THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

Conflicts of laws are the necessary result of the division of judicial business. There are too many legal actions arising in localities too diffused to be tried in a single court or system of courts; consequently, litigation has to be distributed, and a highly complex body of jurisdictional regulations has been evolved to control the distribution. Once admit the multiplicity of courts, and diversities of law appear. Not only does the procedure in particular courts respond in some degree to the local traditions of the bar and to the specialized needs of the communities served, but indigenous precedents and practices establish themselves, which exercise an inevitable, if subtle, effect upon the conceptions of substantive law locally applied in judicial decision as well as in legislation. In an area so great and populous as the United States, this natural variety in both the administration of justice and formal legislation possesses sinister possibilities, which are, however, largely obviated by a common type of legal training, by a common body of legal doctrine, by the example of the federal courts and the state appellate courts, and by the numerous agencies which promote the interpenetration of legal ideas and practices. But to attain complete standardization appears neither feasible nor desirable. The fact that there will always be a measure of local independence in the development of legal institutions, even in a highly centralized, bureaucratic state, lies at the basis of the conception of judicial jurisdiction

The Comity Doctrine

The doctrine of comity, as developed in the Netherlands during the last quarter of the Seventeenth Century, for the first time posed in stark simplicity the basic dilemma of conflicts law in modem times to mediate between the pretensions of territorial sovereignty and the needs of international commerce. As Ulrik Huber, the most influential exponent of the doctrine, observed: Exempla, quibus utemur, ad juris privati species maxime quidem pertinebunt, sed judicium de illis unice juris publici rationibus constat, & exinde definiri debent.\u27\u27 [ The examples which we shall use belong principally to the category of private law but their treatment rests exclusively on principles of public law, and they must be defined accordingly. ] In this summary account, it is proposed to sketch the background, to restore the meaning-still too frequently misunderstood- and to consider the relevance at the present time of the basic principle in this historic doctrine. It is hoped that a modest excursus of this nature in a field of special interest to the MaxPlanck- Institut fur auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht, founded by Ernst Rabel, may be accepted in acknowledgement of the signal contributions to the advancement of comparative legal science, for which we are indebted to the distinguished jurist, who has directed the Institut since 1945, Hans Dolle

COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND UNIFICATION OF LAW

The current interest in international unification of law as a major objective of comparative legal research is significant testimony, in an era of accentuated nationalism, to the increasing solidarity of the modern world. In the development of this interest, Latin America has played a pioneer role. As early as 1826, the celebrated Congress convened at Panama envisaged in its deliberations what one of its members termed a System of Public Law for the Americas. The Congress of Montevideo of 1888-1889, anticipated by the Lima Congress of Jurists of 1878, produced the first substantial and successful codification of private international law, comprized in eight treaties and recently revised. Together with the Código Bustamante, this consolidation of the rules of private international law constitutes a notable instance of the spirit of legal unity flourishing in the Americas

WHAT SHOULD THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE DO?

It will generally be agreed, I believe, that the creation of the American Law Institute in 1923 was one of the most hopeful events in the recent legal history of this country. The plan for the Institute, as formulated in the impressive report which motivated its establishment, was well-conceived, broad-visioned, and based upon a comprehensive analysis of the chief defects in the legal system of the United States. This plan was significant in at least three important respects. In the first place, it defined an ambitious and, in some respects, a unique task for the Institute to accomplish; the report refers to the work which the organization should undertake as a restatement and adds that the object of this restatement should not only be to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life. In other words, the proposed object was to undertake an exhaustive study of the law of the United States in order to state that law in ideal terms, which should take account of new social needs and at the same time form a common pattern for judicial decision, to the end that the maladjustments of law to contemporary conditions and the evils of the law\u27s diversities might thereby be alleviated. In the second place, conceiving that the task of the improvement of the technical legal system was incumbent upon the legal profession as a whole, the plan designated a select and nevertheless representative organization through which a conscious, equal, and permanent union of the efforts of the judiciary, the bar, and the law schools might be formed to prosecute the task. In the third place, and this was perhaps the most significant feature of the plan, the necessity of comprehensive, exhaustive study was for the first time in this country adequately recognized as the indispensable basis of systematic legal reform. In sum, the Institute was formed to promote the improvement of the laws of the United States by scientific research. This feature, which has distinguished the Institute from the welter of organizations dedicated to legal reform, was highly significant and hopeful

RESEARCH IN INTER-AMERICAN LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

In the Americas, the historic trade routes have run east and west, more than north and south. Geographic necessity has decreed that, subject to possible reorientation with the future development of aviation, the dominant factor influencing the course of commerce with this hemisphere should be the open sea. Westward across the Atlantic, came the explorers, the conquistadors, the pioneers, succeeded by wave after wave of immigration to the New World, seaborne on argosies that, laden with the fabulous spoils and profits of empire, returned to the homelands the tribute of the New to the Old World. Achievement in the Nineteenth Century of political autonomy by the American republics, despite the growth of local industries and markets, did not alter the primary channels of international commerce. Nor did the epochal building of the railroads in place of the more primitive turnpikes and canals do so; from the viewpoint of world trade, these still lead to the great maritime ports, the nerve centers of American civilization, through which the raw materials of the hinterlands are forwarded in exchange for foreign goods. Among the most precious of these goods have been the languages, the laws, the institutions, inventions, ideas, customs, and beliefs that those who came to America brought from Europe. For this reason, generations after the declarations of independence, the main currents of culture lay across the Atlantic to America. In this invisible commerce, the balance .μas been long and largely in Europe\u27s favor

JURISPRUDENCE ON PARADE

Jurisprudence is part of the pageant that makes history. This is a truism that, it may be added, obtains irrespective of the view held as to the significance of general legal theory. To some, the constructs of jurisprudence may seem but laggard symbols of more vital facts and trends. The degree of the lag exhibited by the more celebrated of such constructs may suggest to an anthropologically-minded observer, such as Thurman Arnold, that the apparent function of jurisprudence in the present social climate is neither to represent reality nor to control the administration of justice, but rather by the magic of ritual to lend to the pageant the promise of paradise human beings still desire of the law that they may be reconciled to the uncertainty, confusion, injustice, and frustration of actual life. On the other hand, those of idealistic bent will, with Holmes, conceive theory as the significant part of law; for these, ideas set the tunes to which the pageant marches. Some of these, perhaps a Kelsen or a Morris R. Cohen, will insist the tunes derive from astral postulates of a metahistorical order, postulates beyond the contingencies of time and space and mysteriously therefore of ultimate significance to the physical world to which law applies. Even on this esoteric view, it is apparent that the categories of jurisprudence are part of their times