Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief

I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what beliefs you count as having, this theory entails that you have some voluntary control over your beliefs. However, the pragmatic picture doesn’t entail that you can believe something as a result of intention to believe it. Nevertheless, I argue that the limited sort of voluntary control implied by the pragmatic picture may be of use in vindicating the deontological conception of epistemic justification

Manifolds with small Heegaard Floer ranks

We show that the only irreducible three-manifold with positive first Betti number and Heegaard Floer homology of rank two is homeomorphic to zero-framed surgery on the trefoil. We classify links whose branched double cover gives rise to this manifold. Together with a spectral sequence from Khovanov homology to the Floer homology of the branched double cover, our results show that Khovanov homology detects the unknot if and only if it detects the two component unlink.Comment: 19 pages, 1 figur