China after Reform: The Ideological, Constitutional, and Organisational Makings of a New Era

In late 2017, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Most observers interpreted this step as just another update of the party’s ideological canon to accommodate Xi’s ambition to increase his personal power, following in the footsteps of Mao Zedong. This contribution argues that we can achieve a better understanding of the claim about a “new era,” if this claim is analysed diachronically as an ongoing process of constructing “chrono-ideological narratives” that link past and future, as well as synchronically in the larger context of recent constitutional and organisational changes. It finds that the “new era” discourse might, in the longer term, have ramifications not only for China’s domestic politics but also for the country’s self-image in the international arena too

In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China: Bringing Ideology and Governance Back In

The contemporary politics of China reflect an ongoing effort by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to claim the right to rule in light of the consequences of economic development, international pressures, and historical change. China stands out within the Asian region for the success the regime has achieved in this effort. By focusing on the changes in China’s elite discourse during the reform period and particularly during the last decade, this paper aims to elaborate on the relative importance of various sources of legitimacy as they shift over time, as well as on their inherent dilemmas and limitations. There is evidence of an agile, responsive, and creative party effort to relegitimate the postrevolutionary regime through economic performance, nationalism, ideology, culture, governance, and democracy. At the same time, the paper identifies a clear shift in emphasis from an earlier economic-nationalistic approach to a more ideological-institutional approach.regime legitimacy, China, Chinese Communist Party, performance, nationalism, ideology, culturalism, governance, democracy

Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China: Challenges in the Post-Jiang Era

The Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. When Working Papers are eventually accepted by or published in a journal or book, the correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included in the Working Papers website at: www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central decision-making, and the role of the provinces

This article examines the formation of the Open Up the West policy from the 1980s to the present. Focusing on the dynamic interaction between central party-state and provincial-level players, it analyses the various ideological and pragmatic factors that have shaped the policy over time. The campaign to Open Up the West is decribed as a “soft policy” to highlight a very diffuse decision-making process which has produced a highly diverse set of agendas and instruments. Due to the amorphous nature of the policy, the article finds, its realization depends to a great extent on the specific interpretations and arrangements of the provincial jurisdictions involved. In June 1999 in the ancient city of Xi’an, Comrade Jiang Zemin made the appeal to the whole party and the people of the whole country on the great development of the western region. Three years have gone by, and the roads have become passable, the lights have become lit, the mountains have become green, the rivers have become clear and the travelling traders have become abundant. One after another, wonderful stories about the homeland of the western region have been circulated and sung

Rising Sino-Vietnamese tensions in the South China Sea

In May 2014 China started to drill for oil near the Paracel Islands, an area claimed by both Vietnam and China as territorial waters, which led to considerable diplomatic tensions and violent actions against Chinese enterprises in Vietnam. China's recent activity reveals an increasing assertiveness, which has raised concerns about possible military actions in the South China Sea. One could argue that China's latest undertaking is proof of its increasingly threatening behavior, thereby confirming the "China threat" thesis. However, when analyzing the context of the South China Sea disputes in recent years, the aforementioned events are consistent with an increasingly assertive behavior demonstrated by several claimant states. China's conduct in the South China Sea is determined by local conflict dynamics and should therefore not dictate Chinese foreign policy in other areas. At first glance, China's behavior could be interpreted as symptomatic of a country that is attempting to change the world order. This could provide the United States and Japan, who are increasingly distrustful of China, with justification for further containing China and embarking on a more confrontational course with the Chinese government. Politics in the South China Sea, where the territorial claims of several states overlap, are marked by a high degree of legal ambiguity, symbolic actions and nationalist resentment. Any provocative action should be interpreted within this conflict context. Although China's behavior in the South China Sea has indeed become increasingly assertive, so has that of several other claimant states – among them the Philippines and Vietnam. Therefore, China’s drilling activities should not be taken as evidence of a growing boldness in other policy areas but rather as part of China's strategy in the South China Sea. The perception of an increasingly assertive China does not stand up to an examination of its actual behavior in international politics. However, acting according to this perception in the longer run could create mistrust and frustration on the Chinese side and turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy

"He who says C must say D" - China's attempt to become the "world's largest democracy"

