Examination of the Medical Expert

The expert witness differs essentially from the ordinary witness in at least two particulars; first, in that the field of his testimony is outside the range of ordinary knowledge and experience; and, secondly, in that his testimony in the great majority of cases is in the form of opinions or conclusions that are deemed necessary for the proper guidance of the jury. It goes without saying that the \u27lawyer who undertakes the examination of the expert should have such familiarity with the subject of inquiry as will enable him to develop it through the expert logically and clearly, but unfortunately it does not go without saying that this is generally the case

Humanistic, and Particularly Classical, Studies as a Preparation for the Law

Aside from the elementary branches, no particular subject is absolutely essential as a basis for the study and practice of the law. In this respect the law occupies a place somewhat different from that of the other learned professions. The student and practitioner of medicine must of necessity get a substantial scientific foundation for his professional work. This for him is an absolutely essential prerequisite. For the professional courses in engineering a special and definite scientific preparation must be made; without it nothing but the most ordinary work in engineering can be accomplished. And it is probable that for theology, work along certain well-defined lines is desirable, if not essential. But it by no means follows that, because success in the study of the law or in the practice of it does not depend upon the mastery of particular subjects, a thorough preparation therefor is not necessary. The contrary is most emphatically true, particularly at the present time. The law is a practical subject, most intimately connected with the private interests of the citizen, and with questions affecting his public rights and obligations; but it is at the same time a science, the mastery of which requires a mental equipment above the ordinary. No one can hope for much success as a student of it without adequate preliminary training, or in its application as an art, without being prepared for the keenest kind of intellectual competition

Disbarment or Suspension of Attorney

The decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of State ex rel Grievance Committee of State Bar Association v. Tanner, rendered Jan. 12, 19O7, 88 Pac. Rep. 301, is of sufficient importance to merit brief notice. The proceeding was instituted by the grievance committee of the State Bar Association for the removal from practice of the defendant, an attorney at law, under a statute of the State that provides for the removal or suspension of an attorney from practice by the Supreme Court upon his being convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude

Should Men Bearing the Same Title in Any Institution Receive the Same Pay?

I suppose that there is at the present time in most universities discrimination to a limited extent between men holding the same title. In some cases it is based upon length of service; in others, it is made in favor of men who perform extra duties. Sometimes, moreover, special endowments lead to discriminations. And occasionally the salary of a man is fixed above that of his associates in order to retain his services when he has been called at an increased salary by another university. Sometimes, also, special and exceptional circumstances put a man in a different class from that of his associates, although he may have the same title, and his exceptional position is recognized by a difference in salary. This happens not infrequently in professional schools, where a man in accepting a professorship, makes a pecuniary sacrifice, or where his standing is such as to make the securing of his services particularly desirable. Or it may happen that there is a discrimination because some of the men are engaged in outside professional work. In each of the cases mentioned, there is a definite reason for the discrimination which serves as a basis for the fixing of compensation. Although causing undoubtedly some friction and criticism, discriminations like those indicated are not subject to the objections that may be urged against a general policy of discrimination, and their wisdom and propriety are, I think, generally recognized. If we eliminate the cases to which reference has been made, it may be said, I think, to be the general custom in American universities to pay the same salary to men bearing the same title. Should the custom be continued, with the exceptions mentioned, or should there be a general policy of discrimination based upon merit? Or, to put the question differently, should the money value of the services of the university professor be fixed by the arbitrary standard of rank, or should it rather be determined by the same standards by which the value of services of like grade in other fields is determined

