the economic and military institutions of the ‘West’, such as NATO and the European Union, or with the Commonwealth of Independent States and other forms of association with the Slavic ‘East’. We examine these choices in each of three societies—Belarus, Russia and Ukraine—on the basis of national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2008. Across the three, ‘Eastern’ orientations have more popular support than ‘Western’ ones, but Ukrainian opinion is more sharply polarised than opinion in the other two countries. There is more support for a ‘Slavic choice’ in Russia than in either of the other two countries, and particularly large numbers there who regret the demise of the USSR; but opinion on such matters is moderate rather than fundamentalist and does not necessarily exclude a closer relationship with the European Union and NATO

Media effects and Russian elections, 1999-2000

The Russian parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1999 and March 2000 appeared to have been won in large part through the partisan use of (particularly state) television. According to the evidence of a spring 2001 national survey, television was the main source of political information for the supporters of all parties and candidates. However, state television (which had been most supportive of the Kremlin) was much more likely to be favoured by the supporters of the pro-regime Unity party; while commercial television (which had provided a more even-handed coverage of the elections) was more popular and respected among the supporters of anti-Kremlin parties and candidates and less popular among supporters of Vladimir Putin. Regression analysis that takes account of reciprocal causation between media source and vote choice indicates that these were not spurious associations. The findings suggest that the state itself may exercise a disproportionate influence upon the electoral process in newly established systems in which social structures and political allegiances remain fluid

Belorussiya, Ukraina i Rossiya: vostok ili zapad?

No abstract available

Rethinking the 'Orange Revolution'

A national representative survey in November–December 2007 suggests that there was little consensus about the nature of the ‘Orange revolution’, and that perceptions varied considerably by region and age-group. The main reason for participation was to ‘protest against the authorities’, but here too there were considerable regional differences. Eight focus groups conducted in different parts of the country allowed participants to articulate their distinctive interpretations of the events: an ‘Orange’ narrative that saw the events of late 2004 as an authentic popular uprising, and a ‘Blue’ narrative that saw them as a Western-funded coup. After the event, increasing numbers felt they had lost rather than gained, with the gains clearest in respect of freedom of speech and losses most marked in relations with Russia. Different views of the revolutionary events in turn were closely associated with voting choices in the September 2007 parliamentary election

Turnout and representation bias in post-communist Europe

Electoral participation has been declining in post-Soviet Europe as in almost all of the established democracies. Patterns of electoral abstention in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine reflect those in other countries, but show particularly strong effects for older age. Not only do older electors vote more often, they also have distinctive views on matters of public policy, particularly on the economy but also on the Soviet system, strong leadership and hypothetical membership of the European Union. These differences are diminished but nonetheless generally remain statistically significant even when socio-economic controls are introduced. These differences may be seen as a ‘representation bias’ that advantages particular sections of the electorate and the views with which they are associated. The particular forms that are taken by this bias in post-communist societies may be transitory, but here as elsewhere lower levels of turnout will continue to impart a significant bias to the extent to which some views rather than others are articulated within the political process

Reconstructing a model of quintessential inflation

We present an explicit cosmological model where inflation and dark energy both could arise from the dynamics of the same scalar field. We present our discussion in the framework where the inflaton field $\phi$ attains a nearly constant velocity $m_P^{-1} |d\phi/dN|\equiv \alpha+\beta \exp(\beta N)$ (where $N\equiv \ln a$ is the e-folding time) during inflation. We show that the model with $|\alpha|<0.25$ and $\beta<0$ can easily satisfy inflationary constraints, including the spectral index of scalar fluctuations ($n_s=0.96\pm 0.013$), tensor-to-scalar ratio ($r<0.28$) and also the bound imposed on $\Omega_\phi$ during the nucleosynthesis epoch ($\Omega_\phi (1 {\rm MeV})<0.1$). In our construction, the scalar field potential always scales proportionally to the square of the Hubble expansion rate. One may thereby account for the two vastly different energy scales associated with the Hubble parameters at early and late epochs. The inflaton energy could also produce an observationally significant effective dark energy at a late epoch without violating local gravity tests.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures; added refs, published versio

Chasing Brane Inflation in String-Theory

We investigate the embedding of brane anti-brane inflation into a concrete type IIB string theory compactification with all moduli fixed. Specifically, we are considering a D3-brane, whose position represents the inflaton $\phi$, in a warped conifold throat in the presence of supersymmetrically embedded D7-branes and an anti D3-brane localized at the tip of the warped conifold cone. After presenting the moduli stabilization analysis for a general D7-brane embedding, we concentrate on two explicit models, the Ouyang and the Kuperstein embeddings. We analyze whether the forces, induced by moduli stabilization and acting on the D3-brane, might cancel by fine-tuning such as to leave us with the original Coulomb attraction of the anti D3-brane as the driving force for inflation. For a large class of D7-brane embeddings we obtain a negative result. Cancelations are possible only for very small intervals of $\phi$ around an inflection point but not globally. For the most part of its motion the inflaton then feels a steep, non slow-roll potential. We study the inflationary dynamics induced by this potential.Comment: 34 pages, 4 figures. Final version published in JCA

Comparing Brane Inflation to WMAP

We compare the simplest realistic brane inflationary model to recent cosmological data, including WMAP 3-year cosmic microwave background (CMB) results, Sloan Digital Sky Survey luminous red galaxies (SDSS LRG) power spectrum data and Supernovae Legacy Survey (SNLS) Type 1a supernovae distance measures. Here, the inflaton is simply the position of a $D3$-brane which is moving towards a $\bar{D}3$-brane sitting at the bottom of a throat (a warped, deformed conifold) in the flux compactified bulk in Type IIB string theory. The analysis includes both the usual slow-roll scenario and the Dirac-Born-Infeld scenario of slow but relativistic rolling. Requiring that the throat is inside the bulk greatly restricts the allowed parameter space. We discuss possible scenarios in which large tensor mode and/or non-Gaussianity may emerge. Here, the properties of a large tensor mode deviate from that in the usual slow-roll scenario, providing a possible stringy signature. Overall, within the brane inflationary scenario, the cosmological data is providing information about the properties of the compactification of the extra dimensions.Comment: 45 pages 11 figure

DBI Inflation using a One-Parameter Family of Throat Geometries

We demonstrate the possibility of examining cosmological signatures in the DBI inflation setup using the BGMPZ solution, a one-parameter family of geometries for the warped throat which interpolate between the Maldacena-Nunez and Klebanov-Strassler solutions. The warp factor is determined numerically and subsequently used to calculate cosmological observables including the scalar and tensor spectral indices, for a sample point in the parameter space. As one moves away from the KS solution for the throat the warp factor is qualitatively different, which leads to a significant change for the observables, but also generically increases the non-Gaussianity of the models. We argue that the different models can potentially be differentiated by current and future experiments.Comment: 17 pages, 10 figures; v2: section 4 expanded, references added; v3: typos fixe