The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.</p

Models of cognition and affect in perceptions of well-being

How do people arrive at assessments of their own life quality? A series of models was developed to provide an interpretation of the way the factors of cognition and affect operate along with evaluations of specific life concerns (domains) in the perception of well-being. Following previous research, cognition was defined operationally as a factor which accounts for the covariance among a set of assessments of life-as-a-whole after affect, as measured by Bradburn's scales, is partialled out and after allowance is made for the presence of correlated measurement errors. It was found that loadings on the cognitive factor, and hence the interpretation of this factor, changed little despite quite large changes in the models. Moreover, in all major comparisons, models that contained the cognitive factor fitted the data better than models that did not. Models that included affect as the only variable intervening between the domains and the life-as-a-whole factor led to results that were intuitively difficult to accept. In the preferred model both affect and cognition were positioned as intervening variables. In this model it was found that the domain evaluations had no direct impact on life-as-a-whole assessments — the contribution of the domains was indirect by way of their association with cognition and affect. It was hypothesised that associated with each domain was a domain-specific element of affect and a domain-specific element of cognition. The linear additive relation found by previous researchers between domain evaluations and life-as-a-whole assessments would then be explainable as a statistical result arising from the summing of the domain-specific elements of affect and cognition.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43703/1/11205_2004_Article_BF00292640.pd