Joan Robinson Meets Harold Hotelling: A Dyopsonistic Explanation of the Gender Pay Gap

This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style dyopsony model of the labor market. Since there are only two employers equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that a fraction of the women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women are less inclined to commute to their competitor and offer lower wages to women. Since women’s labor supply at the firm level is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model presents an explanation of wage discrimination in line with Robinson (1933).monopsony, gender, discrimination

Joan Robinson Meets Harold Hotelling : A Dyopsonistic Explanation of the Gender Pay Gap

This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style dyopsony model of the labor market. Since there are only two employers equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that a fraction of the women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women are less inclined to commute to their competitor and offer lower wages to women. Since women?s labor supply at the firm level is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model presents an explanation of wage discrimination in line with Robinson (1933). -- Das folgende Papier gibt eine alternative Erklärung geschlechtsspezifischer Lohndifferentiale im Rahmen eines einfachen Dyopsonmodells des Arbeitsmarktes im Stile von Hotelling. Da nur zwei Arbeitgeber existieren, sind gleichproduktive Frauen und Männer gezwungen, zu ihrem Arbeitgeber zu pendeln, wobei Reisekosten entstehen. Es wird angenommen, dass ein Teil der Frauen höhere Reisekosten aufweist, z.B. aufgrund häuslicher Verpflichtungen. Die Arbeitgeber machen sich zunutze, dass Frauen eine geringere Pendelneigung aufweisen und daher in geringerem Maße den Arbeitgeber wechseln, indem sie ihnen geringere Löhne anbieten. Da das Arbeitsangebot von Frauen auf Firmenebene aus diesem Grunde weniger lohnelastisch ist, stellt dies eine Erklärung von Lohndiskriminierung im Sinne von Robinson (1933) dar.monopsony,gender,discrimination

Let's take bargaining models seriously: The decline in union power in Germany, 1992 - 2009

Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell substantially (by almost one-third) from 1999 to 2007. Two-thirds of this fall in union power follow from the reduction in the labour share relative to the capital share whereas changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for the remaining third. -- Dieser Beitrag versucht unter Verwendung des right-to-manage-Modells kollektiver Verhandlungen aus den beobachteten Lohnabschlüssen auf die entsprechende Gewerkschaftsmacht zurückzuschließen. Wir leiten einen zeitvarianten Indikator gewerkschaftlicher Stärke her und berechnen ihn mit Jahresdaten für Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Gewerkschaftsmacht in den 1990er Jahren relativ stabil war, aber von 1999 bis 2007 deutlich (um fast ein Drittel) zurückging. Zwei Drittel dieses Rückgangs der Gewerkschaftsmacht gehen auf eine Verringerung der Lohnquote relativ zur Kapitaleinkommensquote zurück, während Veränderungen im Abstand zwischen dem Nettolohn und dem Einkommen bei Arbeitslosigkeit für das restliche Drittel verantwortlich sind.trade union power,wage bargaining,labour share,Germany

Let's take bargaining models seriously: The decline in union power in Germany, 1992 - 2009

Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell substantially (by almost one-third) from 1999 to 2007. Two-thirds of this fall in union power follow from the reduction in the labour share relative to the capital share whereas changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for the remaining third. -- Dieser Beitrag versucht unter Verwendung des right-tomanage-Modells kollektiver Verhandlungen aus den beobachteten Lohnabschlüssen auf die entsprechende Gewerkschaftsmacht zurückzuschließen. Wir leiten einen zeitvarianten Indikator gewerkschaftlicher Stäarke her und berechnen ihn mit Jahresdaten für Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Gewerkschaftsmacht in den 1990er Jahren relativ stabil war, aber von 1999 bis 2007 deutlich (um fast ein Drittel) zurückging. Zwei Drittel dieses Rückgangs der Gewerkschaftsmacht gehen auf eine Verringerung der Lohnquote relativ zur Kapitaleinkommensquote zurück, während Veränderungen im Abstand zwischen dem Nettolohn und dem Einkommen bei Arbeitslosigkeit für das restliche Drittel verantwortlich sind.trade union power,wage bargaining,labour share,Germany

