The Importance of Human Reliability Analysis in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

HRA is a method used to describe, qualitatively and quantitatively, the occurrence of human failures in the operation of complex systems that affect availability and reliability. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure in a PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) provides a more complete picture of the risk and risk contributions. A high quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedural, equipment design and need for automation

Shuttle Risk Progression: Use of the Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to Show Reliability Growth

It is important to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), as well as future manned spaceflight programs, to understand the early mission risk and progression of risk as the program gains insights into the integrated vehicle through flight. The risk progression is important to the SSP as part of the documentation of lessons learned. The risk progression is important to future programs to understand reliability growth and the first flight risk. This analysis uses the knowledge gained from 30 years of operational flights and the current Shuttle PRA to calculate the risk of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) at significant milestones beginning with the first flight. Key flights were evaluated based upon historical events and significant re-designs. The results indicated that the Shuttle risk tends to follow a step function as opposed to following a traditional reliability growth pattern where risk exponentially improves with each flight. In addition, it shows that risk can increase due to trading safety margin for increased performance or due to external events. Due to the risk drivers not being addressed, the risk did not improve appreciably during the first 25 flights. It was only after significant events occurred such as Challenger and Columbia, where the risk drivers were apparent, that risk was significantly improved. In addition, this paper will show that the SSP has reduced the risk of LOCV by almost an order of magnitude. It is easy to look back afte r 30 years and point to risks that are now obvious, however; the key is to use this knowledge to benefit other programs which are in their infancy stages. One lesson learned from the SSP is understanding risk drivers are essential in order to considerably reduce risk. This will enable the new program to focus time and resources on identifying and reducing the significant risks. A comprehensive PRA, similar to that of the Shuttle PRA, is an effective tool quantifying risk drivers if support from all of the stakeholders is given

Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Shuttle Decision Making Process

This slide presentation reviews the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assist in the decision making for the shuttle design and operation. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined approach to identifying and analyzing risk in complex systems and/or processes that seeks answers to three basic questions: (i.e., what can go wrong? what is the likelihood of these occurring? and what are the consequences that could result if these occur?) The purpose of the Shuttle PRA (SPRA) is to provide a useful risk management tool for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to identify strengths and possible weaknesses in the Shuttle design and operation. SPRA was initially developed to support upgrade decisions, but has evolved into a tool that supports Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) and near real-time flight decisions. Examples of the use of PRA for the shuttle are reviewed

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident, NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. The HST SM4 was subsequently reinstated and flown as Space Transportation System (STS)-125 because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damaged thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a viable crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of STS-125, the viability of the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For STS-125, there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue due to limited consumables (power, oxygen, etc.) available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depended upon several factors, including when a problem was identified; when and what actions, such as powering down, were begun to conserve consumables; and where the Launch on Need (LON) vehicle was in its ground processing cycle. Crew rescue success also needed to be weighed against preserving the Orbiter s ability to have a landing option in case there was a problem with the LON vehicle. This paper focuses on quantifying the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down strategies. Results from this effort supported NASA s decision to proceed with STS-125, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009

Large Satellite Bus Reliability

NASA is proposing to build a small space station in Cis-lunar orbit called Deep Space Gateway (DSG). At the heart of the DSG is the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) which is conceptually similar to previously designed and operated satellite buses. A satellite bus is composed of the satellite spacecraft infrastructure minus the payload, and generally includes power, propulsion, avionics, and guidance, navigation and control. In November of 2017, five companies were awarded contracts by NASA to research PPE designs. In order to better understand the reliability of large satellite buses which may be the starting point of the PPE, NASA used Weibull analysis to evaluate spacecraft with similar masses and design life to the PPE. In addition, a subset of the large satellites which had satellite buses manufactured by any one of the five companies was also evaluated. This paper provides the results of the reliability analysis and compares the reliability of the general population of large satellites to the reliability associated with large satellite buses manufactured by the five companies currently studying PPE options

2009 Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview

Loss of a Space Shuttle during flight has severe consequences, including loss of a significant national asset; loss of national confidence and pride; and, most importantly, loss of human life. The Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) is used to identify risk contributors and their significance; thus, assisting management in determining how to reduce risk. In 2006, an overview of the SPRA Iteration 2.1 was presented at PSAM 8 [1]. Like all successful PRAs, the SPRA is a living PRA and has undergone revisions since PSAM 8. The latest revision to the SPRA is Iteration 3. 1, and it will not be the last as the Shuttle program progresses and more is learned. This paper discusses the SPRA scope, overall methodology, and results, as well as provides risk insights. The scope, assumptions, uncertainties, and limitations of this assessment provide risk-informed perspective to aid management s decision-making process. In addition, this paper compares the Iteration 3.1 analysis and results to the Iteration 2.1 analysis and results presented at PSAM 8

"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA

NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASAs International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included

Use of PRA in Shuttle Decision Making Process

How do you use PRA to support an operating program? This presentation will explore how the Shuttle Program Management has used the Shuttle PRA in its decision making process. It will reveal how the PRA has evolved from a tool used to evaluate Shuttle upgrades like Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) to a tool that supports Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) and real-time flight decisions. Specific examples of Shuttle Program decisions that have used the Shuttle PRA as input will be provided including how it was used in the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) manifest decision. It will discuss the importance of providing management with a clear presentation of the analysis, applicable assumptions and limitations, along with estimates of the uncertainty. This presentation will show how the use of PRA by the Shuttle Program has evolved overtime and how it has been used in the decision making process providing specific examples

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. There was at the time no viable technique to repair the orbiter s thermal protection system if it were to be damaged by debris during ascent. Furthermore in the event of damage, since the mission was not to the International Space Station, there was no safe haven for the crew to wait for an extended period of time for a rescue. The HST servicing mission was reconsidered because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for the astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damage thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of servicing mission, the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For HST there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue because of the limited consumables available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depends upon several factors including when a problem is identified, when and to what extent power down procedures are begun, and where the rescue vehicle is in its ground processing cycle. Severe power downs maximize crew rescue success but would eliminate the option for the orbiter servicing the HST to attempt a landing. Therefore, crew rescue success needed to be weighed against preserving the ability of the orbiter to have landing option in case there was a problem with the rescue vehicle. This paper focuses on quantification of the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down capabilities. That work supported NASA s decision to proceed with the HST service mission, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009