Share repurchase regulations: do firms play by the rules?

Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a database containing 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms over the period 2000-2002, we show that very few firms fully comply with the regulations for all their buybacks. Non-compliance has an adverse effect on liquidity only for the smallest and least liquid firms.open market share repurchases, insider trading, regulations, liquidity

Actual share repurchases, timing and liquidity

Research on the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the US. Using a previously unused database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms, we show that corporate share repurchases have a significant adverse effect on liquidity as measured by bid–ask spread or depth. Our results also indicate that share repurchases largely reflect contrarian trading rather than managerial timing ability.Repurchase; Timing; Liquidity; Euronext Paris