Host Country’s Intellectual Property Rights and Firm’s Equity Participation

Foreign direct investment, Intellectual property rights, Ownership structure, F23, O34,

Crafting trust. The role of political institutions in a comparative perspective

In this article, the authors evaluate the origins of generalized trust. In addition to examining individual-level determinants, the analytic focus is on the political-institutional context. In contrast to most of the analyses to date, the authors conduct hierarchical analyses of the World Values Surveys (1995-1997 and 1999-2001) to simultaneously test for differences among respondents in 58 countries and for variations in levels of trust between countries with different institutional configurations. In addition, the authors extend the institutional theory of trust by introducing the power-sharing quality of institutions—a rather neglected institutional dimension hitherto. With regard to the most important contextual factors, the authors find that countries whose authorities are seen as incorruptible, whose institutions of the welfare state reduce income disparities, and whose political interests are represented in a manner proportional to their weight have citizens who are more likely to place trust in one another

Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation

The role of political institutions in shaping public policy has been analyzed in isolation from corruption, and legislative organization (specifically, bicameralism) has received minimal attention. We analyze pollution taxation when decisions are influenced by several veto players, such as legislative chambers. Our theory predicts that an increase in the number of veto players (e.g., moving from uni- to bi-cameralism) pushes the pollution tax towards the social optimum, with the effect being conditional on corruption. As such, dispersion around the optimal tax is lower under bicameralism. Empirical tests – using data from 86 countries – support the theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Environmental policy, Veto players, Bicameralism, Corruption, Taxes,