Regulating Industrial Water Pollution in the United States

The performance of the industrial point-source water pollution abatement program in the U.S. Clean Water Act is examined. I begin with a brief description of the statute and then turn to a description of the process used to develop the rules that govern effluent discharges. This is followed by a discussion of the outcomes resulting from efforts to apply these rules to industrial pollutant sources. Two types of outcomes are considered: administrative outcomes and outcomes in the water. Last, the issue of implementation is discussed: how the Clean Water Act may have affected the incentives governing the behavior of industrial dischargers, municipal waste treatment plant operators, and regulators. Surprisingly, there is some evidence that the Clean Water Act, at least as far as industrial point sources are concerned, may be evolving into an effluent fee policy, or at least a mixed policy.effluent guidelines, indirect dischargers, water quality

Coase and Car Repair: Who Should Be Responsible for Emissions of Vehicles in Use?

This paper examines the current assignment of liability for in-use vehicle emissions and suggests some alternative policies that may reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness. The authors first discuss the cost, performance and incentives under current Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) programs, using the recently implemented Arizona "Enhanced I/M" program as an example. These programs were designed to identify and repair vehicles with malfunctioning emission control systems. Since their inception, however, I/M programs have been plagued by transaction costs that have drastically raised the cost of I/M as well as limited its effectiveness. These transaction costs fall into three categories: emission monitoring, repair avoidance, and non-transferability of emission reductions. The authors argue that most of these transaction costs can be attributed to the current assignment of liability for I/M to motorists, and they examine the potential for other liability assignments to reduce transaction costs and improve program efficiency. Among the alternative institutional arrangements discussed are greater imposition of liability on manufacturers, emission repair subsidies, repair liability auctions, and vehicle leasing.

Evaluating Regulatory Impact Analyses

Federal agencies in the United States are required to prepare regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) for every major regulatory action they undertake. Increasingly, other OECD countries are imposing similar requirements. However, there has been little examination of the quality of these documents or of the uses to which they have been put in the regulatory process or elsewhere. In this paper we survey previous efforts to evaluate RIAs and find a fair amount of evaluation of RIAs as stand-alone documents, but much less evaluation of their contribution to producing better regulations.regulation, RIA, benefit-cost analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis

The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution

To what extent should developing countries eschew conventional command and control environmental regulation that is increasingly seen as inefficient and rely instead on economic incentives? This paper addresses this question as it pertains to industrial air pollution. The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of various economic incentive instruments, presents in-depth case studies of their application in Sweden, the United States, China, and Poland, and proposes a number of policy guidelines. The authors argue that both design deficiencies and pervasive constraints on monitoring and enforcement impede the effectiveness of economic instruments in developing countries. The latter are difficult to rectify, at least in the medium term. As a result, tradable permits are generally not practical. Suitably modified however, emissions fee policies probably are appropriate. They can provide a foundation for a transition to an effective economic incentive system, and can raise much needed revenue for environmental projects and programs. In addition, if political opposition can be overcome, environmental taxes constitute a second-best but potentially effective pollution control instrument.

Public Support for Pollution Fee Policies for Motor Vehicles: Survey Results

In this paper we report on the results of a telephone survey conducted in Southern California during August and September 1996. The purpose of the survey was to inform respondents about a set of rather complex pricing policies designed to reduce motor vehicle emissions and to estimate respondent support for those policies. After receiving extensive information about these policies, respondents were polled on whether they would support, i.e., vote for, any or all of these options. The pollution fee survey elicited support for a plan that levied a fee on vehicles in the region, depending on the vehicle's emissions per mile and on the miles driven. The sample was then split in two, with half the respondents being told that a portion of the revenues would be returned to the public in the form of reductions in motor vehicle fees or sales tax reductions, and half told that these returns would be made in the form of coupons. Nearly 40 percent of respondents agreed to support the base plan (42 percent of those expressing an opinion). More than 50 percent supported the fees with rebates, including support of 54 percent when all the available revenues are returned to the public (57 percent of the sample expressing an opinion). Support for the coupon policy was intermediate between the base and rebate policies, attracting 42 percent of the sample (45 percent of those expressing an opinion). Statistical analyses were performed on the data to explain the voting patterns observed. Generally, the levels of support were significantly affected by the design features of the plans, such as the size of the fee paid and the rebate, as well as by a host of socio-demographic and perceptual variables, such as ethnicity, age, political affiliation, expected efficacy of the policy, and the degree to which air pollution affects the respondent or his or her family. Examination of these statistical results may be useful in the development of pollution fee programs to present to the public, as well as in the design of public information campaigns and the allocation of marketing resources to win support for these programs.

