Optimal Life Cycle Portfolio Choice with Variable Annuities Offering Liquidity and Investment Downside Protection

This paper assesses optimal life cycle consumption and portfolio allocations when households have access to Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (GMWB) variable annuities over their adult lifetimes. Our contribution is to evaluate demand for these products which provide access to equity investments with money-back guarantees, longevity risk hedging, and partially-refundable premiums, in a realistic world with uncertain labor and capital market income as well as mortality risk. Others have predicted that consumers will only purchase such annuities late in life, but we show that they will optimally purchase GMWBs prior to retirement, consistent with their recent rapid uptick in sales. Additionally, many individuals optimally adjust their portfolios and consumption streams along the way by taking cash withdrawals from the products. These products can substantially enhance consumption, by up to 10% for those who experience highly unfavorable experiences in the stock market

Life-Cycle Portfolio Choice with Stock Market Loss Framing: Explaining the Empirical Evidence

We develop a life-cycle model with optimal consumption, portfolio choice, and flexible work hours for households with loss-framing preferences giving them disutility if they experience losses from stock investments. Structural estimation using U.S. data shows that the model tracks the empirical age-pattern of stock market participants’ financial wealth, stock shares, and work hours remarkably well. Including stock market participation costs in the model allows us to also predict low stock market participations rates observed in the overall population. Allowing for heterogeneous agents further improves explanatory power and accounts for the observed discrepancy in wealth accumulation between stockholders and non-stockholders

Putting the Pension Back in 401(k) Plans: Optimal versus Default Longevity Income Annuities

Most retirees take payouts from their defined contribution pensions as lump sums, but the US Treasury recently moved to encourage firms and individuals to convert some of the $15 trillion in plan balances into longevity income annuities paying lifetime benefits from age 85 onward. We evaluate the welfare implications of this reform using a calibrated lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice model embodying realistic institutional considerations. We show that defaulting a fixed fraction of workers’ 401(k) assets over a dollar threshold is a cost-effective and appealing way to enhance retirement security, enhancing welfare by up to 20% of retiree plan accruals

How Will Persistent Low Expected Returns Shape Household Economic Behavior?

Many believe that global capital markets will generate lower returns in the future versus the past. We examine how persistently lower real returns will reshape work, retirement, saving, and investment behavior of older persons using a calibrated dynamic life cycle model. In a low return regime, workers build up less wealth in their tax-qualified 401(k) accounts versus the past, claim social security benefits later, and work more. Moreover, the better-educated are more sensitive to real interest rate changes, and the least-educated alter their behavior less. Interestingly, wealth inequality is lower in periods of persistent low expected returns

How Persistent Low Expected Returns Alter Optimal Life Cycle Saving, Investment, and Retirement Behavior

This paper explores how an environment of persistent low returns influences saving, investing, and retirement behaviors, as compared to what in the past had been thought of as more “normal” financial conditions. Our calibrated lifecycle dynamic model with realistic tax, minimum distribution, and Social Security benefit rules produces results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age behavior of U.S. households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66. In the context of a zero return environment, we show that workers will optimally devote more of their savings to non-retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts, since the relative appeal of investing in taxable versus tax-qualified retirement accounts is lower in a low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim Social Security benefits later in a low interest rate environment

Fixed and Variable Longevity Annuities in Defined Contribution Plans: Optimal Retirement Portfolios Taking Social Security into Account

This paper investigates retirees’ optimal purchases of fixed and variable longevity income annuities using their defined contribution (DC) plan assets and given their expected Social Security benefits. As an alternative, we also evaluate using plan assets to boost Social Security benefits through delayed claiming. We determine that including deferred income annuities in DC accounts is welfare enhancing for all sex/education groups examined. We also show that providing access to well-designed variable deferred annuities with some equity exposure further enhances retiree wellbeing, compared to having access only to fixed annuities. Nevertheless, for the least educated, delaying claiming Social Security is preferred, whereas the most educated benefit more from using accumulated DC plan assets to purchase deferred annuities

How Would 401(k) ‘Rothification’ Alter Saving, Retirement Security, and Inequality?

The US has long incentivized retirement saving in 401(k) and similar retirement accounts by permitting workers to defer taxes on contributions, levying them instead when retirees withdraw funds in retirement. This paper develops a dynamic life cycle model to show how and whether ‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – would alter household saving, investment, and Social Security claiming patterns. We show that these changes differ importantly for low- versus higher-paid workers. We conclude that moving to a system that taxes pension contributions instead of withdrawals will lead to later retirement ages, particularly for the better-educated. It also would reduce work hours and lifetime tax payments and increase wealth and consumption inequality. In addition, we show how these behaviors would differ in a persistently low interest rate environment versus a more “normal” historical return world

Do Required Minimum Distribution 401(k) Rules Matter, and For Whom? Insights from a Lifecycle Model

Tax-qualified vehicles helped U.S. private-sector workers accumulate $25Tr in retirement assets. An often-overlooked important institutional feature shaping decumulations from these retirement plans is the “Required Minimum Distribution” (RMD) regulation, requiring retirees to withdraw a minimum fraction from their retirement accounts or pay excise taxes on withdrawal shortfalls. Our calibrated lifecycle model measures the impact of RMD rules on financial behavior of heterogeneous households during their worklives and retirement. We show that proposed reforms to delay or eliminate the RMD rules should have little effects on consumption profiles but more impact on withdrawals and tax payments for households with bequest motives

Money-Back Guarantees in Individual Retirement Accounts: Still a Good Deal?

Capital market volatility spurs interest in protecting retirement accounts; one such approach is to require money-back guarantees. Using a lifecycle model where investors have access to stocks, bonds, and tax-qualified retirement accounts, we show that such guarantees alter participant consumption, saving, and investment behavior during times of high interest rates, but impacts are even larger in a low-return environment. We conclude that abandoning guarantees could enhance old-age consumption for over 80% of retirees, particularly lower earners, without harming pre-retirement consumption. Our results are of interest for default investment options in individual retirement accounts such as the Pan-European Personal Pension Products

WP 2019-398

The U.S. has long incentivized retirement saving in 401(k) and similar retirement accounts by permitting workers to defer taxes on contributions, levying them instead when retirees withdraw funds in retirement. This paper develops a dynamic life-cycle model to show how and whether “Rothification” — that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts — would alter household saving, investment, and Social Security claiming patterns. We show that these changes differ importantly for low- versus higher-paid workers. We conclude that moving to a system that taxes pension contributions instead of withdrawals will lead to later retirement ages, particularly for the better-educated. It also would reduce work hours and lifetime tax payments and increase wealth and consumption inequality. In addition, we show how these behaviors would differ in a persistently low interest rate environment versus a more “normal” historical return world.U.S. Social Security Administration through the Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, award RDR18000002-01https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/151937/1/wp398.pd