Posner, Economics and the Law: from Law and Economics to an Economic Analysis of Law.

The purpose of this article is to discuss Posner's economic analysis of law and to analyse the differences between his economic analysis of law and law and economics. We propose and demonstrate a twofold original argument. First, we show that Posner does not only propose an economic analysis of the working of the legal system but also that his approach has changed in the early 1970s, shifting from a law and economics perspective in which the focus is put on the working of the economic system to an economic analysis of law in which the emphasis is put on the functioning of the legal system. He appears then no longer influenced by Aaron Director and Ronald Coase but rather by Gary Becker. Therefore, and this is the second part of our demonstration, we show that the evolution in Posner's works essentially derives from the influence of Becker and the adoption by the former of the methodological views of the latter. More precisely, we claim that Posner no longer retains a -- restrictive -- definition of economics by subject matter but that he aligns himself on Becker and his broader definition of economics placing nonmarket decisions and method at the core of the discipline. In other words, we argue that Posner is the first who transposes Becker’s definition of economics in law and economics and that this is precisely what makes Posner's economic analysis of law possible and specific, and also of particular importance.

L’analyse économique du droit - Éléments de rupture et de continuité des années 1970 à aujourd’hui

L’objectif de l’article est de souligner certains éléments de rupture et de continuité majeurs dans l’analyse économique du droit du début des années 1970 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Notre point de départ consiste dans une distinction, rarement soulignée, entre « économie du droit » et « analyse économique du droit ». Nous montrons d’abord en quoi consiste cette distinction, puis que l’objectif et le positionnement du programme de recherche initial de l’analyse économique du droit au début des années 1970 – la rationalisation des choix dans la sphère juridico-judiciaire – et l’adoption d’une méthodologie essentiellement inspirée de Becker induisent une continuité notable dans ses développements ultérieurs, dans la mesureoù ces derniers apparaissent largement déterminés par les  évolutions de l’analyse économique standard, dont les outils, techniques et  roblématiques sont importés directement dans le domaine de l’économie du droit. En ce sens, nous considérons que les développements récents du Behavioral Law and Economics et de l’analyse économique des normes sociales constituent moins des contributions originales que des amendements visant à adapter la théorie initiale à une science économique en mutation.This article emphasizes some key elements of rupture and continuity in the history of the economic analysis of law from the early 1970s until now. We first make a distinction between law and economics and the economic analysis of law. Building upon this distinction, we argue that the aim and development of an original research program in the early 1970s – i.e. rationalizing legal and judicial decisions within an economic framework – and the adoption of a beckerian methodology explain why the works in the field of the economic analysis of law exhibit elements of intellectual continuity. In that view, topics, tools, and methodology of the economic analysis of law appear to be mostly oriented by the advances in mainstream economics. From that perspective, recent developments in behavioral law and economics and the economics of social norms may be rather an attempt to adapt the economic analysis of law to contemporary trends in economic science than an original contribution of the economic analysis of law to economic theory

Avocats

La régulation de la profession d’avocat fait depuis plusieurs années l’objet d’un débat public insistant, le plus souvent, sur les effets anticoncurrentiels de la réglementation professionnelle et les effets bénéfiques attendus d’une libéralisation du « marché du droit ». À l’encontre de cette perspective dominante, les travaux d’Olivier Favereau s’attachent à préciser la nature de la concurrence entre avocats. En montrant que celle-ci porte non pas seulement sur les prix, mais surtout sur la..

Rationalité économique et décision judiciaire

A veni

A short history of the economic analysis of law in France 1980-2010 – preliminary milestones

Economic analysis of law (eal) was born in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States.However, it took more than two decades before it was fully accepted in France. Theaim of this article is to describe the reception and slow dissemination of eal inFrance and the way the French situation changed from the 1980s until the early 2010s.It also attempts to put forward a few reasons why eal developed so late in Franceand why this evolution did not occur until the 1990s and 2000s

Avocats

Forthcomin

L’analyse économique du juge constitutionnel

A veni

Explaining the production and dissemination of global corporate governance standards: A law and economics approach to corporate governance codes as a global law-making technology

The chapter questions the production and dissemination of global standards of corporate governance across OECD countries in the recent decades. It argues that convergence around similar corporate governance principles – defined in broad terms and at a high level of generality – was made possible due to deep changes in law-making technologies occurring over the same period. In the recent decades, traditional legal technologies became inefficient in meeting the new legal needs of economic agents generated by economic globalization and the increase of cross-border investment. In the field of corporate governance, this resulted in increased reliance on soft law, and especially corporate governance codes. We argue that the specific features of codes as a legal technology (characterized by a self-regulatory production process, legal standards rather than detailed rules, strong reliance on the comply-or-explain principle, and the use of non-legal sanctions) may have facilitated the emergence and dissemination of global corporate governance standards across OECD countries

A short history of the economic analysis of law in France 1980-2010 – preliminary milestones

Economic analysis of law (eal) was born in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States.However, it took more than two decades before it was fully accepted in France. Theaim of this article is to describe the reception and slow dissemination of eal inFrance and the way the French situation changed from the 1980s until the early 2010s.It also attempts to put forward a few reasons why eal developed so late in Franceand why this evolution did not occur until the 1990s and 2000s

Was Napoleon a Benevolent Dictator? An Economic Justification for Codification

codification, coordination, legal harmonisation, network externalities, legal market,