The real field with an irrational power function and a dense multiplicative subgroup

This paper provides a first example of a model theoretically well behaved structure consisting of a proper o-minimal expansion of the real field and a dense multiplicative subgroup of finite rank. Under certain Schanuel conditions, a quantifier elimination result will be shown for the real field with an irrational power function and a dense multiplicative subgroup of finite rank whose elements are algebraic over the field generated by the irrational power. Moreover, every open set definable in this structure is already definable in the reduct given by just the real field and the irrational power function

Reasoning First

Many think of reasons as facts, propositions, or considerations that stand in some relation (or relations) to attitudes, actions, states of affairs. The relation may be an explanatory one or a “normative” one—though some are uncomfortable with irreducibly “normative” relations. I will suggest that we should, instead, see reasons as items in pieces of reasoning. They relate, in the first instance, not to psychological states or events or states of affairs, but to questions. That relation is neither explanatory nor “normative.” If we must give it a label, we could call it “rational”—but that will mean, I think, only that the consideration bears on the question. By thus putting reasoning first, we not only avoid a handful of difficulties that have plagued thinking about reasons, but we also bring back to center-stage the importance of rational agency

I'll Bet You Think This Blame Is About You

There seems to be widespread agreement that to be responsible for something is to be deserving of certain consequences on account of that thing. Call this the “merited-consequences” conception of responsibility. I think there is something off, or askew, in this conception, though I find it hard to articulate just what it is. The phenomena the merited-consequences conception is trying to capture could be better captured, I think, by noting the characteristic way in which certain minds can rightly matter to other such minds—the way in which certain minds can carry a certain kind of importance, made manifest in certain sorts of responses. Mattering, not meriting, seems to me central. However, since I cannot yet better articulate an alternative, I continue in the merit-consequences framework. I focus on a particular class of consequences: those that are non-voluntary, in a sense explained. The non-voluntariness of these reactions has two important upshots. First, questions about their justification will be complex. Second, they are not well thought of as consequences voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder. By focusing on merited consequences and overlooking non-voluntariness, we risk misunderstanding the significance of moral criticism and of certain reactions to moral failure

Agency and Responsibility

I first sketch the different things we might have in mind, when thinking about responsibility. I then relate each of those to possible investigations of human agency. The most interesting such relation, in my opinion, is that between agency and what I call “responsibility as mattering.” I offer some hypotheses about that relation

Monte Carlo Radiative Transfer Simulations on the Influence of Surface Waves on Underwater Light Fields

A Monte Carlo model has been developed for calculating the penetration of light into the ocean. For monochromatic light (490 nm) the spatial exact allocation of the scattered parts of underwater light is described in terms of the variation of particle content and the angle of light incidence. Based on this model, it is possible to generate complex spatiotemporal fluctuating light fields according to every possible shape of the water surface. By means of single gravity waves the focusing effect and its importance of radiance supply for water depths up to 100 m is discussed