For more than a decade the People’s Republic of China has been perceived as a competitor governance model to Western democracy. Since the new leadership under Xi Jinping started to internationally position China as the “world’s largest democracy,” it has been challenging the West’s prerogative of interpretation of political order. As its international significance has grown, China’s demands for an equal position in the global competition over values and discourse have increased. In pursuing interpretation aspirations with regard to sociocultural values and political order, China has started to challenge the perceived discourse hegemony of the United States and the West. China’s claim to be the “world’s largest democracy” is linked to its belief that the Chinese political system should not simply be another democratic system, tailored to its national conditions; rather, in comparison to India, which in the West is considered the biggest democracy, China should be the “truest” and most economically successful democracy thanks to numerous participation mechanisms. The new interpretation of China’s political system is linked to long-standing debates amongst Chinese elites about the socialist party-state’s characteristics, achievements and deficits, and summarises them confidently and pointedly. At the same time, China’s self-description as a "democracy" corresponds well with the self-image of many Chinese people. China’s pursuit of international prerogative of interpretation is in line with domestic goals. The assertion of discourse power strengthens the supporters of a "democracy with Chinese characteristics,” on the one hand, and presents an implicit threat to critics of the domestic political system, on the other. Policy Implications Many Western observers are likely to dismiss China’s official attempts to position itself as the “world’s largest democracy” as nonsensical and implausible. How­ever, an examination of the underlying demands for discourse power would appear necessary, not only from the perspective of a pluralistic approach – which as such takes alternative worldviews seriously. The “factual power of the normative” must also be taken into account if such alternative governance discourses and values are to be introduced internationally as power resource

Making China Great Again - Xi Jinpings Abschied von der Reformära

Der Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) im Oktober 2017 und die Tagung des Nationalen Volkskongresses (NVK) im März 2018 haben eine neue Ära in der politischen Entwicklung der Volksrepublik eingeläutet. Beschlossen wurde eine Fülle ideologischer, konstitutioneller, organisatorischer und personeller Neuerungen. Zusammen markieren sie das Ende der von Deng Xiaoping im Jahr 1978 eingeleiteten Reformära. Die Kanonisierung der "Xi-Jinping-Ideen zum Sozialismus chinesischer Prägung für eine neue Ära" stellen diesen nach nur fünf Amtsjahren auf eine Stufe mit Mao Zedong und Deng Xiaoping. Programmatisch beinhalten die Xi-Jinping-Ideen nicht mehr nur ein Wohlstandsversprechen, sondern ein explizites internationales Statusstreben. Die jüngsten Verfassungsänderungen greifen tief in die konstitutionelle Architektur ein, indem die bisherige Fiktion einer Trennung zwischen Partei und Staat nun endgültig aufgegeben wird. Die Entfristung des Staatspräsidentenamtes und die Einrichtung einer Nationalen Aufsichtskommission als verlängerter Arm der Partei bestätigen dies. Ein massiver Umbau von Partei- und Regierungsorganen zielt auf eine effektivere Regierungsführung zur Bewältigung sozioökonomischer und finanzieller Risiken. Mit der Zentralisierung werden aber zugleich wichtige exekutive Aufgaben in die Hände der Partei verschoben. Die Führung hat darauf verzichtet, einen designierten Nachfolger für Xi Jinping zu bestimmen. Auch der Bruch mit informellen Altersgrenzen spricht für Vermutungen, wonach Xi die Spitzenämter in Partei, Staat und Militär über das Jahr 2023 hinaus behalten könnte. Die umfangreichen Neuerungen markieren den Aufbruch Chinas in eine neue Ära, die Reminiszenzen an die Herrschaft Mao Zedongs weckt. Angesichts des erreichten Entwicklungsstands des Landes verweisen sie zugleich aber auf ein neues Selbstverständnis im globalen Kontext. Die Führung will sich damit schlagkräftiger aufstellen, um sich künftig besser für internationale Konflikte zu wappnen. Europäische Entscheidungsträger sollten darauf gefasst sein, dass in Chinas Selbstwahrnehmung im wörtlichen Sinne "neue Zeiten" angebrochen sind, die auch auf internationalem Parkett neue Verhaltensweisen rechtfertigen

