Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry

Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry Faheem Farooq, Depts. of Biology and Chemistry, Jay Bisen, Manaeil Hasan, and Akhil Patel, with Dr. Jan Rychtar, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics, and Dr. Dewey T. Taylor, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals - Owner and Intruder - and model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. Owner is in a possession of a valuable resource when it spots Intruder. Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder has to decide whether to fight with the Owner. The individuals may value the resource differently and we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We find that it is typically beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. However, we identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better. We also show that an individual may or may not benefit from their opponent knowing less. Finally, we consider the same kind of interactions but with the reversed order of decisions. We find that typically the individual initiating the interaction has an advantage. However, when individuals know only their own valuation and not the valuations to their opponents, it is sometimes better when the opponent initiates.https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/uresposters/1298/thumbnail.jp

Owner-Intruder contests with information asymmetry

We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals – the Owner and the Intruder – and model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. The Owner is in possession of a resource when another individual, the Intruder, comes along and may try to steal it. If the Intruder makes such a stealing attempt, the Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder can withdraw or continue with the stealing attempt. The individuals may value the resource differently and we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We identify scenarios when it is beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. We also identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better as well as show that an individual may not benefit from their opponent knowing less. Finally, we consider the same kind of interactions but without the option for the Intruder to withdraw. We find that, surprisingly, the Intruder typically fares better in that case