Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?

Merger policy is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. It is now widely believed that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on static efficiency to account for innovation and address dynamic efficiency. Innovation can fundamentally affect merger analysis in two ways. First, innovation can dramatically affect the relationship between the pre-merger marketplace and what is likely to happen if a proposed merger is consummated. Thus, innovation can fundamentally influence the appropriate analysis for addressing traditional, static efficiency concerns. Second, innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance that is potentially affected by a merger. We explore how merger policy is meeting the challenges posed by innovation.

The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation

The continued growth of forensic DNA databases has brought about greater interest in a search method known as familial or kinship matching. Whereas a typical database search seeks the source of a crime-scene stain by making an exact match between a known person and the DNA sample, familial searching instead looks for partial matches in order to find potential relatives of the source. The use of a familial DNA search to identify the alleged Grim Sleeper killer in California brought national attention to the method, which has many proponents. In contrast, this Article argues against the practice of familial searching on a variety of grounds, including claims related to equality, accuracy, privacy, racial discrimination, and democratic accountability. It then addresses the legality of the method. Lastly, in the event that arguments to prohibit the practice prove unpersuasive, this Article sets forth recommendations for restrictions on familial searches that might ameliorate their possible iniquitous effects

Mergers and Innovation

Merger review is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. It is now widely believed that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on short-run, price and output effects to account for longer-run effects on technological innovation. The question is, how should merger policy adapt to technological change? Some have argued that the right response is for antitrust authorities to reduce merger enforcement to prevent unintended harm to innovation. Others have suggested that the enforcement agencies analyze a merger’s effects on innovation using the same framework they use to analyze a transaction’s effects on prices and output levels. We argue that merger authorities should neither treat innovation like price and output under the existing framework nor retreat from enforcement in the name of innovation. We examine how merger policy should change both to accommodate the influence of innovation on traditional, static efficiency concerns and to recognize that innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance affected by a merger

Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States

This article discusses changes in the U.S. telecommunications market over the last decade and argues that increasing competitive substitution from wireless and internetbased communications has undermined the rationale for conventional monopoly regulation of incumbent local telephone carriers. The article suggests that the time is right to shift from a regime of a priori rules governing incumbent-form conduct to a regime of ex post competition enforcement

Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States

This article discusses changes in the U.S. telecommunications market over the last decade and argues that increasing competitive substitution from wireless and internetbased communications has undermined the rationale for conventional monopoly regulation of incumbent local telephone carriers. The article suggests that the time is right to shift from a regime of a priori rules governing incumbent-form conduct to a regime of ex post competition enforcement

Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence

Since Ronald H. Coase's (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating. We review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions: First, what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and, second, what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment, and profits. Throughout, we highlight areas of potential cross-fertilization and promising areas for future work