Dueling for honor and identity economics

Dueling is one of the best indicators of political transition from anarchy to order. This paper explores the dynamics of dueling for honor as a social institution in England, France, and Germany. It identifies major differences regarding the frequency, duration, and nature of dueling. Although dueling for honor emerged as a self-organizing and self-regulatory collective action of the aristocracy in crisis, it transformed into a middle class institution in France and Germany. However, this institution suddenly ended in England around 1850. In this study, we will follow a cognitive version of identity economics to explain the emergence of this institution, and its divergent trajectories in these countries in terms of identity choice. We will argue that while dueling is an identity investment, it might have different values according to its diverse social meanings. We will show that different social meanings that were attached to dueling in England, France and Germany gave rise to different values in identity investment, and led to different results in enhancing social identities

Identity, Authority and Evolution of Order: the trajectory of dueling simulated

Borrowing from public choice literature, while aristocratic civil wars can be regarded as anarchy, and the monopoly of violence by the state as Leviathan, duel of honor is an orderly anarchy. The sudden or gradual withering of duel of honor as an institution marks the transition to the monopoly of violence by the state in Europe. In this paper, we endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model where a simulated agent considers three sets of factors to make its dueling decision: 1) its own characteristics such as dueling skill; 2) its identity such as the reaction received from other members of its own social group; and finally 3) the reaction of the authority such as the possible punishment that could be inflicted by the state against dueler. These factors then interact through a dynamic utility function affected by both optimization and learning processes. The results of our agent-based computational model which are validated against the historical evidence from England, France, and Germany show that a complex, aggregative historical process may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choice of heterogeneous individual agents conditioned by their group identity and authority (organizational) influence

Identity, Authority and Evolution of Order: the trajectory of dueling simulated

Borrowing from public choice literature, while aristocratic civil wars can be regarded as anarchy, and the monopoly of violence by the state as Leviathan, duel of honor is an orderly anarchy. The sudden or gradual withering of duel of honor as an institution marks the transition to the monopoly of violence by the state in Europe. In this paper, we endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model where a simulated agent considers three sets of factors to make its dueling decision: 1) its own characteristics such as dueling skill; 2) its identity such as the reaction received from other members of its own social group; and finally 3) the reaction of the authority such as the possible punishment that could be inflicted by the state against dueler. These factors then interact through a dynamic utility function affected by both optimization and learning processes. The results of our agent-based computational model which are validated against the historical evidence from England, France, and Germany show that a complex, aggregative historical process may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choice of heterogeneous individual agents conditioned by their group identity and authority (organizational) influence

Dynamics of effort allocation and evolution of trust: an agent-based model

Trust is a dynamic and complex phenomenon and understanding the factors which affect its formation, evolution and disappearance is a critical research issue. It has been shown that trust plays a key role in how human and social capital develop, how economies grow and how societies progress. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of the relations between a dynamic effort allocation system, an evolving trust framework and a reputation module to study how changes in micro-level rent-seeking traits and decisions can shape the emergence of trust across the simulated environment. According to our results, variations in trust are correlated more with the returns to being productive, rather than rent-seeking. In line with previous studies, our model shows that higher than average levels of risk-taking by agents lead to further trust and gains during an interaction, though taken to an extreme, both trust and gain can decline as a result of reckless decisions. We also report on the formation of trust clusters in our model as an emergent phenomenon

Why might climate change not cause conflict? an agent-based computational response

In this paper, we first briefly review the recent literature on climate change, resource scarcity and conflict. This is then followed by introducing an agent based computational model based on the theory of production and conflict which is capable of simulating the dynamics of micro-level resource conflicts. The model considers differences in resource attributes, differentiates between conflict subjects, takes into account bounded rationality, non-linearity and feedback loops, and is enriched by a set of scenarios ranging between mild to severe resource shocks. Our results show that agents tend not to get engage in conflict during mild resource scarcity scenarios as they adapt to the changes and since the decreases in returns to resource predation and increases in their protective practices act as negative feedback loops, discouraging resource predators from allocating further effort to predation. The model results also show that scarcity is more likely to encourage product predation rather than resource predation among the agents

Why might climate change not cause conflict? an agent-based computational response

In this paper, we first briefly review the recent literature on climate change, resource scarcity and conflict. This is then followed by introducing an agent based computational model based on the theory of production and conflict which is capable of simulating the dynamics of micro-level resource conflicts. The model considers differences in resource attributes, differentiates between conflict subjects, takes into account bounded rationality, non-linearity and feedback loops, and is enriched by a set of scenarios ranging between mild to severe resource shocks. Our results show that agents tend not to get engage in conflict during mild resource scarcity scenarios as they adapt to the changes and since the decreases in returns to resource predation and increases in their protective practices act as negative feedback loops, discouraging resource predators from allocating further effort to predation. The model results also show that scarcity is more likely to encourage product predation rather than resource predation among the agents

Dynamics of effort allocation and evolution of trust: an agent-based model

Trust is a dynamic and complex phenomenon and understanding the factors which affect its formation, evolution and disappearance is a critical research issue. It has been shown that trust plays a key role in how human and social capital develop, how economies grow and how societies progress. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of the relations between a dynamic effort allocation system, an evolving trust framework and a reputation module to study how changes in micro-level rent-seeking traits and decisions can shape the emergence of trust across the simulated environment. According to our results, variations in trust are correlated more with the returns to being productive, rather than rent-seeking. In line with previous studies, our model shows that higher than average levels of risk-taking by agents lead to further trust and gains during an interaction, though taken to an extreme, both trust and gain can decline as a result of reckless decisions. We also report on the formation of trust clusters in our model as an emergent phenomenon

Dueling for honor and identity economics

Dueling is one of the best indicators of political transition from anarchy to order. This paper explores the dynamics of dueling for honor as a social institution in England, France, and Germany. It identifies major differences regarding the frequency, duration, and nature of dueling. Although dueling for honor emerged as a self-organizing and self-regulatory collective action of the aristocracy in crisis, it transformed into a middle class institution in France and Germany. However, this institution suddenly ended in England around 1850. In this study, we will follow a cognitive version of identity economics to explain the emergence of this institution, and its divergent trajectories in these countries in terms of identity choice. We will argue that while dueling is an identity investment, it might have different values according to its diverse social meanings. We will show that different social meanings that were attached to dueling in England, France and Germany gave rise to different values in identity investment, and led to different results in enhancing social identities

Prediction of Pervious Concrete Permeability and Compressive

Abstract: admixtures. The hydrological property of pervious concrete is the primary reason for its reappearance in construction. Much research has been conducted on plain concrete, but little attention has been paid to porous concrete, particularly to the analytical prediction modeling of its permeability. In this paper, two important aspects of pervious concrete due data. The proposed network is intended to represent a reliable functional relationship between the input independent variables accounting for the variability of permeability and compressive strength of a porous concrete. Results of the higher values were observed for the permeability as compared with compressive strength and for the train data set concrete when there are no laboratorial data available