Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the winner as well as the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and then propose two estimation strategies, one based on the empirical distribution function of winning bids for the last unit sold and the other based on approximation methods using orthogonal polynomials. We apply our methods to daily data from fish auctions held in Grenå, Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.Asymmetric, Multi-unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-price fish auctions, Dutch auctions, Nonparametric identification and estimation

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives (revised)

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this decomposition to male and female workers from a tree-planting firm in the province of British Columbia, Canada. We provide evidence that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to incentives than did the men, the average difference is not statistically significant. The productivity differential that men enjoyed arose because of differences in ability, strength in our application.Productivity, Gender, Compensation, Incentives

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this decomposition to male and female workers a tree-planting firm in the province of British Columbia, Canada. We provide evidence that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to incentives than did the men, the average difference is not statistically significant. The productivity differential that men enjoyed arose because of differences in ability, strength in our application.Productivity, Gender, Compensation, Incentives

On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm

Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the commonvalue paradigm, we analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the transaction price as the number of bidders gets large. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.common value; information aggregation; multi-unit auctions; taxis

On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm

Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the commonvalue paradigm, we analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the　transaction price as the number of bidders gets large. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.common value, information aggregation, multi-unit auctions, taxis

Is the ’Linkage Principle’ Valid?: Evidence from the Field

revenue comparison, auction choice, linkage principle, used-car auctions