U.S. public and private venture capital markets, 1998-2001: A fundamental information analysis

Systematic analysis of U.S. capital markets reveals important empirical facts that analytical modeling or empirical research seeking to explain the 1998-2001 movements needs to recognize. There is no single "bubble point" at which U.S. capital markets had an epiphany that valuations required a sharp downward re-evaluation. Rather, different sectors had different points after which ex post sustained declines occurred. For the NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX public capital markets, the sustained ex post declines occurred starting in March 2000 for the computer software industry and in September 2000 for the computer hardware industry. Private venture capital investment in new ventures peaked in the March 2000 quarter for software and in the September 2000 quarter for hardware and communications. Four sectors exhibiting extreme price movements are identified - computer hardware, computer software, telecommunications, and biotech/pharmaceuticals. These sectors had observable characteristics prior to 1998 that implied higher risk - they had higher relative risk (CAPM beta), higher standard deviation of security returns, more extreme revenue growth increases (decreases) in the upper (lower) tails, and a higher propensity for negative net income. During the 1998-2001 period, companies in these sectors had abnormally high revenue growth rates. An Internet sample of companies exhibits even higher abnormal revenue growth rates relative to either prior periods or other companies in the 1998-2001 period. The large relative increases and decreases in the market capitalization of U.S. capital markets in 1998-2001 may well have more grounding in risk-reward asset pricing theory than many commentators have recognized.capital markets; stock prices; Internet stocks; stock market bubble;

Give everyone a prize? Employee stock options in private venture-backed firms

This study examines employee stock options in private entrepreneurial companies. I focus on private U.S. venture-backed firms because they are renowned for the intensity and organizational depth of their stock option grants. Contrary to simple stereotype, however, I show that 27% of U.S. venture-backed firms do not grant stock options to all employees. I seek to explain this by theorizing that the economic and legal settings in which venture-backed companies exist lead to both costs and benefits from the use of stock options to attract, compensate, incent, monitor, and retain certain employees, and that sometimes the costs exceed the benefits. I test the theory by determining whether variation in the organizational depth to which venture-backed firms grant employee stock options can be explained by proxies for these economic and legal costs. Such proxies include the fraction of employees who are in technical positions; the degree of flatness in the firm's organizational structure; its proximity to other venture-backed companies; the number of patents it has been granted; and the fraction of equity held by venture investors. The results support the theory and thereby imply that venture-backed firms grant employee stock options in an economically sophisticated manner.

CEO compensation in venture-backed firms

We hypothesize that because fast-growing young companies must raise money in private capital markets that contain significant financing frictions, the CEOs of such firms will be compensated for successful fundraising. Using a sample of 1585 private venture-backed U.S. firms, we find that the cash pay of entrepreneur-CEOs is increasing in both the quantity and quality of financing secured and is more sensitive to successful fundraising the more challenging and difficult is the fundraising task. Successful fundraising also increases the gap between the pay of CEOs and other executives. Finally, we show that while VC financing dilutes the CEO's fractional equity ownership, it increases the dollar value of that ownership.CEO compensation Private venture-backed companies Rewards for successful fundraising