What counts in the development of young children's number knowledge?

Prior studies indicate that children vary widely in their mathematical knowledge by the time they enter preschool and that this variation predicts levels of achievement in elementary school. In a longitudinal study of a diverse sample of 44 preschool children, we examined the extent to which their understanding of the cardinal meanings of the number words (e.g., knowing that the word “four” refers to sets with 4 items) is predicted by the “number talk” they hear from their primary caregiver in the early home environment. Results from 5 visits showed substantial variation in parents’ number talk to children between the ages of 14 and 30 months. Moreover, this variation predicted children’s knowledge of the cardinal meanings of number words at 46 months, even when socioeconomic status and other measures of parent and child talk were controlled. These findings suggest that encouraging parents to talk about number with their toddlers, and providing them with effective ways to do so, may positively impact children’s school achievement

PAPER Early sex differences in weighting geometric cues

Abstract When geometric and non-geometric information are both available for specifying location, men have been shown to rely more heavily on geometry compared to women. To shed insight on the nature and developmental origins of this sex difference, we examined how 18-to 24-month-olds represented the geometry of a surrounding (rectangular) space when direct non-geometric information (i.e. a beacon) was also available for localizing a hidden object. Children were tested on a disorientation task with multiple phases. Across experiments, boys relied more heavily than girls on geometry to guide localization, as indicated by their errors during the initial phase of the task, and by their search choices following transformations that left only geometry available, or that, under limited conditions, created a conflict between beacon and geometry. Analyses of search times suggested that girls, like boys, had encoded geometry, and testing in a square space ruled out explanations concerned with motivational and methodological variables. Taken together, the findings provide evidence for an early sex difference in the weighting of geometry. This sex difference, we suggest, reflects subtle variation in how boys and girls approach the problem of combining multiple sources of location information

Memory for the Time of 60 Minutes Stories and News Events

This study tested whether impressions of the temporal distances of past events provide differentiated information about the times of events from the past months. Participants judged the times of stories from the television show 60 Minutes that were not easily linked to contemporaneous events and, in a comparison condition, of news events. They also compared the relative recency of pairs of 60 Minutes stories that had been broadcast the same week or during different weeks. Results showed that the times of 60 Minutes stories could be differentiated if they fell within the past 1 to 2 months, but the times of older events were mainly undifferentiated. Memory for the temporal contiguity of 60 Minutes stories was also very poor. The times of news stories were accurate throughout the range of times. These findings provide information about the time course over which distance information is useful

25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation : a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152-176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179-188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Störzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1-14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191-212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419-422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909-5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceeding s of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915-5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540-566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.22 page(s

Basing Categorization on Individuals and Events

Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that events constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categorization. In these models, each learning event updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. An implication is that events involving the same individual affect learning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals across events, establish representations of them, and use these representations in categorization. These findings are consistent with ‘‘representationalism,’ ’ the view that an internal model of the world constitutes a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an undifferentiated dynamical system. Although categorization is an inherently statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completion, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently representational process that establishes an internal model of the world. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to track the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and simulat