2,839 research outputs found
Land Grant Application- Rogers, Henry (New York)
Land grant application submitted to the Maine Land Office for Henry Rogers for service in the Revolutionary War.https://digitalmaine.com/revolutionary_war_mass/1302/thumbnail.jp
The Study Of Alkaline Reserve In Relation To The Athlete In Performance
There has always been a baffling mystery as to why certain times individual athletes fail to perform up to their apparent standard of ability. Since all muscular activity is concerned with chemical reactions, certainly the field of chemistry should be able to throw some light on these fluctuations.
The Physical Education field has been concerned with tone and physical growth of muscles; however, little thought and consideration have been given to blood chemistry in relation to exercise. The chemical composition of the blood has many vital relations to muscular construction and relaxation; e.g., calcium contracts muscle cells, and potassium relaxes them.
One of the most important chemical considerations is the acid-base balance of the blood. (1) While the blood is always alkaline, there is a wide fluctuation in the quantitative amount of what is termed the alkali reserve. A depleted alkali reserve is inappropriately a condition of acidosis which might imply that the blood is really acid in reaction. The blood never becomes acid because the human organism is equipped with an efficient buffer system that prevents this condition from taking place. This vital mechanism is provided to maintain life. Though life may be preserved on a low alkali intake, the human organism may fall short of muscular efficiency.
This paper deals with the study of the alkaline reserve in relation to the athlete in performance. The study was conducted with the members of the football team at Pickard High School, Brenham, Texas during the 1963-61j. fall term. The objective was to try to determine the influence that acid or alkali reserve might have on the speed and endurance of athletes.
The normal condition of the blood, and, so far as we know, of the tissue generally, is very nearly neutral. Neither a distinctly acid nor a strongly alkaline condition or of the system generally is compatible with health or even with life. The maintenance of this condition of approximately neutrality is what one usually has in mind when one speaks of the problem or the phenomena of acid-base balance in the body.
To balance the (fixed) acid-forming elements (sulfur, phosphorus, and chlorine) the food furnishes significant (though quite variable) amounts of four base-forming elements: sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium. In normal nutrition, the problem of acid-base balance is chiefly that of elimination of surplus fixed acid, especially that formed from oxidation of the sulfur of the food protein. This surplus fixed acid is taken care of chiefly in two ways: (1) by elimination of nitrogen as ammonium salt as just explained; and (2) by the secretion of a more acid urine, which usually means a large proportion of acid phosphate in the urine. In case the surplus of fixed acid is small or transient, a shifting of the proportions between mono (primary) and di-(secondary) phosphate may suffice; but beyond this, the increased excretion of primary phosphate may involve increased excretion of total phosphate necessarily carrying with it some fixed base and thus tending to deplete the body\u27s alkaline reserve
The Essentials of a Law Establishing an International Court
The First Hague Conference created the permanent Court of Arbitration, which was its highest achievement. The Second Hague Conference proposed the establishment of an International Court of Prize and a Court of Arbitral Justice, and upon these its fame will forever endure. In the First Conference the idea of the creation of an International Court had been promptly laid aside as soon as it was suggested, it being regarded as impracticable, if not impossible. The acceptance of the proposal by forty-five nations in the Second Conference marks the rapid progress of this movement
The Applied Axioms of Social Psychology as Carried by the Language of Alfred Eaton\u27s Attitudes in John O\u27Hara\u27s From the Terrace
A monograph presented to the faculty of the Department of English at Morehead State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Henry P. Rogers in January of 1969
The Element of Locality in the Law of Criminal Jurisdiction
THE Federal Courts have no common law criminal jurisdiction. The question was raised in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, in 1798, in United States v. Worrall, 2 Dallas, 384, and the Court was equally divided in opinion. Iii 1818, Mr. Justice STORY, in United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gallison, 488, decided that there were common law offences against the United States. But this, as we shall see, was overruled by the Supreme Court. As early as 1807, Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Ex parte .Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, had said, This Court disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the Constitution, or by the laws of the United States. Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law, until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction. This was a statement of general doctrine, and it remained for the Court to make an application of the principle to the matter we are discussing, in 1812, in United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32, where it was decided that the Courts of the United States have no common law jurisdiction in criminal cases, the Court remarking that, although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. But in 1816 the question was again presented and similarly ruled on, although it appears that a difference of opinion existed at that time among the members of the Court: United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheaton, 415. Whatever doubt may, at one time, have existed on this subject, it is now settled beyond controversy, that the Federal government has no common law jurisdiction of criminal matters: United States v. Lancaster, 2 McLean, 431, 433 (1841); United States v. Taylor, 1 Hughes, 514, 518 (1874); United States v. Shepherd, Id. 520, 522 (1875)
Law Schools and Legal Education
In the February number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, there appeared an interesting article from the pen of Mr. Henry Budd, discussing the relation of law schools to legal education. The motive which inspired the writing of the article, was a commendable one, and the desire of the writer to have a higher standard established, governing admissions to the bar, will be quite generally concurred in. No one could read the article in question, however, without readily perceiving that the law schools of the United States were considered to be, in large measure, responsible for the admission to the bar of men scantily prepared for the work of their profession and in many cases not even so sufficiently equipped, as to be able to acquire that learning, which in many eases is necessarily postponed until after the technically called studentship, has come to an end, not understanding thoroughly the foundations of the law. It is evidently the impression of the writer that a law school is, on the whole, a pretty poor place for one who really wants to know the law, and that the present system of acquiring a legal education, is far inferior to that of former times, to the old Ameri- can system of legal education, when the centre of instruction was the office of the preceptor
Power of Partners - II
In considering the powers which a partner possessed, it was stated in our former article, that he could make a chattel mortgage to secure a debt due from his firm. It becomes necessary to state, now that we are considering the powers which he does not possess, that he can not mortgage the partnership realty. And it makes no difference that the mortgage was made to secure a pre-existing debt of the firm, contracted within the scope of the partnership business. In the case last cited it was held that, while a mortgage on lands could not be foreclosed as to the interest of any person who had not executed it, or assented to, or ratified it, yet it could be foreclosed as to the interest of the person who executed it, though in executing it he may have used the partnership name, reciting that he was a member of the firm. He could not deny that he had an interest in the firm at the date of the execution of the mortgage. It is also settled that he can not make a chattel mortgage for the purpose of securing his own private or individual debts. And if he makes such a mortgage, the other party will not take, though ignorant at the time of the facts constituting the illegality. It has also been held that one partner can not mortgage his undivided interest in a specific part of the property belonging to the firm
Coyle v. The Commonwealth
Homicidal mania must be proved, not assumed, nor confounded with reckless frenzy; To instruct, however, that it must be proved by \u27clearly preponderating evidence\u27 is error. All the authorities require is that the evidence proving it should \u27fairly\u27 preponderate.
An attempt at suicide is not of itself evidence of insanity, and raises no legal presumption thereof....
It was clearly proved that Coyle killed Emily Myers. That fact is admitted. The only defence set up is that he was insane at the time
Change of Domicil
Domicil of origin is distinguished from domicil of choice. Domicil of origin is the domicil which every one receives at birth, while domicil of choice is that which is acquired by the voluntary act of the party. Changes from domicil of origin to domicil of choice, or from one domicil of choice to another of choice, often involve important and interesting inquiries, to some of which attention is invited. In a former article we had occasion to consider the law of domicil in its relation to married women, infants and persons under guardianship. It then appeared: 1. That a married woman could not acquire a domicil of choice separate from that of her husband–that her domicil could only be changed by her husband, except in those cases in which he had been guilty of such dereliction of duty as to entitle her to a divorce. 2. That an infant could not change its domicil. That the domicil could only be changed by the father in his life time, or the mother during her widowhood. 3. It was thought that the guardian could change the domicil of the ward, if done with no fraudulent intent. The consideration that was then given to the subject makes it unnecessary to enter into any discussion of changes of domicil by persons belonging to the above classes, and attention is called rather to changes of domicil by persons who are sui juris
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