Lobbying Battles in the Libyan War

In many contemporary armed conflicts, belligerent parties fight not only on the battlefield, but also on the diplomatic front in the world’s capitals. In Washington and other US cities, warring groups often hire high-profile public relations professionals in order to gain access to US policymakers and influence policy. This brief, by Bush School faculty member Reyko Huang, uses the ongoing conflict in Libya to illustrate the foreign war lobby in the United States and examine why fighting groups hire American lobbyists, far from the war front

Arms for education? External support and rebel social services

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels’ need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels’ incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels’ resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories

Lobbying Battles in the Libyan War

In many contemporary armed conflicts, belligerent parties fight not only on the battlefield, but also on the diplomatic front in the world’s capitals. In Washington and other US cities, warring groups often hire high-profile public relations professionals in order to gain access to US policymakers and influence policy. This brief, by Bush School faculty member Reyko Huang, uses the ongoing conflict in Libya to illustrate the foreign war lobby in the United States and examine why fighting groups hire American lobbyists, far from the war front

Democracy on the Battlefield? Why Armed Groups Hold Elections

Armed rebel groups, by definition, use violence to fight against the state in efforts to take over the central government or achieve independent statehood. And yet, this simple view of rebel groups as belligerents belies the fact that they engage in a wide range of non-violent political projects as part of their militant campaigns. Among them, one phenomenon stands out as being particularly arresting given the wartime context: many rebel groups hold popular elections during war. What explains this behavior

The Elitism of Armed Rebellion

The global fame—or ignominy—of rebel leaders is often determined by the degree of violence and upheaval they and their armed organizations generate. Names like Joseph Kony, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Jonas Savimbi are inseparable from the violent political projects of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Islamic State, and UNITA, which these individuals led, respectively. But are these men representative of rebel leaders as a class of political actors in international politics? Though civil wars are the most common form of warfare today, we have little systematic information on the leaders of rebel organizations. This article reveals a new research tool that helps fill that gap and also describes why the information is important

The Wartime Origins of Postwar Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes

Despite widespread depiction of civil war as a pathway to autocracy or state failure, the empirical record shows significant variation in post-civil war states' regime trajectories. While some states settled into durable authoritarianism, others went on to enter the ranks of electoral democracies shortly after belligerents laid down their arms. What explains this variation? In the extreme, how is it that a state that is staunchly autocratic at the war's outbreak can emerge from it a nascent democracy? This study proposes that post-civil war regime outcomes have wartime origins. Differences in the nature of rebel governance of civilians generate different social and institutional legacies across civil wars. These legacies can endure into peacetime politics, affecting the latter in often unintended ways. The theory centers on two wartime transformations that result from different forms of rebel governance. First, where rebels depend heavily on civilian material support, civilians become mobilized as a political force. Widespread social mobilization can in turn create political pressures on postwar elites to respond with a democratization strategy. Second, where rebel groups engage in extensive wartime "statebuilding," they create formal and informal institutions of governance which they can carry over into postwar politics should they prevail in the war. Because institutions are sticky, how they govern civilians in times of war can affect how they will govern in times of peace. These arguments are tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. An original cross-national dataset on rebel governance for all civil wars ending between 1950 and 2006 serves as the basis, first, for a novel empirical analysis of rebel governance in civil war, then for statistical tests of the theory. To further probe the theory's causal claims, the study engages in an in-depth analysis of the Nepalese civil war and its political aftermath based on field interviews. The theory is further tested in a comparative analysis of the Ugandan, Tajik, and Mozambican civil wars. Together, empirical findings show that rebel governance in civil war can catalyze significant social and political change, with enduring impacts on postwar political regimes. The study offers theoretical and practical implications for our understanding of, and response to, the politics of violent rebellion and its effects on regime development

Replication Data for "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War"

Replication data for Reyko Huang, "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War," International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89–126

