The fiscal theory of the price level and sluggish inflation : how important shall the wealth effect be ?.

According to the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies with governments facing the possibility to act in a non-Ricardian manner make the general price level be fully determined. Here, depending on the expectations framework, we show to what extent the validity of the FTPL also depends on consumers being non-Ricardian. With prices driven by rational expectations, the qualitative results of the strategic interactions between policies do not depend on the Ricardian or non-Ricardian behaviour by the households. With sluggish inflation, the strong version of the FTPL does not bring to a dynamically stable economy. The economy is stable only for a weak version of the FTPL; but, this time, stability conditions depend strongly on the existence and size of the wealth effect. If inflation is sluggish, the FTPL is incompatible with Ricardian consumers.fiscal theory of the price level; public debt; fiscal policy; monetary policy; inflation rate;

On the definition and the properties of the principal eigenvalue of some nonlocal operators

In this article we study some spectral properties of the linear operator $\mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}+a$ defined on the space $C(\bar\Omega)$ by :$$\mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}[\varphi] +a\varphi:=\int\_{\Omega}K(x,y)\varphi(y)\,dy+a(x)\varphi(x)$$ where $\Omega\subset \mathbb{R}^N$ is a domain, possibly unbounded, $a$ is a continuous bounded function and $K$ is a continuous, non negative kernel satisfying an integrability condition. We focus our analysis on the properties of the generalised principal eigenvalue $\lambda\_p(\mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}+a)$ defined by \lambda\_p(\mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}+a):= \sup\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R} \,|\, \exists \varphi \in C(\bar \Omega), \varphi\textgreater{}0, \textit{such that}\, \mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}[\varphi] +a\varphi +\lambda\varphi \le 0 \, \text{in}\;\Omega\}. We establish some new properties of this generalised principal eigenvalue $\lambda\_p$. Namely, we prove the equivalence of different definitions of the principal eigenvalue. We also study the behaviour of $\lambda\_p(\mathcal{L}\_{\Omega}+a)$ with respect to some scaling of $K$. For kernels $K$ of the type, $K(x,y)=J(x-y)$ with $J$ a compactly supported probability density, we also establish some asymptotic properties of $\lambda\_{p} \left(\mathcal{L}\_{\sigma,m,\Omega} -\frac{1}{\sigma^m}+a\right)$ where $\mathcal{L}\_{\sigma,m,\Omega}$ is defined by $\displaystyle{\mathcal{L}\_{\sigma,m,\Omega}[\varphi]:=\frac{1}{\sigma^{2+N}}\int\_{\Omega}J\left(\frac{x-y}{\sigma}\right)\varphi(y)\, dy}$. In particular, we prove that $$\lim\_{\sigma\to 0}\lambda\_p\left(\mathcal{L}\_{\sigma,2,\Omega}-\frac{1}{\sigma^{2}}+a\right)=\lambda\_1\left(\frac{D\_2(J)}{2N}\Delta +a\right),$$where $D\_2(J):=\int\_{\mathbb{R}^N}J(z)|z|^2\,dz$ and $\lambda\_1$ denotes the Dirichlet principal eigenvalue of the elliptic operator. In addition, we obtain some convergence results for the corresponding eigenfunction $\varphi\_{p,\sigma}$

The fiscal theory of the price level and sluggish inflation: how important shall the wealth effect be?

According to the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies with governments facing the possibility to act in a non-Ricardian manner make the general price level be fully determined. Here, depending on the expectations framework, we show to what extent the validity of the FTPL also depends on consumers being non-Ricardian. With prices driven by rational expectations, the qualitative results of the strategic interactions between policies do not depend on the Ricardian or non-Ricardian behaviour by the households. With sluggish inflation, the strong version of the FTPL does not bring to a dynamically stable economy. The economy is stable only for a weak version of the FTPL; but, this time, stability conditions depend strongly on the existence and size of the wealth effect. If inflation is sluggish, the FTPL is incompatible with Ricardian consumers

Les déficits publics en Europe:Causes, conséquences ou remèdes à la crise ?

