Exchange Rate Regime Transition Dynamics In East Asia

This paper investigates the currency regime choices of six East Asian emerging countries, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, for the period 1973-99 from the optimum currency area (OCA), macroeconomic stabilization and currency crisis perspectives. It finds that regime transition dynamics in these countries are statistically insignificant for the period under consideration, but static regime choice is largely consistent with the predictions of international macroeconomics. The empirical results suggest that a more fixed or flexible regime is suitable for these East Asian countries.

International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century—Which Way?

This paper examines some competing views on currency regime choice by applying the dynamic multi-state Markov (MSM) model to the regime transitions of 166 countries from 1980 to 1999. The findings suggest that the bipolar view is valid only in the long run and for a reason quite different from what the proponents had imagined, namely, economic development rather than crisis-driven exits. The estimated steady-state probabilities even predict that a unipolar fixed exchange rate system could emerge in the long run. Despite some divergence, both de jure and de facto regime data corroborate the key findings.The bipolar view, Regime transition, Crisis, Developmental stage, Markov model

Currency Regime Choice: A Survey of Empirical Literature

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the choice of exchange rate regime. Prominent issues include: (i) the choice based on fundamentals, shocks, financial structure, and political ideology; (ii) the “bipolar view” or “hollowing out hypothesis” and its validity; (iii) regime choice in emerging economies, and (iv) the discrepancy between declared and actual regime, and its consequence on the analysis of currency regime choice. Although much has been learned in each approach, this survey highlights the areas of research in which our understanding of exchange rate regime transition is still incomplete. Observed data rejects the validity of the bipolar view. Moreover, it is seen that a substantial amount of countries diverge from their de jure regime without declaration, which needs to be taken into account for drawing a valid conclusion on the choice of a regime. From the survey it may be concluded that no empirical regularities regarding the choice of a currency regime have emerged yet.

Financial Reforms and Persistently High Bank Interest Spreads in Bangladesh: Pitfalls in Institutional Development?

This paper analyzes interest rate spreads and margins in banking in Bangladesh for the period 1990-2008. The application of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel regression model to a panel of 43 banks for the period 1990-2008 reveals persistency in interest spreads and margins. The model also identifies that high administrative costs, high non-performing loan ratio and some macroeconomic factors are the key determinants of persistently high interest rate spreads and margins. Persistently high spreads and margins in old private banks (established before 1999) are attributed to a certain degree of market power in the post-liberalization period (after 1999). These factors together imply a lack of competition and efficiency in the banking sector of Bangladesh despite financial reforms.Interest rate spread and margin, Bank efficiency, Competitiveness, Bangladesh

An Analysis of Exchange Rate Regime Duration

The analysis of mean duration of exchange rate regime reveals that overall durability of regimes has been declining since the 1970s. The durability of intermediate regimes has decreased to the lowest in the 1990s than those in the 1970s and 1980s, which provides a basis for the hollowing out hypothesis. The changing pattern of regime distribution might be associated with the changing pattern of developmental stage.Exchange rate regime duration, developmental stage

Do Currency Regime and Developmental Stage Matter for Real Exchange Rate Volatility? A Cross-Country Analysis

This paper analyzes real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility of 18 countries for the post-Bretton Woods period (1973-2004) under the Markov chain model framework. The findings can be summarized as follows: (i) flexible regimes induce higher short-term volatility; (ii) neither currency regime nor developmental stage is found to induce long-term real volatility; and (iii) flexible regimes and lower level of development can help adjust to long-term real shocks. Further investigation suggests that less developed economies adjust to long-term real shocks by deviating from their de jure exchange rate regime. Moreover, estimated steady state probability suggests that REER exhibits more stability in the long run, and it takes around 20 months to converge to equilibrium. In other words, this finding provides an explanation to purchasing power parity (PPP) in relative terms.Currency regime, Developmental stage, Real exchange rate volatility

Financial Deregulations, Conflict of Interest and Banking Crisis in Japan: A Decision-theoretic-GARCH Approach to Analyze the Management Behavior

This paper proposes an empirical model framework to analyze the management behavior that is crucial at the outset of financial deregulations and/or crisis. In a learning model setting, the proposed framework shows that management efficiency is a function of conditional hateroschedasticity of profitability (productivity), and it can be estimated by the GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986). Application of the GARCH model in analyzing management behavior enables to consider information theory explicitly, and it has been found effective in explaining causality of the Japanese banking crisis. Moreover, the paper also shows how to explain the sources of variations in the behavior of the bank management.Financial deregulation, conflict of interest, banking crisis, Japan

Financial Deregulation and Crisis:An ‘Agency-conflict’ Case of Japan

The main focus of this paper is on the ‘agency-conflict’ during financial deregulations in the 1980s as the potential causality of Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s. Agency conflict is defined as the conflict of interest among the policy makers and agencies (e.g. banks) that arises as a combined effect of heteroschedasticity1 of policy shifts at that time and the overall weaknesses of corporate governance of the Japanese banks. This paper theoretically and empirically tests the hypothesis that “agency-conflict” increases short-term profit and can be a potential cause of the subsequent crisis. First part of the theoretical model based on the Bayesian Learning Model explains how agency conflict can increase profit in brief and second part of the theory explains how banks can be vulnerable to crisis at the outset of the bubble. Moreover, the theoretical model is used as the basis of empirical analyses on the causes to the probability of banking crisis. The paper also provides discussion on a number of interrelated structural changes and agency-conflicting issues that occurred in the Japanese financial system. However, the analyses find that the ‘agency-conflict’ is significant to the probability of banking crisis.Financial deregulations, agency conflict, banking crisis, and corporate governance

Exchange Rate Policy under Floating Regime in Bangladesh: An Assessment and Strategic Policy Options

This paper examines the exchange rate policy in Bangladesh for the period 2000-08. Regime classification of the paper suggests that Bangladesh maintained a de facto managed floating regime by intervening in the foreign exchange market on a regular basis. This is at odds with the Bangladesh Bank's claim of maintaining de jure floating regimesince end-May 2003. A high exchange rate pass-through is observed along with high market pressure during the period of expansionary monetary policy. Given the thin foreign exchange market and high pass-through effects, it appears difficult for Bangladesh to mainatin a freely floating regime. Although Bangladesh maintained average competitiveness, the currency remained somewhat overvalued. Based on the findings, some pragmatic policies in managing the exchange rate in Bnagladesh have been suggested.Exchange Rate, Floating Regime, Bangladesh

Development of Non Bank Financial Institutions to Strengthen the Financial System of Bangladesh

Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) represent one of the most important parts of a financial system. In Bangladesh, NBFIs are new in the financial system as compared to banking financial institutions (BFIs). Starting from the IPDC in 1981, a total of 25 NBFIs are now working in the country. As on June 30, 2001 the total amount of paid up capital and reserve of 24 NBFIs stood Tk.6901.8 million (BB, 2002). The NBFIs sector in Bangladesh consisting primarily of the development financial institutions, leasing enterprises, investment companies, merchant bankers etc. The financing modes of the NBFIs are long term in nature. Traditionally our banking financial institutions are involved in term lending activities, which are mostly unfamiliar products for them. Inefficiency of BFIs in long-term loan management has already leaded an enormous volume of outstanding loan in our country. At this backdrop, in order to ensure flow of term loans and to meet the credit gap, NBFIs have immense importance in the economy. In addition, non-bank financial sector is important to increase the mobilization of term savings and for the sake of providing support services to the capital market. The focus of this paper is to highlight the necessity and importance of NBFIs to strengthen the financial system for rapid economic development of the country.Non-Banks, Bangladesh