Whatever happened to second tier ettlements? A survey of settlements under the Labour Relations Act 1987

The Labour Relations Act 1987 provides a Package that will enable employers to effectively dismantle the system of national awards should they so desire. Such employers will no doubt use the provisions of the Act that restrict unions to a single set of negotiations for any group of workers thus effectively eliminating secondary bargaining as we have known it. This research examines what has happened to second tier settlements in the 1987/88 wage round. It is concluded that this wage round has been very much treated as a transitional round as far as wage bargaining is concerned. New rules effectively eliminating secondary bargaining have been widely ignored by unions and employers alike as both groups grapple with difficult decisions about the future of wage bargaining. Old practises have been informally continued in many industries. There is some evidence however that the maintenance of the nationui award system in future wage rounds will present significant problems for some unions

The 1981 Federation of Labour Conference

The unity that had been expressed at the FOL Conference following the successful Kenleith settlement, has been placed under considerable strain following the arrests of picketers at Mangere Airport and the resultant Kiwis Care march led by Tania Harris through the streets of Auckland. Union morale had taken a battering, and the effect of this on the unity of the labour movement had explosive potential for the 1981 FOL Conference. Unity within the labour movement was strained, but the split came not between unionists but between the industrial and political wings of the labour movement, and was to become a major issue throughout Conference

New Zealand's Collective Employment Contracts: Update November 1992

The Employment Contracts Act 1991 contains a very different thrust than that of New Zealand's earlier industrial relations legislation. That thrust is directed at the decollectivisation of the labour relations system, encouraging enterprise bargaining over multi-employer bargaining, and promoting individual rights as equal to those of any collective. A direct corollary of these policies is reflected in the decision to keep no public record of collective bargains. Confidentiality of settlement outcomes has become an important aspect of negotiations. While Government policy has determined that there will be no public record of collective bargains, it has decided that, for "analytical and research" purposes, employers who enter into collective employment contracts that cover 20 or more staff should forward copies of those contracts to the Secretary of Labour. No such obligation rests with unions or other employee organisations who enter into contracts. The absence of a comprehensive public record of collective bargaining has made it very difficult to ascertain the effects of the legislation, but then, that is something that can be used to advantage by those who support the Act

REPORT: The 1984 Federation of Labour Conference

Federation of Labour Conferences are often reactive and negative forums - reactive to industrial events of the day and negative about, in particular, Government policies. Three years ago, for example, the Conference developed an anti the Muldoon Government theme yet did not take the next step, and actively support wholeheartedly the election of an alternative Government - presumably a Labour Government. (Harbridge, 1981 p.92). The 1984 Conference represented a significant change in approach. In the 3 major policy areas Conference not just came out with policies that were "things against" but also promoted in their place policies that were "things for". The first of these policy decisions was to campaign for a return to bargaining and for an end to the wage freeze. The second was to campaign for the election of a Labour Government at the next election and the end of the National Government. The third was for the development of new economic directives for the country -based on the principle of putting the interests of people ahead of the interests of the owners of property and capital. This last decision signified a realisation that, on its own, the election of a Labour Government would be no panacea for the problems faced by working people

Recent Redundancy Agreements: a Content Analysis

The on-going saga of the G.N. Hale redundancy dispute appears now to have run its course. From grievance committee, to the Labour Coun, to the Court of Appeal, and back to the Labour Court, the case has attracted considerable attention - from the media and naturally from industrial relations practitioners, eager to learn the view of the New Zealand court system on the vexed matter of redundancy compensation. In the most recent Labour Coun decision on Hale (WLC89/90), Goddard C J held that while the employer was able to prove that the worker was genuinely made redundant the dismissal was unjustifiable because "the circumstances called for the payment of compensation; none was paid; and the amount that was offered and refused was fixed by unilateral decision of the employer and was inadequate". The effect of this decision is profound. Employers planning to make employees redundant have a new set of requirements to meet before their actions can be taken as justifiable. While it will remain the case that there is no right to compensation for a dismissal on the grounds of redundancy unless that right is conferred by a redundancy agreement or by an award or ,collective agreement, there may still be a right to compensation if the dismissal, although genuinely on the grounds of redundancy, is unjustifiable and thereby gives rise to a successful personal grievance. An employer will now need to focus on the circumstances of the redundancy to detetuaine whether it calls for compensation and where it does, the employer will need to offer, and have accepted, compensation that is both adequate and negotiated

REPLY: The Treatment of Industrial Relations in Three Major New Zealand Newspapers: A Reply

Warren Page is a very senior journalist in New Zealand and the comments he has made provide a valuable insight into the difficulties that newspapers have with reporting industrial relations. He has made a number of defences on behalf of the industry for my research results, yet has not criticised the results themselves, only my interpretation of them. I would like to offer the following by way of reply

The Treatment of Industrial Relations in Three Major New Zealand Newspapers

Industrial relations items appearing in three Nevw Zealand newspapers were examined to provide an analysis of issues presented and frequency with which spokespersons were reported. The newspapers followed the same approach. Disputes were reported in 55 percent of items and no spokesperson was reported in 80 percent. When a spokesperson was reported it was most likely to be an employee representative. A comparison of the treatment of industrial relations and control items showed significant differences. Industrial relations was found to be presented in short articles with large headlines which indicated a tendency to sensationalise

People can prefer a policy win for the party they oppose over Congressional gridlock.

Party conflict, gridlock, and dysfunction are common words for describing the US Congress in recent years. In new research, D.J. Flynn and Laurel Harbridge investigate how party conflict— resulting in compromise, victories for one party, or gridlock—shapes public opinion towards Congress. They find that on issues where the parties agree over end goals, gridlock hurts evaluations of Congress even more than legislative victories for the opposing party

SHORTER PAPERS: A Comment on the Extent of Voluntary Bargaining in New Zealand Industrial Relations

In the current debate about the future of private sector wage fixing in New Zealand, there is an implicit assumption that there is an extensive second tier of bargaining which supplements national award negotiations. Commentators are, however, reluctant to quantify the true extent of this second tier. Their reluctance stems from the fact that much of this second tier is negotiated informally, and while agreements may be written, they are often unlikely to be registered with the Arbitration Court

Changing patterns of working time arrangements in registered collective agreements in New Zealand

Internal numerical flexibility (working hours, overtime and shift arrangements) is an important measure of the overall flexibility of the labour market. New Zealand's industrial legislation on working time arrangements is permissive and allows the parties to collective bargaining considerable freedom. However, awards and agreements have generally limited the 40 hour week to certain clock hours worked between Monday to Friday. Overtime and shift arrangements provide for work outside these clock hours. The research reported in this paper examines changes to working time arrangements in registered collective settlements in the 1987/88 wage round. Over 30 percent of registered settlements contained a change to their working time arrangements with agreements being significantly more likely than awards to contain such a change. At least one more flexible working time arrangement was introduced in over 80 percent of those settlements