La thèse selon laquelle la hausse des déficits et des dettes publics serait la cause essentielle du niveau élevé des taux d'intérêt réels n'a pas de sens dans la situation de demande insuffisante qu'a connue l'Europe depuis 1981. Cette hausse est apparue nécessaire pour soutenir l'activité et l'accumulation du capital, dans une situation où, du fait de la libéralisation financière, de la non-coordination des politiques monétaires, de l'indépendance des Banques centrales et des contraintes du SME, les États avaient perdu la maîtrise des taux d'intérêt. Retrou­ver cette maîtrise est l'enjeu crucial pour diminuer les taux d'intérêt réels, relancer la croissance, et donc réduire les dettes publiques.Public deficits in europe : causes, consequences, or remedies to the crisis ? The view according to which the growth of public deficits and debts in Europe would be the primary cause for high real interest rates is of little sense in the low-demand context Europe has experienced since 1981. The growth of public deficits appeared necessary to support the level of activity and capital accumulation in situation in which govern ments had lost control over interest rates because of financial liberalization non coope rative monetary policies Central Banks independence and constraints due to the EMS Recovering this control is at stake to lower real interest rates boost growth and thus reduce public debt

Pour en finir avec la masse monétaire

Pour en finir avec la masse monétaire La diminution du rôle de la monnaie comme actif de transaction et la disparition de la distinction entre actifs monétaires et non monétaires empêchent les Banques centrales de fixer le taux d'intérêt à partir de l'évolution d'un agrégat monétaire. Les théoriciens doivent renoncer à la courbe LM pour adopter un schéma réaliste où la Banque centrale fixe le taux d'intérêt en fonction des objectifs finaux de la politique monétaire (inflation et production). Ce schéma ne crée pas d'indétermination du niveau des prix, même dans des modèles avec parfaite flexibilité des prix. L'inflation est déterminée de façon conjointe par les politiques monétaire et budgétaire.For a monetary theory without money The reduced role of money as a means of transaction and the decreasing gap between monetary and financial assets prevent central Banks from fixing the interest rate according to the evolution of a monetary aggregate. Theorists must give up LM curve. Fixing the interest rate according to the final targets of monetary policy (inflation and output) is the best schedule for monetary policy. It does not create price level indetermination, even in models with perfect prices flexibility. Inflation results jointly from monetary and fiscal policies

Discussing Euro Volatility

This paper deals with Euro introduction and ask whether it is likely to increase the exchange rates volatility on a world-wide scale. Following this purpose, we present a three country-model (US, Germany and France) and compare the exchange rate volatility according to the nature of the shock (demand or supply shock) and to the exchange rate regime in Europe (flexible, EMS or EMU). Each country is represented by two authorities: a central bank and a government (a single central bank and two governments in Europe in the case of EMU). Within this framework, we compute Nashequilibria. In theory, the exchange rate of a large closed country fluctuates more than the exchange rate of a small open country (the size effect), but results are ambiguous in the specific case of the Euro. An increase in volatility would only occur after demand and external supply shocks. Volatility would be reduced following internal supply shocks. The conclusions are the opposite if the sensitivity of intra-European trade to relative prices is particularly strong. In the case of common shocks in Europe, the excess of volatility would help economic stabilisation. As for asymmetric shocks (hitting only one country), the Euro would fluctuate less than the currency of the hit country in the previous monetary system (EMS), but this stability would harm economic stabilisation, as loss functions show. We note also that the independence of the ECB could lead to strong variations of the Euro after inflationary shocks if the ECB and European governments do not share the same inflation target. The constraints on fiscal policies which are induced by the Stability pact could make more active monetary policies necessary: these would be a source of instability for the Euro

A propos de la volatilité de l’euro.

Cette publication n'a pas de résumé

Faut-il réduire la dette publique ?.

Cette publication n'a pas de résumé

politique monétaire sans monnaie.

Cette publication n'a pas de résumé

Faut-il réduire la dette publique ?.

France; rapport Pébereau; Finances publiques; Dettes publiques;