Reconciliation as State-building in East Timor

Reconciliação como formação de estado em Timor-Leste. Tal como reconciliação e justiça entraram no discurso neo-liberal sobre direitos humanos que emergiu no período a seguir à guerra-fria, também em Timor-Leste após o conflito foram institucionalizadas várias formas de mecanismos de reconciliação e justiça. Nenhuma, porém, atraiu tantos fundos e tantas atenções como a CAVR, a Comissão para a Verdade e a Reconciliação em Timor-Leste. Por que é que foi assim, especialmente se considerarmos o falhanço do sistema jurídico indonésio em impor justiça em elementos superiores do exército acusados de crimes de guerra em Timor-Leste e, em particular, considerando a falta de recursos e de autoridade ao dispor do próprio sistema de Timor-Leste encarregado de julgar crimes graves ? Porquê o recuo na procura de nenhuma impunidade para criminosos de guerra e por que motivo abraçaram os dirigentes de Timor-Leste processos de reconciliação individual e colectiva ? Esta fé em formas tradicionais de reconciliação terá sido reivindicada considerando especialmente a história da violência neste estado assente em metade de uma ilha ? De facto, à medida que o processo CAVR entra na sua fase final, quais são os méritos desta forma de gestão após o conflito e que lições podem ser retiradas da situação específica de Timor-Leste na Ásia e Melanésia para outras situações pós-conflito ? Reconhecendo que a reconciliação em situações pós-conflito tem atraído muito menos literatura, este artigo procura enquadrar criticamente a CAVR e o processo de reconciliação em Timor-Leste dentro dos largos parâmetros do processo político de formação do estado ajudado pelas Nações Unidas.Just as reconciliation and justice have entered the neo-liberal discourse on human rights that emerged in the post-Cold War period, so in post-conflict East Timor various forms of reconciliation and justice mechanisms have been institutionalized. None has attracted as much funding and attention as CAVR, East Timor's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Why has this been so, especially given the failure of the Indonesian legal system to deliver justice on senior military elements charged with war crimes in East Timor, and especially given the lack of resources and empowerment offered East Timor's own hybrid legal system charged with trying serious crimes ? Why the retreat from seeking no impunity for war criminals and why the embrace by East Timorese leaders of individual and community reconciliation processes ? Has this faith in traditional forms of reconciliation been vindicated, especially given the history of violence in this half-island state ? Indeed, as the CAVR process enters its final stage, what are the merits of this form of post-conflict management and what lessons can be derived from East Timor's specific Melanesian-Asian setting for other post-conflict situations ? Acknowledging that reconciliation in post-conflict situations has attracted far less literature, this article seeks to critically frame CAVR and the reconciliation process in East Timor within the broad parameters of political process and UN-sponsored state-building.La réconciliation comme processus de construction de l'État au Timor Oriental. De même que la réconciliation et la justice ont fait leur entrée dans le discours néolibéral sur les droits de l'homme qui est apparu dans la période qui a suivi la Guerre Froide, à Timor Oriental, la période ouverte à la fin du conflit a vu l'institutionnalisation de diverses formes de mécanismes de réconciliation et de justice. Aucune d'entre elles n'a attiré autant de subventions et d'attention que la CAVR, la Commission pour la vérité et la réconciliation à Timor Oriental. Comment expliquer cette situation, surtout compte tenu de l'incapacité du système juridique indonésien à juger certains officiers supérieurs accusés de crimes de guerre et du manque de ressources et de pouvoir accordés au système juridique hybride de Timor Oriental chargé de juger des crimes graves ? Pourquoi faire machine arrière après avoir demandé que les criminels de guerre ne bénéficient d'aucune impunité et pourquoi les leaders du Timor Oriental adoptent-ils des procédés de réconciliation individuelle et communautaire ? Cette foi dans les formes traditionnelles de réconciliation a-t-elle été justifiée, notamment à la lumière du passé violent qu'a connu cet État occupant la moitié de l'île ? Alors que le processus de la CAVR entre dans sa phase finale, quels sont les mérites de cette forme de gestion de la situation post-conflit et quelles leçons peut-on tirer du contexte spécifiquement mélanésien et asiatique de Timor Oriental pour d'autres situations de même nature ? Conscients du fait que la réconciliation dans de tels contextes a fait l'objet de peu de publications, l'objectif des auteurs est de fournir une mise en perspective critique de la CAVR et du processus de réconciliation à Timor Oriental dans le cadre plus large du processus politique et de la construction de l'État sponsorisée par l'ONU.Gunn Geoffrey, Huang Reyko. Reconciliation as State-building in East Timor. In: Lusotopie, n°11, 2004. Médias pouvoir et identités. pp. 19-38

Counting What Counts: Ten Steps Toward Increasing the Relevance of Empirical Research in the UN System

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Reconciliation as State-building in East Timor

