What can the capabilities approach learn from an ubuntu ethic? A relational approach to development theory

Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as the locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry

The role of the instrumental principle in economic explanations

Economic explanations tend to view individuals as acting to satisfy their preferences, so that when given a choice between goods, individuals choose those goods which have greater utility for them – they choose those goods which they believe can best satisfy their preferences in the circumstances at hand. In this thesis, I investigate how utility theory works when it is used to explain behaviour. In theory, utility is a positive concept. It is intended to describe and explain an individual’s behaviour without judging or justifying it. It also seems to be regarded as non-hypothetical, for it explains an individual’s behaviour in terms of preferences which need not be shared by others, but may be wholly particular to her. This implies a distinctive way of approaching people’s behaviour as isolated from and immune to the judgements of a community, for utility cannot be used as a common standard by which we judge an individual’s behaviour as better or worse, appropriate or inappropriate. I argue that this theoretical treatment of utility is substantially different from the practice of using utility to explain behaviour. In the first place, when utility is used to explain behaviour as preference-guided, it treats this behaviour as rational action. An explanation of rational action is, however, necessarily governed by the instrumental principle. This principle is normative – it stipulates the correct relation between a person’s means and her ends, rather than simply describing an existing relation. The principle is also non-hypothetical – our commitment to the principle does not rely on the possession of particular ends, but on having ends in general. The instrumental principle therefore acts as a common standard for reasoning about how to act, so that when we explain an agent’s behaviour as rational action, we expect that her action will conform to standards that we all share in virtue of having ends. Thus, I contend, in order to explain the rational actions of an individual, marginal utility necessarily appeals to the judgements of a community

Involuntary social experimentation: revisiting the case for a moratorium

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When are experiments corrupt?

Between 2010 and 2011, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) funded a large-scale experiment on Kenyan schools. The policy experiment tested the effects of cutting teachers’ salaries and hiring them on short-term contracts, but the intervention failed after sustained opposition from teacher unions and parent associations. This article critically revisits the narrative of how this experiment was designed, implemented and interpreted, finding evidence that the experiment violated empirical logic. It examines whether the theory of neopatrimonialism can explain the ways in which vested interests may have undermined the empirical logic of the experiment. By doing so, the analysis tests the explanatory utility of neopatrimonialism, and casts light on the conditions under which policy experiments in Africa may be anti-empirical

The role of the instrumental principle in economic explanations

Economic explanations tend to view individuals as acting to satisfy their preferences, so that when given a choice between goods, individuals choose those goods which have greater utility for them – they choose those goods which they believe can best satisfy their preferences in the circumstances at hand. In this thesis, I investigate how utility theory works when it is used to explain behaviour. In theory, utility is a positive concept. It is intended to describe and explain an individual’s behaviour without judging or justifying it. It also seems to be regarded as non-hypothetical, for it explains an individual’s behaviour in terms of preferences which need not be shared by others, but may be wholly particular to her. This implies a distinctive way of approaching people’s behaviour as isolated from and immune to the judgements of a community, for utility cannot be used as a common standard by which we judge an individual’s behaviour as better or worse, appropriate or inappropriate. I argue that this theoretical treatment of utility is substantially different from the practice of using utility to explain behaviour. In the first place, when utility is used to explain behaviour as preference-guided, it treats this behaviour as rational action. An explanation of rational action is, however, necessarily governed by the instrumental principle. This principle is normative – it stipulates the correct relation between a person’s means and her ends, rather than simply describing an existing relation. The principle is also non-hypothetical – our commitment to the principle does not rely on the possession of particular ends, but on having ends in general. The instrumental principle therefore acts as a common standard for reasoning about how to act, so that when we explain an agent’s behaviour as rational action, we expect that her action will conform to standards that we all share in virtue of having ends. Thus, I contend, in order to explain the rational actions of an individual, marginal utility necessarily appeals to the judgements of a community

Involuntary experiments in former colonies: the case for a moratorium

There is a rich literature on the use of medical trials as a model for designing and evaluating the outcomes of social policy interventions in former colonies. Yet social experimentalists have not engaged in a correspondingly vibrant discussion of medical ethics. A systematic review of social experiments shows that few studies explicitly discuss informed consent, or the serious constraints on securing informed consent from impoverished or child participants, particularly in the context of cluster randomization. The silence on informed consent, and in some cases active denial thereof, suggests that it is often considered less important than other elements of experimental design. This matters since involuntary experimentation on vulnerable people violates their personhood, increases the risk of unintended harm, and establishes continuities with colonial experimentation. There is a need to develop more effective mechanisms for regulating social experiments in former colonies. In the interim, scholars in the South have a responsibility to call for a moratorium on experiments

The knowledge commons, pan-Africanism, and epistemic inequality: a study of CODESRIA

