Mr. Justice Brandeis

ON FEBRUARY 13, 1939, Mr. Justice Brandeis retired from regular active service as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The gratitude which the nation unanimously feels for his magnificent service was expressed by President Roosevelt in his letter acceding to the retirement as the inevitable which one must perforce accept . Especially to students of law was Mr. Justice Brandeis\u27 service invaluable. Both before he ascended the Bench in 1916, and during his incumbency, he was to them a generous source of inspiration and enlightenment. He was a pioneer in the conviction now generally held that Jaw is not a closed system of verbal logic; that its incidence on life requires it to be constantly alive, and to be sensitive to social needs and social change; that legal education must include education in the economic and social conditions of which law is an inseparable part. Only the formalities of classification would exclude Mr. Justice Brandeis from the list of great American educators. His judicial opinions, his briefs, his public writings all teach-and they teach with a wealth of information, analysis and insight. His work in helping to build the University of Louisville and its Law School exemplifies his broad educator\u27s vision as well as his pride in American history and traditions. His interest in education generally and in legal education in particular has been unflagging, intimate and effectively active. He has regarded the teacher as the possessor of a great opportunity, matched by a serious responsibility, for public service, and he has lent encouragement to the profession in numerous ways

Reforming Procedure of the N.L.R.B.

My subject implies a dichotomy which constitutes one of the law\u27s perpetual paradoxes, seemingly impossible of resolution, the differentiation between procedure and substance. By all. experience divorcement of the two seems impossible. Procedure must be a function of the substance sought to be achieved; it is the instrument fashioned to attain previously determined goals. Yet substance is the function of the procedures which produce it; policy can be made, changed, perverted by procedure. This seeming paradox is not peculiar to administrative law and, perhaps, not even peculiar to law alone. And it does not leave us helpless. It merely requires us, when considering procedural reform-specifically in administration -to bear clearly in mind three obvious ideas-axioms so commonplace that, unless specifically adverted to, they are likely to ·be ignored to the detriment of our thinking

Civil Liability and the Securities Act

THERE is a danger in discussing civil liability in connection with the Securities Act that both the purpose of the Act and the emphasis of the discussion will be misunderstood. It is not the object of the Act simply to provide a legal remedy for the investor who has bought securities upon a false representation, to compensate him for a loss incurred. Even the provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely preventive rather than redressive. Both in the extent of liability imposed -the variety of persons to whom the liability is attached, the bases of the liability, and the persons in whose favor it runs-and in the limitation of the amounts recoverable, the in terrorem function of the Act is evidenced. But even this purpose of securing preventive vigilance and caution on the part of the persons concerned is only coordinate with, or probably subordinate to, another object. The Act seeks not only to secure accuracy in the information that is volunteered to investors, but also, and perhaps more especially, to compel the disclosure of significant matters which were heretofore rarely, if ever, disclosed. Civil liability is imposed largely as one appropriate means of accomplishing these ends, not as the end itself, or, on the other hand, as the only means. While, then, discussion of the Act may properly be directed to the different provisions separately, it is apt to be misleading, and more covertly disingenuous, if the principal objectives are not constantly pushed to the front

Standard of Care Required of Children

It is undoubtedly true that the law of torts does not generally hold children to the exercise of the same degree of care and intelligence that it requires of adults. To do otherwise, would be to shut its eyes, ostrich-like, to the facts of life and to burden unduly the child\u27s growth to majority. Similar concessions to immaturity are made in other branches of the law. The same realism, however, necessitates the recognition of the fact that at some age prior to twenty-one, and in some situations, a minor is fully as competent as a person over twenty-one and should be held to the same standard of conduct. It is not the purpose of this paper to discover that age and those situations. Assuming that the adult standard is not to be applied, the problem is what standard, if any, is to be used. Again, it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the legal presumptions that many jurisdictions apply to minors. Such fictitious presumptions can be justified only, if at all, on grounds of expediency and facility in the administration of trials. But, whether or not the law of the particular jurisdiction raises a conclusive presumption that infants under seven years are incapable of contributory negligence, and rebuttable presumptions that minors between seven and fourteen are not capable and minors over fourteen are capable of contributory negligence, still the question is raised: If the minor is capable of negligence, by what standard, if any, is his conduct to be measured

Smith: LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

A Review of LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS. By Russell A. Smith

Intelligence and Delinquency

The study of the relationship of intelligence and delinquency began with the early 19th century neo-classical criminal justice doctrine that since crime was a rational choice of conduct, mental defectives in common with infants and the insane, were not legally responsible for their actions. While the medical differentiation of mental defectives from the insane was accomplished during the early part of the 19th century, it was not until the late 19th century that scientific standards were established for the measurement of degrees of mental ability and for the determination of mental defect, despite man\u27s observation since time immemorial of the individual variability in mental ability. These were tests for general intelligence, the product of research by a whole school of psychologists, but attributable directly to the researches of Alfred Binet, of France