Reconciliação como formação de estado em Timor-Leste. Tal como reconciliação e justiça entraram no discurso neo-liberal sobre direitos humanos que emergiu no período a seguir à guerra-fria, também em Timor-Leste após o conflito foram institucionalizadas várias formas de mecanismos de reconciliação e justiça. Nenhuma, porém, atraiu tantos fundos e tantas atenções como a CAVR, a Comissão para a Verdade e a Reconciliação em Timor-Leste. Por que é que foi assim, especialmente se considerarmos o falhanço do sistema jurídico indonésio em impor justiça em elementos superiores do exército acusados de crimes de guerra em Timor-Leste e, em particular, considerando a falta de recursos e de autoridade ao dispor do próprio sistema de Timor-Leste encarregado de julgar crimes graves ? Porquê o recuo na procura de nenhuma impunidade para criminosos de guerra e por que motivo abraçaram os dirigentes de Timor-Leste processos de reconciliação individual e colectiva ? Esta fé em formas tradicionais de reconciliação terá sido reivindicada considerando especialmente a história da violência neste estado assente em metade de uma ilha ? De facto, à medida que o processo CAVR entra na sua fase final, quais são os méritos desta forma de gestão após o conflito e que lições podem ser retiradas da situação específica de Timor-Leste na Ásia e Melanésia para outras situações pós-conflito ? Reconhecendo que a reconciliação em situações pós-conflito tem atraído muito menos literatura, este artigo procura enquadrar criticamente a CAVR e o processo de reconciliação em Timor-Leste dentro dos largos parâmetros do processo político de formação do estado ajudado pelas Nações Unidas.Just as reconciliation and justice have entered the neo-liberal discourse on human rights that emerged in the post-Cold War period, so in post-conflict East Timor various forms of reconciliation and justice mechanisms have been institutionalized. None has attracted as much funding and attention as CAVR, East Timor's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Why has this been so, especially given the failure of the Indonesian legal system to deliver justice on senior military elements charged with war crimes in East Timor, and especially given the lack of resources and empowerment offered East Timor's own hybrid legal system charged with trying serious crimes ? Why the retreat from seeking no impunity for war criminals and why the embrace by East Timorese leaders of individual and community reconciliation processes ? Has this faith in traditional forms of reconciliation been vindicated, especially given the history of violence in this half-island state ? Indeed, as the CAVR process enters its final stage, what are the merits of this form of post-conflict management and what lessons can be derived from East Timor's specific Melanesian-Asian setting for other post-conflict situations ? Acknowledging that reconciliation in post-conflict situations has attracted far less literature, this article seeks to critically frame CAVR and the reconciliation process in East Timor within the broad parameters of political process and UN-sponsored state-building.La réconciliation comme processus de construction de l'État au Timor Oriental. De même que la réconciliation et la justice ont fait leur entrée dans le discours néolibéral sur les droits de l'homme qui est apparu dans la période qui a suivi la Guerre Froide, à Timor Oriental, la période ouverte à la fin du conflit a vu l'institutionnalisation de diverses formes de mécanismes de réconciliation et de justice. Aucune d'entre elles n'a attiré autant de subventions et d'attention que la CAVR, la Commission pour la vérité et la réconciliation à Timor Oriental. Comment expliquer cette situation, surtout compte tenu de l'incapacité du système juridique indonésien à juger certains officiers supérieurs accusés de crimes de guerre et du manque de ressources et de pouvoir accordés au système juridique hybride de Timor Oriental chargé de juger des crimes graves ? Pourquoi faire machine arrière après avoir demandé que les criminels de guerre ne bénéficient d'aucune impunité et pourquoi les leaders du Timor Oriental adoptent-ils des procédés de réconciliation individuelle et communautaire ? Cette foi dans les formes traditionnelles de réconciliation a-t-elle été justifiée, notamment à la lumière du passé violent qu'a connu cet État occupant la moitié de l'île ? Alors que le processus de la CAVR entre dans sa phase finale, quels sont les mérites de cette forme de gestion de la situation post-conflit et quelles leçons peut-on tirer du contexte spécifiquement mélanésien et asiatique de Timor Oriental pour d'autres situations de même nature ? Conscients du fait que la réconciliation dans de tels contextes a fait l'objet de peu de publications, l'objectif des auteurs est de fournir une mise en perspective critique de la CAVR et du processus de réconciliation à Timor Oriental dans le cadre plus large du processus politique et de la construction de l'État sponsorisée par l'ONU.Gunn Geoffrey, Huang Reyko. Reconciliation as State-building in East Timor. In: Lusotopie, n°11, 2004. Médias pouvoir et identités. pp. 19-38