Estimating Full IM240 Emissions from Partial Test Results: Evidence from Arizona

The expense and inconvenience of enhanced vehicle emissions testing using the full 240-second dynamometer test has led states to search for ways to shorten the test process. In fact, all states that currently use the IM240 allow some type of fast-pass, usually as early in the test as second 31, and Arizona allows vehicles to fast-fail after second 93. While these shorter tests save states millions of dollars in inspection lanes and driver costs, there is a loss in information since test results are no longer comparable across vehicles. This paper presents a methodology for estimating full 240 second results from partial-test results for three pollutants: HC, CO and NOx. Using random sample of vehicles in Arizona which received full 240 second tests, we use regression analysis to estimate the relationship between emissions at second 240 and emissions at earlier seconds in the test. We examine the influence of other variables such as age, model-year group, and the pollution level itself on this relationship. We then use the estimated coefficients in several applications. First, we attempt to shed light on the frequent assertion that the results of the dynamometer test provide guidance for vehicle repair of failing vehicles. Using a probit analysis, we find that the probability that a failing vehicle will passing the test on the first retest is greater the longer the test has progressed. Second, we test the accuracy of our estimates for forecasting fleet emissions from partial test emissions results in Arizona. We find that forecast fleet average emissions are very close to the actual fleet averages.

Costs, Emissions Reductions and Vehicle Repair: Evidence from Arizona

The Arizona I/M program provides one of the first opportunities to examine the costs and effectiveness of vehicle emission repair. This paper examines various aspects of emission reductions, fuel economy improvements, and costs of repair, drawing data from over 80,000 vehicles failing the I/M test in Arizona between 1995 and the first half of 1996. We summarize the wealth of repair data from the Arizona program and highlight its limitations. Because missing or incomplete cost information has been a serious shortcoming for evaluation of I/M programs, we develop a method for estimating the costs of repair when those costs are not reported. We find surprising evidence that almost one quarter of all vehicles that take the I/M test are never observed to pass the test. Using a statistical analysis, we provide some information about the differences between the vehicles that pass and those that do not. Older, more polluting vehicles are much more likely to never pass the I/M test, and their expected costs of repair are much higher than those of new cars. The paper summarizes the evidence on cost and emission reduction in the Arizona program, comparing costs and emission reductions for both cars and trucks. Finally, we examine the potential for more cost-effective repair, first through an analysis of tightening I/M cutpoints, and then by calculating the cost savings of achieving different emission reduction goals when the most cost effective repairs are made first.

Learning from Experiments: An Evaluation Plan for CMAQ Projects

The Congestion Mitigation/Air Quality Program (CMAQ), established in 1991 by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) to provide about $1 billion per year to fund transportation projects that improve air quality, is intended both to support traditional transportation control measures and to encourage innovation in developing new strategies and technologies for controlling emissions from transportation sources. While the program has indeed encouraged some innovative approaches to local transportation and air quality problems, critics see it as a diversion of funds that could more usefully be devoted to conventional highway improvement projects. The current debate in Congress over the reauthorization of ISTEA and, specifically, the CMAQ provisions, is hampered by the lack of detailed information about the achievements of previous CMAQ projects and a plan for evaluating future projects. Resolution of this debate could be aided by emphasizing the role of CMAQ projects as natural experiments and developing a plan to conduct them. The purpose of this paper is to outline a strategy of analysis and data collection that will facilitate evaluation of CMAQ projects. This paper argues that the lack of emphasis (in all but the largest projects) on project evaluation can be explained by the public goods nature of information. Because local implementing agencies bear the costs of evaluation, while the benefits are enjoyed primarily by other jurisdictions in planning their transportation and environment projects, too little evaluation is conducted. At present, much of the potential usefulness of CMAQ projects to planners is dissipated because there is little systematic learning. Indeed, a project could succeed as an experiment if learning took place, even if it failed to improve air quality. This paper examines the kinds of data collected now in CMAQ programs in comparison with the kinds of data that would permit more effective program evaluation, particularly ex post evaluation, i.e., analysis of what actually resulted from the implementation of the individual project. In many cases, data-gathering should concentrate on observable outcomes that can clearly be attributed to the project and yet bear some relationship to air quality or congestion, either established by previous empirical study or by model results. A method is proposed for collecting the requisite data for each of several important types of CMAQ projects. To assure that the data are collected and evaluated will also require changes in the way in which CMAQ is administered, including the dedication of some portion of CMAQ funds for evaluating completed projects. The biggest change may be the need to develop measures of "success" and identify "control cases" against which to judge the success of the experiment.