Humanistic, and Paticularly Classical, Studies, as a Preparation for the Law

Aside from the elementary branches, no particular subject is absolutely essential as a basis for the study and practice of the law. In this respect the law occupies a place somewhat different from that of the other learned professions. The student and practitioner of medicine must of necessity get a substantial scientific foundation for his professional work. This for him is an absolutely essential prerequisite. For the professional courses in engineering, a special and definite scientific preparation must be made. Without it nothing but the most ordinary work in engineering can be accomplished. And it is probable that for theology, work along certain well defined lines is desirable, if not essential. But it by no means follows that because success in the study of the law or in the practice of it does not depend upon the mastery of particular subjects, a thorough preparation therefor is not necessary. The contrary is most emphatically true, particularly at the present time. The law is a practical subject, most intimately connected with the private interests of the citizen and with questions affecting his public rights and obligations, but it is at the same time a science, the mastery of which requires a mental equipment above the ordinary. No one can hope for much success as a student of it without adequate preliminary training, or in its application as an art without being prepared for the keenest kind of intellectual competition. Upon the very threshold of his work the law student discovers that his success is to depend very largely upon his equipment, not upon his having mastered any particular subject but upon his having made himself master of his own mental processes to such an extent that he can do independent and original thinking. The fundamental principles of the different departments of the law must be mastered, and that their full significance may be appreciated, their historical development, through the successive decisions of the courts, must be traced. But he soon discovers that his task embraces more than the memorizing of principles and the study of their origin and growth. His eyes are soon opened to the fact that the serious business of the law student consists in the application of general principles to the solution of problems involving new conditions and varying statements of fact. And then, too, he discovers directly that, although the body of the settled law is large, there are continually arising questions upon which the law is unsettled and whose solution requires the harmonizing, if possible, of conflicting decisions, or where this is not possible, the determination as to the weight of reason and authority. He soon discovers that for every step taken and for every conclusion reached a logical and forceful reason must be assigned. It is needless for me to suggest that work of this nature, if successfully accomplished, calls for analytical power ind constructive ability; it demands the informed and trained judgment of an educated man. While occasionally one having a natural aptitude for the law may be able, even with limited preparation, to master its principles and the art of its application and to push to the front with, apparent ease, the fact remains that, as a rule, the appreciative and successful study of jurisprudence demands preliminary training of a high order and of the thorough, and rigorous kind

Characteristics and Constitutionality of Medical Legislation

Right to practice medicine regulated by statute.--In the absence of a statute upon the subject, any person is at liberty to practice medicine or surgery or both. This is the common law. And yet in the absence of a statute the physician necessarily assumes certain responsibilities that grow out of his relation to those whom he treats. He is bound to bring to the discharge of his duties the learning, skill and diligence usually possessed and exercised by physicians similarly situated. In other words, while in the absence of statutory regulation, the door of the profession is open to all, the one who enters cannot escape the common law responsibility for his acts.

Justice William Rufus Day

The University of Michigan , when measured by the standard of public services rendered by its graduates, must certainly be accorded an honorable rank. For a quarter of a century the number of its alumni occupying high official station has been large. The list includes state executives, judges of state courts of last resort, senators and representatives in the national congress, cabinet officers, and members of important commissions raised by the general government for international and executive purposes. The character of the services has in some cases been conspicuous for its excellence and in all cases such as to bring honor to the incumbents and credit to their Alma Mater. The distinction of being the first of our graduates to be called to a seat upon the highest tribunal of the land belongs to the subject of this sketch

What Is the Practice of Medicine?

In a popular sense, and as ordinarily understood the practice of medicine is the applying of medical or surgical agencies for the purpose of preventing, relieving, or curing disease, or aiding natural functions, or modifying or removing the results of physical injury. Stewart v. Raab, 55 Minn. 20, 56 N. W. Rep. 256. But in some relations, and for some purposes, the expression has a more extended meaning. This is to be found sometimes in statutory provisions, sometimes in the decisions of the courts upon questions involving the construction of the expression and sometimes in both. Medical acts not infrequently state what shall be deemed to be the practice of medicine under them. But even where this is so, the courts are often called upon to interpret the words of the legislature and to determine whether or not certain acts of a party make him a practitioner of medicine within the meaning of the governing statute. Where the medical act contains no direct provision in regard to the matter, the court, in case of litigation, must determine what is the practice of medicine, and in so doing must take into consideration the general scope and purpose of the statute. The medical statutes have been enacted primarily for the protection of the public, although incidentally the medical profession are protected by these laws. The difficult cases are not those where a person attempts to heal disease by the use of drugs or ordinary appliances, but rather those where resort is had to new or extraordinary methods. Some of the ways in which this question has arisen appear in the following paragraphs

Surgical Operation on Minor without Consent of Parent

The case of Bakker v. Welsh et al., Io8 N. W. Rep. 94, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, is of interest, as it involves a question of special importance to the surgical practitioner and one upon which there seems to be a great dearth of authority

Characteristics and Constitutionality of Medical Legislation

Right to practice medicine regulated by statute.--In the absence of a statute upon the subject, any person is at liberty to practice medicine or surgery or both. This is the common law. And yet in the absence of a statute the physician necessarily assumes certain responsibilities that grow out of his relation to those whom he treats. He is bound to bring to the discharge of his duties the learning, skill and diligence usually possessed and exercised by physicians similarly situated. In other words, while in the absence of statutory regulation, the door of the profession is open to all, the one who enters cannot escape the common law responsibility for his acts.