IMPROVING THE SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITION

Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

TAXATION, FINES, AND PRODUCER LIABILITY RULES: EFFICIENCY AND MARKET STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS

This paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety.Public Economics,

Slotting Allowances and Retail Product Variety under Oligopoly

Slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail market. The role of the practice and its effects on market efficiency are highly controversial. To date, the literature has focused on the effect of the practice on retail prices; however, slotting allowances also have the potential to alter the range of products available to consumers. Our analysis reveals that the strategic use of slotting allowances by oligopoly firms leads to a superior allocation of product variety among retailers. Indeed, absent price effects, we show that slotting allowances lead to the socially optimal provision of product variety.Slotting fees, vertical contracts, monopolization., Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, Marketing, L13, L14, L42, D43,

BACKWARD IMPLICIT CONTRACTS, PRE-COMMITMENT AND MARKET POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL DURUM WHEAT MARKET

We devise a formal test of market power that is applied to the international durum market. The model captures the asymmetric cost structure brought about the initial payment system of the Canadian Wheat Board. The model generates testable hypotheses about market conduct and optimal strategic positioning.Crop Production/Industries, Industrial Organization,

Product Liability, Entry Incentives, and Industry Structure

Industrial Organization,