Am Steuerrad der Geschichte: Die Welt nach Chinas 20. Parteitag

Der 20. Nationale Kongress der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas im Oktober 2022 hat nicht nur gezeigt, wie fest Partei- und Staatschef Xi Jinping zu Beginn seiner dritten - womöglich lebenslangen - Amtszeit zuhause im Sattel sitzt. Vom jüngsten Parteitag gehen auch klare Signale aus, dass die Volksrepublik unter seiner Führung eine deutlich aktivere Rolle auf der internationalen Bühne beansprucht. Um die außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Implikationen zu verstehen, empfiehlt es sich, die ideologischen Botschaften des 20. Parteitags nicht nur als Rhetorik zu betrachten, sondern in ihrer handlungsleitenden Relevanz ernst zu nehmen. Der Kanon der "Xi-Jinping-Gedanken" stellt mittlerweile eine umfassende Weltanschauung mit globalen Geltungsansprüchen dar. Eine subtile, doch weitreichende Botschaft ist die Ansage Xis, vermehrt "historische Initiative" zu übernehmen. Hinter dieser Formel verbirgt sich ein wachsendes Bedürfnis, in globalen Belangen nicht länger der Spielball westlicher Eindämmungsstrategien zu sein, sondern eine proaktiv gestaltende Rolle zu spielen. Dieser Anspruch, strategische Führung zu übernehmen, wird insbesondere im Kontext des Taiwan-Konflikts artikuliert. Massive Bedrohungsszenarien lassen darauf schließen, dass die chinesische Führung sich auf eine Eskalation militärischer Konflikte in der Region einstellt, was aber nicht gleichbedeutend mit eigenen Kriegsabsichten sein muss. Zugleich finden sich vielfache Kooperationsangebote im Bereich globaler Governance, darunter die Globale Sicherheits-Initiative vom April 2022. Da China sich aus multilateralen Formaten zunehmend ausgegrenzt sieht, stehen diese Angebote allerdings immer öfter unter Vorbehalt. Für europäische Entscheidungsträgerinnen und Entscheidungsträger stellt sich damit die Frage dringlicher denn je, ob der Volksrepublik entsprechend ihres gestiegenen geopolitischen Gewichts und ihrer eigenen unmissverständlichen Ansprüche mehr Mitsprache und Gestaltungsspielraum in globalen Belangen zugestanden wird oder nicht. Davon dürfte nicht nur die Zukunft des Multilateralismus abhängen, sondern auch die Geschwindigkeit, mit der sich China und die USA im Bann spiegelbildlicher Feindseligkeit auf eine militärische Auseinandersetzung zubewegen

Civil Society Work in China: Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs

Enacted in January 2017, China's Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation Management Law ("FNGO Law") has been interpreted as the clearest evidence of "shrinking spaces" for civil society in China. While the overall trend towards tightened political control and the restriction of independent societal initiatives under Xi Jinping continues unabated, the effects of the new legal environment for non-profits operating in China remain ambiguous. The new FNGO Law epitomises the Chinese party-state's securitised and mistrustful approach towards independent social forces - notably those with Western backing - in the "new era." However, as opposed to other countries with restrictive NGO laws, Chinese authorities have stopped short of directly attacking or scapegoating NGOs. Instead, they portray the law as a transparency- and service-oriented regulatory improvement that finally grants foreign NGOs legal security. After two years, 110 European organisations out of a total of 734 have registered offices or carried out "temporary activities" under the law. Finding a Chinese sponsor remains the foremost challenge. But even registered NGOs struggle with onerous reporting burdens and transaction costs. In conjunction with the Charity Law, the FNGO Law represents an effort to gradually replace foreign funding with domestic donations. But the new legal environment generally favours larger foundations at the expense of smaller, grassroots organisations - be they Chinese or foreign ones. China's FNGO Law is but one piece of a broader shift towards a new governance approach, one that strikes a fragile balance between the openness required for China's lofty global ambitions and the party-state's all-encompassing claim to top-down social control. Facing this challenge to liberal, pluralist conceptions of international relations, European engagement with China requires both cooperation and confrontation. Non-profits engaging directly with Chinese counterparts are as important as advocacy-oriented NGOs working on more sensitive issues without the restrictions that come with continued access to mainland China