An Upper Bound on the Convergence Time for Quantized Consensus of Arbitrary Static Graphs

We analyze a class of distributed quantized consensus algorithms for arbitrary static networks. In the initial setting, each node in the network has an integer value. Nodes exchange their current estimate of the mean value in the network, and then update their estimation by communicating with their neighbors in a limited capacity channel in an asynchronous clock setting. Eventually, all nodes reach consensus with quantized precision. We analyze the expected convergence time for the general quantized consensus algorithm proposed by Kashyap et al \cite{Kashyap}. We use the theory of electric networks, random walks, and couplings of Markov chains to derive an $O(N^3\log N)$ upper bound for the expected convergence time on an arbitrary graph of size $N$, improving on the state of art bound of $O(N^5)$ for quantized consensus algorithms. Our result is not dependent on graph topology. Example of complete graphs is given to show how to extend the analysis to graphs of given topology.Comment: to appear in IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, January, 2015. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1208.078

Does Trade Globalization Induce or Inhibit Corporate Transparency? Unbundling the Growth Potential and Product Market Competition Channels

How does increasing globalization affect corporate transparency? Freer trade represents different facets and in theory has ambiguous effects on corporate transparency. On the one hand, by exposing firms to more product market competition, it could discourage discretionary disclosure. On the other hand, by opening up foreign markets and enhancing firms’ growth opportunities, it may promote more transparency. Rather than simply estimating a net effect, this paper pursues an approach that allows separate estimation of the two potentially opposing channels. We employ three different measures of corporate transparency and track their evolutions for 4061 firms in 49 countries during 1992-2005. By using detailed product-level tariff schedules for these countries, we construct a measure of growth opportunities enabled by foreign tariff liberalizations at the sector-country-year level, and a second measure of globalization-induced product market competition based on a country’s own tariff liberalization (again at the sector–country-year level). We find strong evidence that higher growth opportunities engendered by globalization promotes corporate transparency, especially in industries that depend heavily on external financing. At the same time, we find somewhat weaker evidence that greater product market competition engendered by globalization discourages corporate transparency. The results demonstrate the importance of disentangling the multiple and potentially conflicting effects of globalization.

High Risk Flash Flood Rainstorm Mapping

Source: ICHE Conference Archive - https://mdi-de.baw.de/icheArchive