Selection Bias and the Output Costs of IMF Programs

Questions over the role of the IMF in the economic development and adjustment in developing countries have been the topic of intensive research and debate in recent years. Although most studies find that participation in an IMF program helps facilitate balance of payments adjustment, research in this area almost uniformly finds that growth is reduced at the same time (e.g. Bordo and Schwartz, 2000; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). In this paper we emphasize that the evaluation of the benefits and costs of participating in IMF-sponsored stabilization programs is complicated by the fact that countries typically enter into an agreement with the IMF only when facing dire economic problems. We argue that the sample selection bias is mainly responsible for the common perception that real output growth declines because countries choose to participate in IMF programs. This article uses four recently developed “matching” statistical methods (e.g. Heckman et al., 1997 and 1998; Rubin and Thomas, 1992; and others), based on the “selection on observables” bias, to estimate the growth effects of IMF program participation. In contrast with the extant literature, none of the matching method results (nearest neighbor, strata, radius and regression-adjusted) find an adverse growth effect. Rather, there is some evidence of a positive impulse to economic growth when countries entering IMF programs are compared to the appropriate counter-factual (i.e. non-participating countries with similar characteristics).

A Cure Worse Than The Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs.

This paper investigates the output effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs, especially those introduced at the time of a severe balance of payments/currency crisis. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 67 developing and emerging-market economies (with 461 IMF stabilization programs and 160 currency crises), we find that currency crises - even after controlling for macroeconomic developments, political and regional factors - significantly reduce output growth for 1-2 years. Output growth is also lower (0.7 percentage points annually) during IMF-stabilization programs, but it appears coinciding with recent balance of payments or currency crises do not appear to further damage short-run growth prospects. Countries participating in IMF programs significantly reduce domestic credit growth, but no effect is found on budget policy. Applying this model to the collapse of output in East Asia following the 1997 crisis, we find that the unexpected (forecast error) collapse of output in Malaysia - where an IMF-program was not followed - was similar in magnitude to those countries adopting IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand).

World money

Money ; Monetary theory ; Foreign exchange ; International finance

A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs

This paper investigates the output effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs, especially those introduced at the time of a severe balance of payments/currency crisis. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 67 developing and emerging-market economies (with 461 IMF stabilization programs and 160 currency crises), we find that currency crises even after controlling for macroeconomic developments, political and regional factors significantly reduce output growth for 1-2 years. Output growth is also lower (0.7 percentage points annually) during IMF-stabilization programs, but it appears that growth generally slows prior to implementation of the program. Moreover, programs coinciding with recent balance of payments or currency crises do not appear to further damage short-run growth prospects. Countries participating in IMF programs significantly reduce domestic credit growth, but no effect is found on budget policy. Applying this model to the collapse of output in East Asia following the 1997 crisis, we find that the unexpected (forecast error) collapse of output in Malaysia where an IMF-program was not followed-- was similar in magnitude to those countries adopting IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand).

Intervention, deficit finance and real exchange rates: the case of Japan

Foreign exchange - Law and legislation ; Budget deficits ; Dollar, American ; Yen, Japanese ; Japan ; Foreign exchange rates - Japan

European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and Macroeconomic Risks.

Financial stability in Europe has received renewed attention with the advent of a common currency, wave of mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions, and greater market competition (e.g. ECB, 1999; IMF, 1999; OECD, 1999). This paper examines whether EU country banking systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic risk at present. Our approach is to examine episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample of countries, highlighting the experience of the EU. We estimate multivariate probit models linking the likelihood of banking problems to a set of macroeconomic variables and institutional characteristics. Institutional characteristics, made available by a new data set on corporate governance in the financial sector not previously used in this type of analysis, include aspects of bank supervision and regulation, restrictions on bank portfolios, and development of the banking system. Given these characteristics, the model predicts a low probability of banking sector distress in EMU countries.

Swaps

Asset-liability management ; Swaps (Finance)

Interdependence: U.S. and Japanese real interest rates

Japan ; Interest rates

Japan's "money focused" monetary policy

Japan ; Monetary policy - Japan

Banking and Currency Crises: How Common Are Twins?

The coincidence of banking and currency crises associated with the Asian financial crisis has drawn renewed attention to causal and common factors linking the two phenomena. In this paper, we analyze the incidence and underlying causes of banking and currency crises in 90 industrial and developing countries over the 1975-97 period. We measure the individual and joint ("twin") occurrence of bank and currency crises and assess the extent to which each type of crisis provides information about the likelihood of the other. We find that the twin crisis phenomenon is most common in financially liberalized emerging markets. The strong contemporaneous correlation between currency and bank crises in emerging markets is robust, even after controlling for a host of macroeconomic and financial structure variables and possible simultaneity bias. We also find that the occurrence of banking crises provides a good leading indicator of currency crises in emerging markets. The converse does not hold, however, as currency crises are not a useful leading indicator of the onset of future banking crises. We conjecture that the openness of emerging markets to international capital flows, combined with a liberalized financial structure, make them particularly vulnerable to twin crises.