Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University

The Killers in the Lab

New York Times Op-EdIn order to combat the threat of biological weapons, more than $20 billion has been spent on bio-defense research since 2001.This has led to a an increase of research facilities as well as the number of people who have access to the materials. However, the 2001 anthrax mailings were conducted by a top Army bio-defense scientist, Dr Bruce Ivins and the anthrax powder originated from the Army bio-defense research center at Fort Detrick, MD. This suggest that the bio-defense program risks creating the very threat it is meant to fight. Elisa D. Harris recommends that a full public examination of all the governments evidence in the 2001 anthrax mailings should occur in order to determine what went wrong. Then the overall bio-defense research strategy must be re-examined, along with the setting of clear priorities, strengthening safety, and ensuring security and oversight of laboratories working with dangerous agents. Harris suggests that the probability of an attack on the American public is low, but any such attack would be devastating. Therefore, the US cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bio-weapons agents in more and more people’s hands

The Iraqi VX Warhead Threat: Hype vs. Reality

Nonproliferation Literature ReviewTo bolster the Administration"s case against Iraq, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in the January 23 New York Times cited former UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler"s estimate that a VX missile warhead launched at a major city "could kill up to one million people." However, Rice misrepresents Butler"s analysis, at least as outlined in his book, The Greatest Threat, and neither Rice nor Butler appear to have fully considered the range of factors that can influence the outcome of any given chemical attack. In his book, Butler does not state that a VX warhead would result in up to one million deaths. Rather, he notes that a single 140 liter warhead would contain enough agent to produce that effect. But the fact that a warhead contains a million lethal doses does not mean that a million people would be killed if such a warhead were deployed. As various commentators have pointed out, the outcome of any chemical attack will vary greatly depending on 1) the purity and form of the agent; 2) the dispersal mechanism; 3) weather and meteorological conditions; 4) the terrain of the target area; and, 5) population density and disposition. Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland

Nonlethal Chemical Weapons Pose Different Threat

The Baltimore SunThe United States is conducting what President Bush has described as a preventive war to eliminate Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Statements by senior administration officials indicate that the United States may use chemical weapons of its own - so-called "nonlethal" riot control agents - against Iraqi troops if, for example, those troops use Iraqi civilians as human shields. Such actions are unlikely to protect innocent Iraqis from harm. They could also increase the risk to U.S. troops while violating one of the key disarmament agreements that U.S. military action is designed to uphold. In little-noticed testimony Feb. 5, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld confirmed before the House Armed Services Committee that the Pentagon has been trying to write rules of engagement that would permit U.S. military forces to use riot control agents (RCAs) in Iraq. Elisa D. Harris is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland

Biological Threat Reduction: Opportunities and Obstacles

Presentation before the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory CouncilMs. Harrington addressed the risk of biological proliferation in Russia and Eurasia. She outlined five sources of risk for biological proliferation: expertise, facilities, materials, unstable sociopolitical environments, and the proximity of the region to the Middle East. Regarding expertise, the thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians involved in bioresearch and development possess skills that could contribute to biological weapons programs. Dozens of research, production and design facilities still remain throughout the former Soviet Union, posing a proliferation risk. Information on the extent and location of biological materials remains sparse, even within the Russian government. Dangerous pathogen collections exist at many of these sites. Efforts have been made to locate these materials and to take initial actions to safeguard them in order to prevent illicit transfer. The unstable sociopolitical and economic environment in the region, exemplified by the current unrest in Uzbekistan, pose a danger to the security of biological institutes and materials. Finally, the facilities" proximity to the Middle East make them particularly tempting targets for biological materials theft by terrorist groups. Several unsuccessful incidents of nuclear materials transfer have been discovered, and biological materials could follow the same trafficking networks. The U.S. has been engaged with key bioinstitutes in the region since 1994, and expanded that involvement in 1997. Several U.S. government agencies oversee programs focused on responding to the biological proliferation threat including the Departments of State, Defense, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. In 2001, the White House review of biothreat reduction programs encouraged the expansion of these programs. Internationally, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union are all funding projects and activities related to reducing the biological threat. In particular, Canada has made a major contribution under the G-8 Global Partnership. Among non-governmental organizations, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Civilian Research and Development Foundation have implemented projects and encouraged dialogue that has sensitized policymakers and the public to the importance of the biological threat. In addition, the International Science and Technology Center now devotes 40% of their budget to funding biological institutes and research. On the Russian side, increased attention to the problem has resulted in competitive grant programs for bioresearchers in order to absorb their expertise and discourage proliferation. Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland

Scientific Openness and National Security after 9/11

CBW Conventions BulletinThe events of 11 September 2001 and the anthrax letters have reignited the longstanding debate over scientific openness and national security. And for the first time, the life sciences community is the focus of concern. Recent proposals for self-governance are unlikely to provide sufficient reassurance that information, in the words of the Corson Report, "not directly and significantly connected with technology critical to national security" is not disclosed. A more formalized system for considering the security implications of biodefence and other dual-use research, including specific criteria for making decisions on dissemination restrictions or classification, is needed in order to maintain support for the very endeavours on which both public health and national security depend. Fear of bioterrorism has emerged as a priority concern of American security policy as a result of the anthrax letters of 2001. That event resonating with the September 11 terrorist attacks crystallized a much more urgent sense of threat than had previously been perceived. It is now commonly assumed that malicious organizations will attempt to exploit the destructive potential of biotechnology, and it is also implicitly conceded that a dedicated effort is likely to succeed. In response to this surge of fear, the American political system has sharply increased investment in biodefence research intended to provide protection against deliberate biological attack. Nowhere is this more true than at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which has seen its funding for biodefence grow by over 3,200%, from $53 million in fiscal year 2001 to a record$1.8 billion (requested) in fiscal year 2006.2 These funds have resulted in a 1,500% increase in the number of grants for research on anthrax, plague and other top biological warfare agents, from 33 between 1996-2000, to almost 500 between 2001 and January 2005.3 This research is dedicated to determining the character and magnitude of potential threat in order to develop better methods of protection. But at least some of this effort will assuredly identify more advanced methods of attack as well. Elisa D Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland John D Steinbruner is the Director of Center for International Security Studies at Maryland

What's Missing?

San Jose Mercury NewsLast week, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq reported that, like his U.N counterparts before the war, he had not uncovered Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction or active weapons production efforts inside the country. David Kay and the 1,400 members of his investigative team may yet find the weapons stocks the Bush administration said were sure to be there. But such discoveries are increasingly unlikely. The gap between President Bush's warnings and Kay's preliminary findings raises at least three important questions as the United States shapes its policy toward the weapons programs of North Korea, Iran and other countries: How reliable is U.S. intelligence on foreign weapons programs? Can sanctions and inspections play a useful role in containing the threat from such programs? And are pre-emptive attacks the most effective way to deal with such threats? Elisa D. Harris is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Ivo H. Daalder was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is co-author of the just-released "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy.

A Last Chance for Saddam Hussein

The New York TimesAs the Bush administration considers how to proceed on Iraq, it has to confront a growing contradiction in its public pronouncements. For months, President Bush has insisted that Baghdad allow United Nations inspectors complete and unfettered access to sites where they suspect weapons are being stored or produced. At the same time, American officials have made clear that Mr. Hussein's regime represents an unacceptable threat that must be removed, by force if necessary. But what if Mr. Hussein lets United Nations inspectors back in and gives them complete access? Would the administration still insist on his removal? Yes, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell. "Even then," he told CNN last month, "the United States believes the Iraqi people would still be better off with a new kind of leadership that is not trying to hide this sort of development activity on weapons of mass destruction and is not of the despotic nature that the Saddam Hussein regime is." Recently, President Bush was even more direct in putting the focus on Saddam Hussein himself, rather than on his weapons. "He is a problem," Mr. Bush said, "and we're going to deal with him." Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

Local Optical Spectroscopy in Quantum Confined Systems: A Theoretical Description

A theoretical description of local absorption is proposed in order to investigate spectral variations on a length scale comparable with the extension of the relevant quantum states. A general formulation is derived within the density-matrix formalism including Coulomb correlation, and applied to the prototypical case of coupled quantum wires. The results show that excitonic effects may have a crucial impact on the local absorption with implications for the spatial resolution and the interpretation of near-field optical spectra.Comment: To appear in Phys. Rev. Lett. - 11 pages, 3 PostScript figures (1 figure in colors) embedded. Uses RevTex, and psfig style

Quantitative methods for the analysis of CFTR transcripts/splicing variants

AbstractIn cystic fibrosis (CF), transcript analysis and quantification are important for diagnosis, prognosis and also as surrogate markers for some therapies including gene therapy. Classical RNA-based methods require significant expression levels in target samples for appropriate analysis, thus PCR-based methods are evolving towards reliable quantification. Various protocols for the quantitative analysis of CFTR transcripts (including those resulting from splicing variants) are described and discussed here