This study is about the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Conceived in 1964 and formalised in 1973, CODESRIA is the longest-standing pan-African intellectual organisation on the continent. It was established with the primary objective of fostering greater collaboration between African scholars, and has acquired a reputation for challenging the marginalisation and fragmentation of African scholarship. However, there has been no systematic account of this important organisation. This study aims to cast light on this organisation and its intellectual contributions in the post-independence period. It examines CODESRIA as a knowledge commons - a community of scholars that creates, manages and shares intellectual goods outside of the state and the market. It asks: what factors have shaped CODESRIA as a pan-African knowledge commons in the context of epistemic inequality? As a way of answering this question, it examines three key debates: the different meanings of pan-Africanism in CODESRIA, CODESRIA’s defence of the academic project during structural adjustment, and African feminists’ struggles to change CODESRIA. These debates exemplify the ways in which different generations of African scholars in the post - independence period have sought to make sense of and respond to the problems of inequality - both outside of CODESRIA and within CODESRIA. This thesis approaches CODESRIA as a case study. It combines a document analysis with semi-structured interviews to construct and critique key intellectuals' understandings of the organisational design and practices of CODESRIA, the nature of its community and intellectual work. It supplements this with a descriptive analysis of CODESRIA’s bibliometric and administrative data. The study finds that CODESRIA has forged a distinctive form of pan-Africanism that offers a non-governmental and intellectual alternative to state-centric and bureaucratic forms of pan-Africanism. As a powerful counter-narrative to prevailing ideas of African intellectual inferiority, pan-Africanism has been an important motivational source for establishing and cohering CODESRIA’s community. Although its pan-African organisational form has been complicated by the enduring influence of colonial frameworks and limited by the the material and institutional weaknesses of African universities, it has nevertheless acted as a mode of collective enquiry for troubling and expanding the colonial conception of Africa. This study further finds that structural adjustment fundamentally reshaped the intellectual and material underpinnings of CODESRIA with complex and ambiguous results. In the short term, CODESRIA’s analysis of structural adjustment led to considerable intellectual and organisational innovation so that it grew in size and influence. In the long-run, however, structural adjustment eroded the public universities upon which CODESRIA relied. This eroded the mechanisms to maintain its intellectual vigour and democratic character, and increased CODESRIA’s dependency on donors. The study also finds that the struggles of feminist scholars to change unequal gender norms in CODESRIA have been a source of significant intellectual and organisational renewal. Contestations over gender inequality within CODESRIA have given rise to a distinctive form of African feminism, which emphasises the historicity of gender relations in ways that reject essentialist and teleological accounts of African societies. Feminist struggles have also given rise to new standards of scholastic excellence that mark a meaningful departure from the skewed standards introduced under colonial rule. Nevertheless, the persistent minoritisation of female scholars in CODESRIA has significantly limited their capacity to effect institutional change, such that the ghettoization of feminist scholarship and the hollowing out of feminist discourses on gender remains a constant threat. The central argument of this study is that inequality can motivate marginalised members to engage in the collective action required to create and reshape knowledge commons, but it can also constrain their collective action and threaten the long-term sustainability of the commons. The collective agency of marginalised individuals is therefore central to the flourishing of knowledge commons. Second, knowledge commons are intimately dependent on public goods, such as universities. Public goods are plausibly the source, and therefore the limit, of knowledge commons’ capacity to flourish over the long-term. As a consequence, it is likely that knowledge commons are complements to public goods provision, rather than substitutes. Rethinking the knowledge commons in terms of the predicaments of African intellectual communities, I contend, provides new ways of understanding the possibilities, constraints and contradictions of knowledge commons in an unequal world. This study contributes to the empirical literature on African intellectual communities. In particular, it provides critical knowledge on a scholarly community that has not only endured, but has managed to thrive in a context of profound economic and political instability. This provides an indication of the institutions, practices, and intellectual resources that are required to ensure that African knowledge systems flourish over the long-term. This study also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on knowledge commons, which are largely theorised using examples from the global North. It shows how reconceptualising knowledge commons in terms of inequality opens up new lines of empirical investigation. Building on existing commons research, it develops a methodological framework for comparative research on southern knowledge commons, which may also be of use for investigating commons in general

Teacher professionalism and accountability in South Africa: a review of the literature

This is a review of literature on teacher professionalism and accountability. The theoretical component focuses on English-language scholarship on the topic stemming from the global North and Africa, while the empirical component focuses on longitudinal studies from the global North and southern Africa – currently absent as a coherent review in the literature. The review of theoretical literature indicates that, across countries, the notion of teacher professionalism remains highly contested, and there are doubts as to whether teaching can be spoken of in the same way as other professions. This view hinges on a posited theoretical tension between accountability regimes and the professional standing of teachers. The literature suggests that, as accountability regimes deepen, teachers tend to be conceptualised as lacking in competence and in need of supervision. Teacher autonomy is consequently undermined and teaching is viewed as a “semi-profession.” Within Africa, the review indicates a complex relationship between teachers’ past struggles against colonialism and apartheid, and their present attempts to assert autonomy and participate in educational governance. In South Africa, teachers are seen to embrace hybrid identities that combine unionist and professional traits. Such hybridity is inflected by teachers’ race, class and gender position. There is relatively little analytical and historical work on the ways in which teachers’ professional status is shaped by race, class and gender. This is particularly urgent given high levels of inequality and violence in the schooling sector. The review of longitudinal studies suggests that there is a limited focus on ordinary teachers’ views and perceptions of their professional roles. High profile multi-country studies, such as TALIS and SACMEQ, have focussed largely on teacher education and subject knowledge matters. While TALIS and the Eurydice network research are increasingly gathering subjective data from teachers, there is limited longitudinal data on teachers’ views of their professional lives and the challenges they face. In South Africa particularly, such research is only starting

What Can the Capabilities Approach Learn from an Ubuntu Ethic? A Relational Approach to Development Theory

Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as the locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry

African perspectives on corruption

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