Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates

Does government debt affect interest rates? Despite a substantial body of empirical analysis, the answer based on the past two decades of research is mixed. While many studies suggest, at most, a single-digit rise in the interest rate when government debt increases by one percent of GDP, others estimate either much larger effects or find no effect. Comparing results across studies is complicated by differences in economic models, definitions of econometric approaches, and sources of data. Using a standard set of data and a simple analytical framework, we reconsider and add to empirical evidence on the effect of federal government debt and interest rates. We begin by deriving analytically the effect of government debt on the real interest rate and find that an increase in government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP would be predicted to increase the real interest rate by about two to three basis points. While some existing studies estimate effects in this range, others find larger effects. In almost all cases, these larger estimates come from specifications relating federal deficits (as opposed to debt) and the level of interest rates or from specifications not controlling adequately for macroeconomic influences on interest rates that might be correlated with deficits. We present our own empirical analysis in two parts. First, we examine a variety of conventional reduced-form specifications linking interest rates and government debt and other variables. In particular, we provide estimates for three types of specifications to permit comparisons among different approaches taken in previous research; we estimate the effect of: an expected, or projected, measure of federal government debt on a forward-looking measure of the real interest rate; an expected, or projected, measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real interest rate; and a current measure of federal government debt on a current measure of the real interest rate. Most of the statistically significant estimated effects are consistent with the prediction of the simple analytical calculation. Second, we provide evidence using vector autoregression analysis. In general, these results are similar to those found in our reduced-form econometric analysis and consistent with the analytical calculations. Taken together, the bulk of our empirical results suggest that an increase in federal government debt equivalent to one percent of GDP, all else equal, would be expected to increase the long-term real rate of interest by about three basis points, though one specification suggests a larger impact, while some estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. By presenting a range of results with the same data, we illustrate the dependence of estimation on specification and definition differences.

"Success Taxes," Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation

Interest in the role of entrepreneurial entry in innovation raises the question of the extent to which tax policy encourages or discourages entry. We find that, while the level of the marginal tax rate has a negative effect in entrepreneurial entry, the progressivity of the tax also discourages entrepreneurship, and significantly so for some groups of households. These effects are principally traceable to the upside' or success' convexity of the household tax schedule. Prospective entrants from a priori innovative industries and occupations are no less affected by the considerations we examine than other prospective entrants. In terms of destination-based industry and occupation measures of innovative entrepreneurs, we find mixed evidence on whether innovative entrepreneurs differ from the general population; the results for entrepreneurs moving to innovative industries suggest that they may be unaffected by tax convexity but the possible endogeneity of this measure of innovative entrepreneurs confounds interpreting this specification. Using education as a measure of potential for innovation, we find that tax convexity discourages entry into self-employment for people of all educational backgrounds. Overall, we find little evidence that the tax effects are focused simply on the employment changes of less skilled or less promising potential entrants.

The Effects of Progressive Income Taxation on Job Turnover

We examine whether the level of the income tax rate and the convexity of the income tax schedule affect job mobility, as measured by moving to a better job. While the predicted effect of the level of the tax rate is ambiguous, we predict that an increase in the convexity of the tax schedule decreases job search activity by taxing away some of the benefits of a successful job search. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate that both higher tax rates and increased tax rate progressivity decrease the probability that a head of household will move to a better job during the coming year. Our estimates imply that a five-percentage-point reduction in the marginal tax rate increases the average probability of moving to a better job by 0.79 percentage points (a 8.0 percent increase in the turnover propensity) and that a onestandard- deviation in our measure of tax progressivity would increase this probability by 0.86 percentage points (a 8.7 percent increase in the turnover propensity).

Entrepreneurship and Household Saving

In this paper, we argue that costly external financing for entrepreneurial investments (coupled with potentially high returns on those investments) has important implications for the saving, investment, and entry decisions of continuing and potential entrepreneurs. These effects are similar in spirit to the role played by costly external financing on investment by corporations. Using data from the 1983 and 1989 Federal Reserve Board Surveys of Consumer Finances, we quantify three findings about entrepreneurial saving decisions and their role in household wealth accumulation. First, entrepreneurial households own a substantial share of household wealth and income, and this share increases throughout the wealth distribution and the income distribution. Second, the portfolios of entrepreneurial households, even wealthy ones, are very undiversified, with the bulk of assets held within active businesses. Third, wealth-income ratios and saving rates are higher for entrepreneurial households even after controlling for age and other demographic variables. Taken together, these findings suggest that studies of household saving decisions in general and of the savings decisions of wealthy or high-income households in particular have paid insufficient attention to the role of entrepreneurial decisions and their role in wealth accumulation. Our conclusion that entrepreneurial saving and investment decisions are interdependent raises three areas for future research: (1) measuring the role of entrepreneurs in aggregate wealth accumulation; (2) studying implications for portfolio allocation and asset pricing; and (3) analyzing consequences for tax policy toward entrepreneurial saving and investment.

Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment

macroeconomics, Financing Constraints, Corporate Investment

Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment: Response to Kaplan and Zingales

Kaplan and Zingales (1995, hereafter KZ) criticize Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988, hereafter FHP) and much ensuing research that uses cross-sectional differences in firm behavior to test for financing constraints on investment. This reply identifies flaws in the KZ analysis. The questions KZ raise have been considered extensively and rigorously in the literature (most of which is not addressed in KZ), with results broadly similar to those of FHP. We also challenge both of KZ's main results. First, their finding that most of the FHP firms are not financially constrained relies on an inappropriate operational definition of what it means to be constrained. Their definition ignores the incentives for firms that operate in imperfect capital markets to accumulate stocks of cash or maintain unused debt capacity to offset partially shocks to the flow of internal finance. Second, the KZ regression results (lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms classified as constrained than for those classified as unconstrained) are uninformative. Their classification approach relies on possibly self- serving managerial statements that may present a distorted picture of firm's availability of finance. It also employs misleading criteria to make unrealistically fine distinctions in the degree of financing constraints, and emphasizes financial distress rather than financing constraints. Finally, econometric problems affect the interpretation of the KZ regressions. We conclude that the KZ findings do not contradict the interpretation of the empirical results in FHP and subsequent research.

Internal Finance and Firm Investment

We examine the neoclassical investment model using a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms. The standard model with no financing constraints cannot be rejected for firms with high (pre-sample) dividend payouts. However, it is decisively rejected for firms with low (pre-sample) payouts (firms we expect to face financing constraints). Hem, investment is sensitive to both firm cash flow and macroeconomic credit conditions, holding constant investment opportunities. Sample splits based on firm size or maturity do not produce such distinctions. The latter comparison identifies firms where "free-cash-flow" problems might be expected to produce correlations between investment and cash flow.