1,834 research outputs found
When the signal is in the noise: Exploiting Diffix's Sticky Noise
Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A
large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the
de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and
shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based
systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed
as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working
Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less
noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing
for an unlimited number of queries.
This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the
noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the
dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a
likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We
show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to
infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our
second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect
the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using
this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private
attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between
93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to
optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7%
accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user.
Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix,
is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore
argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of
anonymization. [...
QuerySnout: automating the discovery of attribute inference attacks against query-based systems
Although query-based systems (QBS) have become one of the main solutions to share data anonymously, building QBSes that robustly protect the privacy of individuals contributing to the dataset is a hard problem. Theoretical solutions relying on differential privacy guarantees are difficult to implement correctly with reasonable accuracy, while ad-hoc solutions might contain unknown vulnerabilities. Evaluating the privacy provided by QBSes must thus be done by evaluating the accuracy of a wide range of privacy attacks. However, existing attacks against QBSes require time and expertise to develop, need to be manually tailored to the specific systems attacked, and are limited in scope. In this paper, we develop QuerySnout, the first method to automatically discover vulnerabilities in query-based systems. QuerySnout takes as input a target record and the QBS as a black box, analyzes its behavior on one or more datasets, and outputs a multiset of queries together with a rule to combine answers to them in order to reveal the sensitive attribute of the target record. QuerySnout uses evolutionary search techniques based on a novel mutation operator to find a multiset of queries susceptible to lead to an attack, and a machine learning classifier to infer the sensitive attribute from answers to the queries selected. We showcase the versatility of QuerySnout by applying it to two attack scenarios (assuming access to either the private dataset or to a different dataset from the same distribution), three real-world datasets, and a variety of protection mechanisms. We show the attacks found by QuerySnout to consistently equate or outperform, sometimes by a large margin, the best attacks from the literature. We finally show how QuerySnout can be extended to QBSes that require a budget, and apply QuerySnout to a simple QBS based on the Laplace mechanism. Taken together, our results show how powerful and accurate attacks against QBSes can already be found by an automated system, allowing for highly complex QBSes to be automatically tested "at the pressing of a button". We believe this line of research to be crucial to improve the robustness of systems providing privacy-preserving access to personal data in theory and in practice
Laser welding of polyamide-6.6 and titanium: a chemical bonding story
Hybrid materials are more and more common in biomedical applications, such as implants. However, assembling the materials is still challenging. Mechanical fastening solutions present durability problems, and adhesive solutions rarely combine strong mechanical properties and biocompatibility. To address these difficulties laser welding is a promising solution. It is a fast process with great design freedom that requires no additional material at the interface. Since the process is quite recent, the involved fundamental mechanism are not well understood. Hence this work aims at exploring the existence of a chemical bond between two materials: titanium and polyamide-6.6. Samples composed of a block of polyamide-6.6 welded to a titanium sheet were broken and analysed using XPS and ToF-SIMS. Results show more polymer in the weld and the chemical bond seems to be a complexation of titanium with the amide function
Pool inference attacks on local differential privacy: quantifying the privacy guarantees of apple's count mean sketch in practice
Behavioral data generated by users’ devices, ranging from emoji use to pages visited, are collected at scale to improve apps and services. These data, however, contain fine-grained records and can reveal sensitive information about individual users. Local differential privacy has been used by companies as a solution to collect data from users while preserving privacy. We here first introduce pool inference attacks, where an adversary has access to a user’s obfuscated data, defines pools of objects, and exploits the user’s polarized behavior in multiple data collections to infer the user’s preferred pool. Second, we instantiate this attack against Count Mean Sketch, a local differential privacy mechanism proposed by Apple and deployed in iOS and Mac OS devices, using a Bayesian model. Using Apple’s parameters for the privacy loss ε, we then consider two specific attacks: one in the emojis setting — where an adversary aims at inferring a user’s preferred skin tone for emojis — and one against visited websites — where an adversary wants to learn the political orientation of a user from the news websites they visit. In both cases, we show the attack to be much more effective than a random guess when the adversary collects enough data. We find that users with high polarization and relevant interest are significantly more vulnerable, and we show that our attack is well-calibrated, allowing the adversary to target such vulnerable users. We finally validate our results for the emojis setting using user data from Twitter. Taken together, our results show that pool inference attacks are a concern for data protected by local differential privacy mechanisms with a large ε, emphasizing the need for additional technical safeguards and the need for more research on how to apply local differential privacy for multiple collections
Quantifying Surveillance in the Networked Age: Node-based Intrusions and Group Privacy
From the "right to be left alone" to the "right to selective disclosure",
privacy has long been thought as the control individuals have over the
information they share and reveal about themselves. However, in a world that is
more connected than ever, the choices of the people we interact with
increasingly affect our privacy. This forces us to rethink our definition of
privacy. We here formalize and study, as local and global node- and
edge-observability, Bloustein's concept of group privacy. We prove
edge-observability to be independent of the graph structure, while
node-observability depends only on the degree distribution of the graph. We
show on synthetic datasets that, for attacks spanning several hops such as
those implemented by social networks and current US laws, the presence of hubs
increases node-observability while a high clustering coefficient decreases it,
at fixed density. We then study the edge-observability of a large real-world
mobile phone dataset over a month and show that, even under the restricted
two-hops rule, compromising as little as 1% of the nodes leads to observing up
to 46% of all communications in the network. More worrisome, we also show that
on average 36\% of each person's communications would be locally
edge-observable under the same rule. Finally, we use real sensing data to show
how people living in cities are vulnerable to distributed node-observability
attacks. Using a smartphone app to compromise 1\% of the population, an
attacker could monitor the location of more than half of London's population.
Taken together, our results show that the current individual-centric approach
to privacy and data protection does not encompass the realities of modern life.
This makes us---as a society---vulnerable to large-scale surveillance attacks
which we need to develop protections against
Influence of Aluminum Laser Ablation on Interfacial Thermal Transfer and Joint Quality of Laser Welded Aluminum–Polyamide Assemblies
Laser assisted metal–polymer joining (LAMP) is a novel assembly process for the development of hybrid lightweight products with customized properties. It was already demonstrated that laser ablation of aluminum alloy Al1050 (Al) prior to joining with polyamide 6.6 (PA) has significant influence on the joint quality, manifested in the joint area. However, profound understanding of the factors affecting the joint quality was missing. This work investigates the effects of laser ablation on the surface properties of Al, discusses their corresponding impact on the interfacial thermal transfer between the joining partners, and evaluates their effects on the joint quality. Samples ablated with different parameters, resulting in a range from low- to high-quality joints, were selected, and their surface properties were analyzed by using 2D profilometry, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), scanning electron microscope (SEM), and energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDX). In order to analyze the effects of laser ablation parameters on the interfacial thermal transfer between metal and polymer, a model two-layered system was analyzed, using laser flash analysis (LFA), and the thermal contact resistance (TCR) was quantified. Results indicate a strong influence of laser-ablation parameters on the surface structural and morphological properties, influencing the thermal transfer during the laser welding process, thus affecting the joint quality and its resistance to shear load
- …