Crime as Prime

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements. Rather murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder

Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will

Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will

Lying About

Lying ascriptions are standardly made using about-clauses, enabling them to characterize the content of a lie when it departs from the content of what is said. Existing accounts of lying are typically framed in ways that ignore the content of the lie; I outline a way of bringing it in

What in the world is weakness of will?

At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors

The Addict in Us all.

In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1-3) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, which in turn affects their strength. We examine these "incentive salience" desires, both in addicts and non-addicts, contrasting them with more cognitive desires. On this account, the self-control challenge faced by addicted agents is not different in kind from that faced by non-addicted agents - though the two may, of course, differ greatly in degree of difficulty. We explore a general model of self-control for both the addict and the non-addict, stressing that self-control may be employed at three different stages, and examining the ways in which it might be strengthened. This helps elucidate a general model of intentional action.This is the final published version. It first appeared at http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00139/abstract

What in the World is Weakness of Will?

At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one‘s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton (1999, 2009) claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele (2010) argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors

We don't torture: Moral resolutions, temptation, and the doctrine of double effect

‘We don’t torture’, announced both Bush and Obama. But what Bush meant as a statement of fact, Obama meant as a statement of resolve. Exploring this example, this article examines how moral resolutions work to overcome the rationalisations that temptation engenders. This in turn sheds light on the the nature of our moral concepts. Resolutions are typically framed using intentional notions (torture, murder, theft). Reflection on the reasons for this provides a new perspective on what is right, and what is wrong, about the doctrine of double effect

Animal lifestyle affects acceptable mass limits for attached tags

Animal-attached devices have transformed our understanding of vertebrate ecology. To minimize any associated harm, researchers have long advocated that tag masses should not exceed 3% of carrier body mass. However, this ignores tag forces resulting from animal movement. Using data from collar-attached accelerometers on 10 diverse free-ranging terrestrial species from koalas to cheetahs, we detail a tag-based acceleration method to clarify acceptable tag mass limits. We quantify animal athleticism in terms of fractions of animal movement time devoted to different collar-recorded accelerations and convert those accelerations to forces (acceleration x tag mass) to allow derivation of any defined force limits for specified fractions of any animal’s active time. Specifying that tags should exert forces <3% of the gravitational force exerted on the animal's body for 95% of the time led to corrected tag masses that should constitute between 1.6% and 2.98% of carrier mass, depending on athleticism. Strikingly, in four carnivore species encompassing two orders of magnitude in mass (ca. 2-200 kg), forces exerted by ‘3%’ tags were equivalent to 4-19% of carrier body mass during moving, with a maximum of 54% in a hunting cheetah. This fundamentally changes how acceptable tag mass limits should be determined by ethics bodies, irrespective of force and time limits specified

El Niño and the delayed action oscillator

We study the dynamics of the El Niño phenomenon using the mathematical model of delayedaction oscillator (DAO). Topics such as the influence of the annual cycle, global warming, stochastic influences due to weather conditions and even off-equatorial heat-sinks can all be discussed using only modest analytical and numerical resources. Thus the DAO allows for a pedagogical introduction to the science of El Niño and La Niña while at the same time avoiding the need for large-scale computing resources normally associated with much more sophisticated coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models. It is an approach which is ideally suited for student projects both at high school and undergraduate level

Ecological inference using data from accelerometers needs careful protocols

Accelerometers in animal-attached tags are powerful tools in behavioural ecology, they can be used to determine behaviour and provide proxies for movement-based energy expenditure. Researchers are collecting and archiving data across systems, seasons and device types. However, using data repositories to draw ecological inference requires a good understanding of the error introduced according to sensor type and position on the study animal and protocols for error assessment and minimization.Using laboratory trials, we examine the absolute accuracy of tri-axial accelerometers and determine how inaccuracies impact measurements of dynamic body acceleration (DBA), a proxy for energy expenditure, in human participants. We then examine how tag type and placement affect the acceleration signal in birds, using pigeons Columba livia flying in a wind tunnel, with tags mounted simultaneously in two positions, and back- and tail-mounted tags deployed on wild kittiwakes Rissa tridactyla. Finally, we present a case study where two generations of tag were deployed using different attachment procedures on red-tailed tropicbirds Phaethon rubricauda foraging in different seasons.Bench tests showed that individual acceleration axes required a two-level correction to eliminate measurement error. This resulted in DBA differences of up to 5% between calibrated and uncalibrated tags for humans walking at a range of speeds. Device position was associated with greater variation in DBA, with upper- and lower back-mounted tags varying by 9% in pigeons, and tail- and back-mounted tags varying by 13% in kittiwakes. The tropicbird study highlighted the difficulties of attributing changes in signal amplitude to a single factor when confounding influences tend to covary, as DBA varied by 25% between seasons.Accelerometer accuracy, tag placement and attachment critically affect the signal amplitude and thereby the ability of the system to detect biologically meaningful phenomena. We propose a simple method to calibrate accelerometers that can be executed under field conditions. This should be used prior to deployments and archived with resulting data. We also suggest a way that researchers can assess accuracy in previously collected data, and caution that variable tag placement and attachment can increase sensor noise and even generate trends that have no biological meaning