POLICY DEPENDENCY AND REFORM: ECONOMIC GAINS VERSUS POLITICAL PAINS

Economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient, if not also ineffective, and therefore well worth reform. Practical experience, however, indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement. Part of the reason appears to be that economic analysis seldom clearly identifies the real costs and benefits of reform, and seldom explains these sensibly to the relevant constituencies. Furthermore, economic analysis rarely explains why the protectionist measures were adopted in the first place, or explores the dependencies that these policies generate. Without these explanations, and without reform strategies that take full account of them, policy reform will continue to be reluctant, slow and frequently counterproductive. This paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits, and draws conclusions as to the general shape of reforms likely to reconcile economic efficiency with political acceptability. In so doing, it re-phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition, which may prove more accessible and credible to policy makers and advisors. It concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession.Political Economy,

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON MARKET INTEGRATION

Industrial Organization,

Average degree conditions forcing a minor

Mader first proved that high average degree forces a given graph as a minor. Often motivated by Hadwiger's Conjecture, much research has focused on the average degree required to force a complete graph as a minor. Subsequently, various authors have consider the average degree required to force an arbitrary graph $H$ as a minor. Here, we strengthen (under certain conditions) a recent result by Reed and Wood, giving better bounds on the average degree required to force an $H$-minor when $H$ is a sparse graph with many high degree vertices. This solves an open problem of Reed and Wood, and also generalises (to within a constant factor) known results when $H$ is an unbalanced complete bipartite graph

CAP Reform Options: A Challenge for Analysis and Synthesis

The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy is continually evolving. The growing debate about the future of the EU Budget post 2013 raises major questions about the future of the CAP. A formal Communication on the future of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) after 2013 is due to be published by the Commission in the summer/early autumn of this year – in order to launch a full public debate on the issues, and as a part of the Budget Review of 2011. Formal legislative proposals on the post-2013 CAP will then follow in mid-2011 – together with Commission proposals for the post-2013 Financial Perspectives.  It is, therefore, appropriate to review the discussions of further reforms, and also to consider our professional capacity to provide robust analysis of potential futures. The debate on the future CAP is of more than an agricultural interest as it affects, inter alia, the environment, climate change, food quality and security and rural communities and their development. Numerous views have already been expressed on the future of the CAP. However there is very limited synthesis of the options and principles underlying their evolutionary fitness – that is, the extent to which suggestions correspond to the socio-economic environment and political climate upon which the future persistence of the CAP depends. This paper synthesises present views on the future of CAP, and outlines a possible conceptual framework for future research and analyses in the field.Agricultural and Food Policy,

What role for public goods in the future of CAP?

The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy continues to evolve. The public debate about its future post 2013 was launched in April 2010 and a formal Commission Communication on the future of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was published in November 2010 (European Commission, 2010). The Commission’s detailed legislative proposals are now expected in October 2011. We focus here on one of the most important parts of the debate – public goods and the ‘greening of the CAP’. A major rationale for the large sums spent under the CAP each year appears now to be centred on the provision of public goods. We review the Commission’s proposals for the provision of public goods and raise questions about the apparent justification for the general approach. We question whether this logic properly appreciates the nature of public good problems and whether the apparently obvious solution – provision of compensatory payments from the public purse – actually solves any of the underlying public good problemsPublic Economics,