The effect of housework on wages in Germany: No impact at all

This paper presents evidence on the impact of hours spent on housework activities on individuals' wages for Germany using data from both the German Socio-Economic Panel and the German Time Use Survey. In contrast to most of the international literature, we find no negative effect of housework on wages. This holds for men and women, for married and single individuals, and for part-time and full-time workers both in West and East Germany. Our insights do not change when we distinguish different types of housework activities or address the endogeneity of housework in our wage regressions by using instrumental variables estimators. -- Auf Grundlage zweier deutscher Datensätze, des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels und der Zeitbudgeterhebung, untersucht dieser Beitrag den Einfluss der für Hausarbeit aufgewandten Zeit auf die Löhne. Im Gegensatz zum Gros der internationalen Forschungsliteratur findet sich kein negativer Effekt der Hausarbeit auf die Löhne. Dieses Ergebnis zeigt sich in West- wie Ostdeutschland sowohl für Frauen und Männer, für verheiratete Individuen und Singles als auch für Teilzeit- und Vollzeitbeschäftigte. Unsere Ergebnisse ändern sich zudem nicht, wenn wir verschiedene Formen von Hausarbeit unterscheiden oder die Endogenität der geleisteten Hausarbeit in den Lohnregressionen mithilfe von Instrumentvariablenschätzungen berücksichtigen.housework,time use,gender pay gap,Germany

Let's Take Bargaining Models Seriously: The Decline in Union Power in Germany, 1992-2009

Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell substantially (by almost one-third) from 1999 to 2007. Two-thirds of this fall in union power follow from the reduction in the labour share relative to the capital share whereas changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for the remaining third.trade union power, wage bargaining, labour share, Germany

Gender Differences in Labor Supply to Monopsonistic Firms: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked Employer-Employee Data from Germany

This paper investigates women's and men's labor supply to the firm within a structural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a linked employer-employee dataset for Germany, we find that labor supply elasticities are small (0.9 - 2.4) and that women's labor supply to the firm is substantially less elastic than men's (which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market). One implication of these findings is that the gender pay gap could be the result of wage discrimination by profit-maximizing monopsonistic employers.labor supply, monopsony, gender, discrimination

Is There a Gap in the Gap? Regional Differences in the Gender Pay Gap

In this paper, we investigate regional dierences in the gender pay gap both theoretically and empirically. Within a spatial oligopsony model, we show that more densely populated labour markets are more competitive and constrain employers' ability to discriminate against women. Utilising a large administrative data set for western Germany and a fexible semi-parametric propensity score matching approach, we and that the unexplained gender pay gap for young workers is substantially lower in large metropolitan than in rural areas. This regional gap in the gap of roughly ten percentage points remained surprisingly constant over the entire observation period of thirty years.Gender pay gap, urban-rural differences, matching, monopsonistic discrimination

Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.works council, separations, collective voice, duration models, Germany

Gender Differences in Labor Supply to Monopsonistic Firms : An Empirical Analysis Using Linked Employer-Employee Data from Germany

This paper investigates women?s and men?s labor supply to the firm within a structural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a linked employer-employee dataset for Germany, we find that labor supply elasticities are small (0.9?2.4) and that women?s labor supply to the firm is substantially less elastic than men?s (which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market). One implication of these findings is that the gender pay gap could be the result of wage discrimination by profit-maximizing monopsonistic employers. -- Mithilfe eines strukturellen Ansatzes, der auf einem dynamischen Monopsonmodell beruht, untersuchen wir das Arbeitsangebot von Frauen und Männern auf Firmenebene. Die unter Verwendung von Verweildauermodellen und eines deutschen kombinierten Firmen-Beschäftigten-Datensatzes geschätzten Arbeitsangebotselastizitäten sind gering (0,9?2,4) und fallen für Frauen erheblich geringer aus als für Männer (während man für das Arbeitangebot auf Marktebene üblicherweise eine höhere Elastizität für Frauen findet). Eine Implikation hieraus ist, dass geschlechtsspezifische Lohndifferentiale die Folge von Lohndiskriminierung seitens gewinnmaximierender monopsonistischer Arbeitgeber sein könnten.labor supply,monopsony,gender,discrimination