The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives

The number of House seats won by the president's party at midterm elections is well explained by three pre-determined or exogenous variables: (1) the number of House seats won by the in-party at the previous on-year election, (2) the vote margin of the in-party's candidate at the previous presidential election, and (3) the average growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income during the congressional term. Given the partisan division of House seats following the 2008 on-year election, President Obama's margin of victory in 2008, and the weak growth of per capita real income during the first 6 quarters of the 111th Congress, the Democrat's chances of holding on to a House majority by winning at least 218 seats at the 2010 midterm election will depend on real income growth in the 3rd quarter of 2010. The data available at this writing indicate the that Democrats will win 211 seats, a loss of 45 from the 2008 on-year result that will put them in the minority for the 112th Congress.US House of Representatives; 2010 election; economics and elections

The Economy, the War in Iraq and the 2004 Presidential Election

In this paper I apply the Bread and Peace model of voting in US presidential elections to analyze the sources of George W. Bush’s narrow re-election victory in 2004. The aggregate election outcome is readily explained by the model’s objectively measured political-economic fundamentals – no appeal need be made to arbitrary count, trend, dummy and switching variables. The results imply that the 2004 election turned mainly on weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal income over the term. The war in Iraq, which has escalated dramatically in political relevance since the 2004 contest, had a relatively small impact on the election result, most likely depressing Bush’s two-party vote share by less than a half percentage point.2004 US presidential election; voting and economy; Iraq and 2004 US election; bread and peace voting

Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy

How do government-supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of private�firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation? We propose a model in which the incentive of firms to operate underground depends on tax rates relative to �firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected by quality of governance �in particular by the presence of high-grade institutions delivering services enhancing official production that anchor profit-maximizing firms to the official economy. Some key predictions of the model concerning the determinants of�firms�tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise-level data from the World Bank's World Business Environment Surveys.tax toleration, tax compliance, tax evasion, corruption, quality of government, institutions, unofficial production, black economy, shadow economy, underground economy, micro political economy of firm behavior

The Politicization of Growth Theory

In this essay I review the main features of neoclassical growth theory, with an eye to seeing what it has to say about the causes of wealth and poverty among nations. I argue that outside the OECD and a comparatively small circle of other countries, neoclassical models contribute little to identifying the deeper sources of cross-national patterns in growth and productivity. I then discuss recent advances in the empirical analysis of economic performance that feature the influence of politics, policy and institutional arrangements on entrepreneurship, innovation, investment and the efficiency with which factor inputs are transformed to output.neoclasssical growth theory; institutions and economic development and growth; politics and economic development and growth

Biogeography and Long-Run Economic Development

The transition from a hunter-gather economy to agricultural production, which made possible the endogenous technological progress that ultimately led to the industrial revolution, is one of the most important events in the thousands of years of humankind’s economic development. In this paper we present theory and evidence showing that exogenous geography and initial condition biogeography exerted decisive influence on the location and timing of transitions to sedentary agriculture, to complex social organization and, eventually, to modern industrial production. Evidence from a large cross-section of countries indicates that the effects of geographic and biogeographic endowments on contemporary levels of economic development are remarkably strong.Geography biogeography and growth; Economic development; Agricultural revolution; Institutions and growth; Plants animals and growth

Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy

We propose a model of how government-supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of private firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation. Our analysis implies that the incentive of firms to produce underground depends on tax rates relative to firmspecific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected by quality of governance — in particular by the presence of high-grade institutions delivering services that profit-maximizing firms deem worth paying for. Some key predictions of the model concerning the determinants of firms’ tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise-level data from the World Bank’s World Business Environment Surveys.-